The Dominion SATURDAY, APRIL 29, 1922. AN APPEAL TO FRANCE

Dominion, Volume 15, Issue 182, 29 April 1922, Page 6

The Dominion SATURDAY, APRIL 29, 1922. AN APPEAL TO FRANCE

The speech by Mr. Lloyd George which is reported to-day sums up as a powerfully-worded appeal to France not to wreck the Genoa Conference. As he is reported, the British Prime'Minister did not actually mention France—probably the,omission was deliberate but it is beyond doubt that he had France in mind in all he had to say about the terrible consequences that must be expected if the Conference should collapse or end in a deadlock. ' Even ’ those who feel most sympathy for France are bound to recognise that hope of re-establish-ing peace and settled order in Europe will vanish unless she is induced to abandon her present attitude. Carried to an ‘extreme, the policy she is. now pursuing—a policy of raising endless objections to proposals of accommodation and settlement—could only 5 result in breaking up the Allied group and leaving a Russo-German alliance as the most powerful combination in Europe. The Italian\ newspaper which affirmed a day or two ago that all illusions have /vanished and that an anti-French coalition is being formed, presumably ran ( well ahead of facts. Britain, certainly, is eager to reach' a good understanding' with France. Italy/ il may be hoped, is of the same mind, and the Czecho-Slovakian Premier has intimated that the small. Central European States constituting tho Little Entente are prepared to enter into an agreement with Franco subject to the previous conclusion of "the Franco-British convention which has been under discussion for some time past. Clcarlv, if France is isolated it will only be as a result of her own refusal of cooperation freely offered. If tffie goes to this insane extreme rather than agree to what she regards as unwarranted concessions ~to Germany and Russia only one outcome can be anticipated. With the Allied organisation broken up,.Russia and Germany would be free to wdrkS^/heir. will on the minor European States, and Europe would be plunged once again into ■a welter of war.

Manifestly in these conditions France’s last hope of exacting reparation from Germany woi-ld disappear and she would fco fortunate if she succeeded in maintaining her national independenbe. Yet there arp apparently definite grounds for the suggestion implied in Mk. Li.oyd George’s speech and- other recent indications'of French policy that France is, or professes to be, ready to invite such an outcome rather than agres to the concessions which are essential to the promotion of European peace and concord. At an immediate view, her disinclination to make the slightesf concession may be easily understood. Where reparations are concerned, she is able to point to an extreme contrast between her own poverty and Germany’s relative prosperity. Ten of the richest industrial departments in France were devastated by the German armies, while, not an acre of German soil suffered the same /fate. France’s external debt is. nearly twelve times as large as that of Germany; her internal debt is at least seven times greater. Taxation per head in Germany is onefourth -or less of the corresponding impost in France. Coal is twice as dear in. France as it is in Germany, and railway rates in the latter country are less than onehalf of those ruling in France. So the comparison might be continued. At almost every point in an economic survey, the advantage is with Germany, the beaten aggressor, and France, the victor, is staggering under crushing penalties No one can deny that France is entitled to press her reparations claim" against Germany tb the uttermost, and to take every practicable means of securing herself against future aggression by Germany, or by a Russo-German combination. At present, however, she is doing: neither of these things. Her obstructive attitude at Genoa threatens to destroy any hope she now has of obtaining the reparations and security to which she is so well entitled. It is obvious that the question of her awn security is involved in that of the general peace of Europe, and that any hope of establishing settled

peace in Europe is contingent upon loyal concerted action by the Allies. However unwilling France, under her present leaders, may be to face the facts, the self-same consideration dominates the question of reparations. The vital problem now raised is to reconcile France’s legitimate claims with the necessity for the policy of conciliation envisaged by Mr. Lloy'd George when he said: “Anybody who imagines you can permanently keep down these two great peoples (Russia and Germany), representing two-thirds of the people of Europe, must either be blind or blinkered.” Although much more is involved, it seems likely that the present crisis will be brought to a head over the question of reparations. Today’s cablegrams declare that Mr. Lloyd George is determined that the ,position in regard to reparations shall be discussed by the signatories to the Treaty of Versailles, and also that M. Poincare definitely states he cannot consent to this course. It is perhaps as well that the issue is thus plainly raised. Hitherto, as Dr. E. J. Dillon observed in a ; recent article in the Fortnightly Review,', the attitude of the other allied nations in discussing questions of treaty enforcement with France has been that: Tho Versailles Treaty, even when it postulates tho impossible, is to be held sacrosanct. In . this France’s allies are willing to humour her to the extent of respectini’ the instrument in words while blunting its edge before applying it. Now this lawyer’s device, common enough in the pre-war game of politics, is mischievous in an endeavour, claiming to be sincere and thorough to save the peoples of Europe by TCS te r_ ing mutual confidence among them. The occasion calls for clear thinking, plain speaking, and a firm resolve. A position has in fact been reached when nothing but plain. speaking will serve. It is manifest that France must modify her present attitude if the Genoa Conference is. to continue with any hope of ultimate success. • The outlook at the moment is unpromising, but even now it seems unthinkable that France will commit the tragic blunder of completely wrecking the Conference. Even by a policy of limited an 3 partial > obstruction such as she pursued at the Washington Conference, however, she may seriously retard European recovery and correspondingly! injure her own national interests.