The Dominion MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1921. THE BRITISH NAVAL PROGRAMME

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 305, 19 September 1921, Page 4

The Dominion MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 1921. THE BRITISH NAVAL PROGRAMME

An interesting, debate on British naval policy was heard in the House of Commons early in August, when estimates providing for the construction of four new capital ships were submitted and passed. The occasion, of course, was noteworthy in the opportunity it afforded for a plain definition of British naval policy on the eve of the Washington conference on the limitation of naval armaments. Of those who criticised the Government programme. a majority urged that it might well have been modified or postponed until the position and outlook had been tested at Washington, but something was heard also from those who believe that the day of the battleship is over. As to this last point, Mr. Amery, Financial Secretary to the Admiralty, observed thlat "the day of capital aircraft or of the capital submarine had not come yet, and until it came the capital surface ship would remain the kernel and pivot of naval warfare.” Mb. Asquith, while he questioned "whether in the circumstances of the moment it was necessary or even wise that we should commit ourselves to the construction of four new capital ships,” agreed that the consensus of opinion among the great naval Powers -was in favour of retention of the capital ship. In defending the policy of building the new ships,' Mr. Amery maintained that far from being one of competition or challenge, it was simply and solely one of replacing obsolete ships already relegated to the Disposals Board. Not only by the actual wear and tear of the war, but by the very experiences of the struggle, the Grand Fleet had become in a large measure obsolete in their hands. At this moment (ho added) there wero under construction a whole battle fleet of vessels of n type incomparably more powerful than anything afloat at the Battle of Jutland, and in the face of whose shattering shell-fire all ships of earlier design were liable to instant and complete destruction by the penetration of their magazines. Japan 'had eight of these vessels, one of which was already completed, and all of which would bo completed by 1925; and she had voted money for eight more to be completed by 1928. The United States, not counting four battleships of 32,600 tons, equipped with 16-inoh guns, vessels considerably more powerful than our latest types, the Royal Sovereignty and Queen Elizabeths . . . would It've completed by the end of 1924 or the beginning of 1925 no less than twelve of these supreme engines of war, each of over 43,000 ions In the case both of Japan and the United States, they were dealing not with projects, but with construction which was actually .in progress.

The new British ships nre to be battle-cruisers of the Hood type, with improvements in the matter of protection and avmaments, but, like all the American and Japanese ships laid down since the Hood, are to be armed with 16-inch instead of 15inch guns. The ships are to be of such dimensions as will obviatp the necessity of any larger docking or other accommodation being provided for them than that already existing. Mr. Amery declined to give even an approximate estimate of the cost of the new ships, but said he hoped they would not coet individually more than the Hood. That ship cost about £6,000,000, but during the debate Mr. Asquith said he supposed the total sum needed for the four new ships would not be much less than thirty millions sterling.

As construction programmes are now framed, the United States is building 13 capital ships of a later design that any vessel in the British Navy except the Hood, and 12 of the 16 are later than the Hood. Japan is building eight vessels later than the Hood, and has provided the money for eight more. It has been reported unofficially that Japan is willing to drop two battlecruisers from her capital ship programme “provided Britain and the United States make similar reduction.” Another recent message stated that Japan may agree to extend her building programme over a longer period than was originally contemplated. On the facts, it is manifest that the policy of laying down four capital ships this year is not in any way inconsistent with Britain’s declared readiness to enter into a mutual limitation of naval armaments. On the contrary, even with these four ships under construction, Britain will be to some extent imperilling the one-Power standard laid down by the Government, and endorsed by the Empire Cabinet. During the debate to which we have alluded, Mr. Winston Churchill told the House of Commons that delay for another year in providing for the replacement of obsolete capital ships would mean that Britain would find herself in a position of definite, and perhaps final, naval inferiority.

We should (ho ridded) continue on tho best possible terms with other naval Powers, but nevertheless we should continue as a Great Power only on sufferance. . . . Profound peace niny continue to rule in the world for many years, and it probably will, but during that period of peace everyone would know that Britain’s day was done, that our diplomacy was based upon fundamental i:>potency at home. . . . Everywhere it would be. known that the oceans which now unite the British Empire had become, instead of bonds of union, impassable gull's and abysses of senaralion. . . . Our late foes w<nild take it as the measure of their calculations v.hen we addressed to them counsels or representations. And what would our Dominions say, supposing we were to tell them “AVe cannot guard you. Wo can no moro extend that protection which hitherto it has always been our pride and boast to supply”? From tho discussion as a whole the fact emerges clearly that Britain is still setting an example of moderation to other naval Powers. Taking account of the relative value of preJutland and post-Jutland ships, those now provided for in Britain arc not even sufficient to balance the post-Jutland ships built or building for other navies. The Washington conference may show that the last word has not been said in regard to tho reduction of the American

and Japanese construction programmes. But unless America and Japan agree to scrap capital ships already under construction, Britain must carry out her present programme, with some additions, or sink to the second or even third place among naval Powers. It is evident than she is still well placed to press for a maximum mutual limitation of naval armaments.