The Dominion TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1921. THE ARMAMENTS PROBLEM

Dominion, Volume 14, Issue 300, 13 September 1921, Page 4

The Dominion TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1921. THE ARMAMENTS PROBLEM

Much as people in many x countries will sympathise with 'Lord Robert Cecil in his desire that the League of Nations should endeavour to bring about an immediate reduction of armaments, it must be recognised that in his answering remarks Mr. Balfour laid no more than just emphasis on the obstacles that stand in the way. It is, as he said, difficult to limit the manufacture of war material when certain countries do not belong to the League, and refuse to Miscuss the matter. The League,, of course, would be very much better placed to deal with this question if America became a member, but even if America were enrolled the present state of Russia would set definite limits for the. time being to any general plan for the limitation of armaments. Russia under the present regime is a disturbing; influence in Europe and apart from the fact that the Bolshevik armies are a standing menace to the smaller States of Eastern Europe, it cannot be ignored that the /existence of these armies to some extent nullifies the security France and other countries would otherwise derive from the measure of disarmament imposed on Germany. So long as there is even a possibility of the Russian ‘armies being organised ..under German\ leadership, France,' at least, is bound to take precautions. It may be hoped that in time Russia will 'recover civilised standards, but until she does there can be no general and unimpeded progress in limiting armaments. The League of Nations itself and organisations formed to strengthen and support it are giving earnest consideration to this ■ great question. For instance, a committee of the British League .of Nations Union recommended recently that the League should bo urged to find out from its members what armaments they required for:

(1) Preserving order-at home. (2) Preserving order in and protecting colonics and dependencies', ami. protecting them from attack by savages. (3) Protecting themselves generally from external aggression bjs rival States and enforcing international obligations by common action. This questionnaire (the committee suggested) should he accompanied by figures showing the armaments laid down for Germany, for preserving order at home, by the Treaty of Versailles, and pointing out that modern civilised States ought not to i require , relatively larger armies than these. With these facts it should bf? possible to arrive at a basis for general reduction all round of forces required' to protect countries against external aggression.

The question of action on these or similar lines was under consideration by a Commission' of the League of Nations when the latest offrcial .reports received by mail were issued. While it nfay be hoped that these a nd other activities by the League will ultimately yield results, it is quite , plain that the time has not arrived when it is possible to promote a general programme of armaments limitation. The menace of Bolshevik militarism 'affects different countries in a varying degree, and this in itself makes a uniform limitation of armaments impracticable. These difficulties, however, make it all the more'imperatively necessary that progress should be made where it is possible. That definite limits are set for tho time being docs not make it any less true that the nations "must learn or perish,” where the expenditure of national resources on armaments is concerned. Looking at matters from this standpoint it is manifest that the best hope of an immediate and important forward step in limiting armaments centres, not in the League of Nations, but in tho international conference which is to assemble shortly at Washington. This conference will ■be called upon to deal with complex and perplexing problems, but it is a saving fact in the situation that these problems are in a great measure separate and distinct from tho general tangle of world affairs, and that their solution depends mainly upon the. readiness and ability of the three leading naval Pow-ers-Britain, America, and Japan—to find a basis of agreement. Tho prospects of such an agreement appear in their most hopeful light when it is considered that it is impeded by no such obstacles as for the moment make a general limitation of armaments impracticable in Europe. Although France and Italy are to participate, the three naval Powers are unquestionably, in a position to determine for themselves whether they are at once to cub down their own naval burdens and give the only really bold lead

in limiting armaments that.is feasible for tho time being. Far as wo arc from having attained the condition of “a tranquil pacific world,” there are reasonably open, though not, of course, assured, prospects' of a progress by stages which will gradually relieve the world of the crushing burden of competitive armaments. There is no possibility meantime of promoting a uniform and universal limitation of armaments, but if every opportunity of making progress where it is possible is turned to account, the goal may yet be reached. The Washington conference promises to test the situation decisively. Its failure would imply that even the most advanced nations were unable to take hold of the commanding truth that nations must learn to live in friendship or perish. On the other hand its success would go far to compensate for the harm done by the refusal qf the United States to co-operate with other countries in the League of Nations. Apart from its vital bearing on Pacific /affairs, an agreement at Washington would strengthen and vindicate the League by giving effective, practical expression to the principles for which it stands, and enable its member-nations to press forward in new confidence towards the goal of h universal limitation ■of armaments.