INNER HISTORY OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 12, Issue 215, 5 June 1919, Page 5

INNER HISTORY OF THE WAR

ANOTHER CHAPTER FROM FRENCH'S BOOK

MR. ASQUITH'S REPLY (By Telegraph-Press Asgociation-Copyrißkt (lice. June 4, 9.30 p.m.) . London, May 23 (delayed). Lord French, in a further article m tho "Daily Telegraph," states: ''In September I formed the opinion that it was extremely desirable to push towards the coast and northward, and drive the Germans from the sea. Mr. Churchill enthusiastically supported mo, and promised absolutely devastating naval support." He (Lord French) anticipated that Marshal Jolfre and tho French Government would opposo tho plan, Mr, Churchill on December 8 wrote slating that Lord Kitchener fully agreed with tho plan, promising to send the Twentyseventh Division. Cabinet next day strongly urged the plan upon the French Government, which referred the question to Marshal Joifre. Ho rejected it, as he had another plan elsewhere; "which," says Lord French, "proved a very feeble substitute." Mr. Churchill continued to press the matter, urging Lord French again to put the Admiralty's views before Marshal .Toffre. Lord Kitchener, in a memorandum of .January 9, 1915, showed that the War Council had abandoned the advance on the const, on the grounds that it would be 100 costly and would extend the line too far. Heavy reinforcements could not be furnished with'out disorganising the general arrangements, and a sufficient supply of ammunition wa-s not available to ensure tho carrying through of tho project (0 a conclusion, though every effort was being made in all parts of the world in order to obtain an unlimited supply.' The War Council also anticipated a strong Ger. man attack in the near future, which could better be resisted in the existing prepared positions.

Lord French disagrees with these objections seriatim, and mentions that large train loads of ammunition Uaversed Franco a few months later, bound i'oi the Dardanelles. He considers these reasons for rejecting the plan for Iho coastal attack illogical. Probably, he goes on, the truo explanation was to be found in the War Council's memorandum of Jannary !>, in which the view-was expressed that the operations on the West front would probably develop into a stalemate. It was necessary to find another theatre of war where decisive results might be. obtained. His opinion was iuvitcd on the matter, and he replied, dicussing nil the possible theories, including Gallinoli. lie said that an attack on Turkey would ho devoid of any decisive results. The only decisive theatre was Germany' itself. He added: "It is quite feasible to break the German lino with a sufficiency ol guns and high explosive shells. .In aiij case it would be .unsafe to withdraw troops from the Western front, which is vital, and where alone decisive results are obtainable."

Marshal Joffre expressed his final opinion on May 19, 1915, that it was necessary to be prepared for a German offensive in the near future. The front must 'bo mado absolutely secure. The Allies must be ready to assume the offensive. Deserves were absolutely necessary, and all tho secondary operations, including'Mhe Flanders coast attack, must give wav to that. Lord French concludes that he always disagreed with these views, and remains convinced that his plan should have been accepted and tried, whereas those actually employed only resulted in feeble and unsuccessful attempts to break tho Ger man line, and absolute failure at th( Dardanelles!—Aus.-N.Z. Cable Assn.