RUSSIA AND THE OUTLOOK

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 58, 1 December 1917, Page 8

RUSSIA AND THE OUTLOOK

It is obvious enough that the present course of events in Russia will probably enable the enemy to transfer a considerable. t .bqdy of force-' from the East front to other theatres. Whether the existing balance of strength in these' theatres will as a result bo disturbed as seriously as some of to-day's cablegrams suggest is distinctly open to doubt. The Daily Mail, for instance, estimates that there are 120 enemy divisions on the East front, the majority of which will probably soon be transferred to the West front, with "masses of artillery": .we have been reminded also that Russia -holds 1,700,000 Austro-German prisoners, and on the whole there is a popular tendency at the moment to suggest that tho Bolshevik peace move will enable Germany to mass enormous additional forces in the West with a view to a mighty effort to reverse the trend of the war in that all-im-portant theatre; This estimate of. the outlook is unconvincing. It ignores a, whole series of_ factors modifying a state of affairs which admittedly turns to an appreciable extent to the advantage of the enemy. In the first place, it is far from certain that the enemy's present strength, on the East front is as great as somo reports infer. For months past the Western Allies and the Italians have mentioned the appearance on their fronts of troops transferred from Russia, and evi, ■deuce to the'same effect has appeared in the nature of the operations' •on the East front.- The /Russians have suffered'a succession of defeats and disasters, not under •pressure of, superior forces, but" as a result 61 their own demoralisation _ and the political disorders behind their lines. It is stated that when the Russians abandoned Riga they had immediately available twice the force the ■ enemy' coukUnuster on that'part of the front. Similar Recounts are given of other areas in tho Eastern theatre in which the enemy has contrived to advance his lines this year, 'and the limited character of his operations and Ins! •failure' to profit by tempting opportunities, as when ho captured Ucrnowitz, and later when he mastered the Gulf of Riga, are also decidedly \suggcstivc. While there is' every reason to believe that tho enemy has already reduced his forces on the East front to a point far below their former strength, it is to be observed also that he has no visible prospect cither of being able to withdraw the whole of his remaining troops or to recover anything like the Avholc number of Austrian and German prisoners imprisoned in Russia. AVhat tho precise outcome of the Bolshevik peace over: hires will be is-a ■somewhat open question-,: but it '.is tolerably certain that it will not be-a.state of affairs enabling tho Central Powers to ignore Russia in their future military measures. Russia's prospects of playing any'considcrablc part as a belligerent have been steadily receding, but' powerful parties _ will undoubtedly repudiate the 'dishonourable peace which Lenin and' his gang are intent on' concluding. As Colonel Repington observes, thero arc still important elements of resistance in Russia, and to-day's messages indicate clearly enough the limited and unstable nature of the control exercised by the Provisional Government. A nominal peace may be concluded, but it will not put an end to serious internal strife, which must' continue until Russia has de--1 finitely broken into fragments or has regained her standing as a nation. Meantime it seems fairly safe to assume that .a considerable pro-' portion of the enemy prisoners in Russia will be safely hold, and that conditions in Russia for some timo to come will make it imperatively necessary that, the Central Empires should maintain an effectual militar,\\ barrier between that country and yhcir own territory. The possibility that Russia may revive under a. dictatorship is not to be ignored, .but in. any'case the enemy Powers have- potent- political rca-. sons for maintaining such a barrier. Much as they desire to obtain material supplies from Russia,, they assuredly desire nothing less than an importation of' Russian political doctrines. The political distempers rife in Russia are essentially infectious, and- in Ihe Dual Monarchy, if not in Germany, they would be apt to find a fruitful, Riven already by internal dissensions and swamped in war-weariness., the _ Dual Monarchy is in no condition to withstand such an invasion of disorders as free contact with Russia would involve. Disclosed particulars of the negotiations under way indicate that the enemy Powers are decidedly apprehensive about coming into more intimate relations with Russia in her present wild reaction from autocracy, and it-seems highly probable that .apprehension on this point .is in itself'.sufficient to in-duce-them to keep Russia at arm's ■length-in the only practicable way--i-by maintaining a military .screen. Taking due account, of these and

other facts, it seems reasonable to conclude that though the Central Powers may contrive to withdraw further forces from Ritissia and possibly to secure the release- of some prisoners, they are unlikely to obtain in this way anything like tho' measure of relief and opportunity that alarmist reports on the subject would biggest. The transfer of enemy strength from tho East front to the Western theatre is not n new development. It has been,'as stated, under way for. a long time past without enabling the enemy to apl preciably alter the adverse balance which points to his ultimate defeat, or to stem the-.stcady progress of .tho Allied offensive which coip pels him to pour out his strength inmen and material at an ever:incrcasing rate. That the transfer'of strength from Russia' to the West front will enable the enemy to,successfully challenge the Allies cVon' in their present strength, and with American "military' aid still 'in. prospec.t,. is a contingency that need hardly be considered. That a dcfra.ite.accession of strength will enable, the enemy to retard in some degree the progress of the Allied offensive goes, however, without saying, and this in itself raises serious pros:' poets.. It is above all. because it promises to assist .the,enemy . in lengthening out the- war that the unfavourable turn of events in Rus-. sia makes a very plain demand for intensified effort on the part of the Allies. To suppose.that Germany will squander whatever additional forces she is enabled, to withdraw from Russia in a mad attempt to overwhelm the Western Allies is to suppose that she will play directly into her enemy's' hands. The time, has long passed-when she had prospects of winning a military'decision in tho WcsJ, and the relief she is gaining in Russia will hardly revive these prospects. B.ut it will assist her to.spin out her defence-in the. main theatre, of which Italy has. now become "an integral part, and it may enable her to undertake new enterprises of recovery-and aggression in secondary theatres, including Turkey.' Setting; aside all alarmist and'fantastic estimates of the situation,, .it is still ■manifest.-.that it has taken a turn which the Allies must meet bv augmented efforts, and, above all, by facing with unfa terming determination the prospect ot the prolongation of;-the war. ;