The Dominion. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1917. ITALY'S HOUR OF TRIAL

Dominion, Volume 11, Issue 36, 6 November 1917, Page 4

The Dominion. TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 6, 1917. ITALY'S HOUR OF TRIAL

['. Nothing better deserves attention in the current news relating to Italy than an extract from an article by General Corsi, published in the Homo , Tribiina. ''It seems certain," General Corsi remarks, "that the enemy's strategical position in the Friuli Plain will compel him to accept battle on a large scale." This gives duo prominence to an aspect of the situation which up to tho ■present has commanded little attention. Hitherto everything else has been overshadowed by the disastrous defeat of the Italian offensive campaign and the terrible losses which have accompanied this defeat, but the outlook is appreciably widened now that it is clearly established that the Italians have effected an orderly retreat. It is only too plain that the enemy has won a success of magnitude—perhaps the greatest success won at a given cost in the whole course of the war—but ho is opposed still by an army and not by a rabble. The Italian armies undoubtedly are very ably led, and reports declare that their lato defeats have loffc them unbroken in spirit. Assuming so much and remembering that Franco and Britain are- drawing freely upon their resources to make good what is now wanting in Italy's military organisation, it is well within the facts to say that the military situation as it is taking shape on the northeastern plains of Italy presents extremely critical features from tho enomy'B standpoint as well as from that of Italy. What the enemy has already accomplished in his action against Italy is in plain sight. He has utterly wrecked the Italian otfensivo campaign, which was within measurable distance of achieving results fatal to the Austro-German alliance. Whether or not German reports relating to prisoners are exaggerated, the losses of tho Italians in men since the retreat began have certainly been out of all proportion to those of the enemy, and it is likely that tho Italian losses in material have been, from the military standpoint, even, more serious. General Coesi points out that the evacuated zone was tho main Italian sunplv base, and contained munition depots and other stores accumulated for the winter campaign It may bo taken ior granted that only a, comparatively Email part ol this material was saved, and that much the larger part had to be destroyed. So far the disastrous aspect of affairs is redeemed only.by tho heroism of the Italian covering troops and rearguards, which set limits to tho enemy's success and to the volume of his captures, but it does not necessarily follow that the campaign will continue to develop nn these lines. The point which is. usfJyernpWsedbytSENEEALCoßSl is that the enemy cannot afford to rest upon his present success.. Iho hopo of extending his gains is not his only incentive to persevere in his attack on tho Italians. Ho has an even stronger incentive in tho fact that it would be ntho -highest degree perilous to settle down on the lino ho has n ™ r o '™, m/irl Tho area of conflict has shitted from mountain country, which favoured an economical defensive, into an area consisting largely of open nln in If the offensive were halted ftis point and the invading armies settled down to face the Italians across the Taghamenoth enemy would be inviting disasta next year. Germany ™Q * cn £ fkhting America as well as Fiance and Britain in tho Western theatre, and if the Austnans m these ciitho Italians on the Friuli llarn +W would be apt to find the as&T rendered them by Germany thtyear a "gift from the Greeks Tookintr at matters from tnis constitute a deadly danger if the armies of tho Dual Monarchy were commuted to an indefinite struggle onT Italian lowland Organised at leisure to that end the mountain ranges and plateaux east °f the Isonzo were an immensely formidable defensive barrier, but armies retiring hurriedly into tho mountains encumbered .with heavy arEy and all the other impedimenta of modern war, would in all Lunch, in the first instance again t the Tagliamento line. But if lliw means that a critical situation ev kts for Italy, it is equally true £ there are only two obvious ways in which the enemy can make his 1 tion in tho Italian theatre S Oneißtoeliminate'ltalyas a actor in tho war. The other is to retire as speedily as may be into he mountain country rom which he has emerged.. It is already fanlv evident tW it was with a clear perception of these possibilities that General Oadorna ordered and conducted his retreat The mountain front to which he had advanced beinE once broken, an attempt to restore it would have involved a desperate gamble. Taking account only of tho difficulties of cross-communi-cation in tho high country,, an attempt to stem the enemy s .immediate onset would have invited not such a defeat as the Italians have suffered, but irretrievable disaster. There is littlo doubt that history will applaud tho decision at which General Cadoena arrived. . Tho chances of a successful stand in the mountain country were- at best problematical; possibly they did not exist. Tho retreat which General Cadorna preferred to this hazardous gamble appears to have been carried out in a fashion which bears witness to his own skill and to tho steady courage of the mass of the armies under his command. Weakened as they are, the Italian armies are infinitely better placed to-day than they would havo been if they had been led by a commander lacking the qualities which enabled General Cadorna to make bold sacrifices in a critical emergency The fruits of his policy ap•pear already in the fact that his armies arc in unbroken array and are facing the enemy on a lino whero they will fight under no other handicap than that arising from tho losses they have suffered. It is not extravagant to assume that this was not the state of affairs which the Austro-Germans hoped to create when they struck their carefullyplanned blow in tho Tolinino sector. Against their losses the Italians aro able to set the fact that

they aro in a position to obtain and to derivo the maximum benefit from reinforcements. The enemy thus far has enjoyed a. triumphal progress, but, _ for tho reasons which have been discussed, ho is now under the necessity of weighing very seriously the consequences of failure and success. It is to be noted that a further partial success gained by the enemy would not transform tho situation as it has been outlined. Tho essential fact is that tho Austro-Gcrmans must either overwhelm Italy or halt at a point of indecisive success inviting ultimately a state of affairs only less perilous from their point of view than that which has been dissipated by their success east of the Isonzo. Tho situation has been considered here only in its military aspect, but in regard to the spirit and resolution of the Italian nation, upon which, at bottom, the fate of the campaign depends, reports arc decidedly reassuring. Tho weight of evidence is that tho peril of tho cnomy invasion, and the knowledge that German armies aro repeating in Italian provinces tho unspeakable atrocities of which they woro first guilty in Belgium, have roused the Italian nation, and armies to now efforts and stiffened their resolution. Treachery undoubtedly had a part in the Italian disaster, but though its first stroko was deadly it seems to have withered in tho light of day. Even BigNOE Giolitti, no true friend of Italian freedom, is now_ swelling tho chorus of determination to assist tho new Government to save the nation. His attitude is assuredly not without significance as an indication of the prevailing spirit. Thcro aro on tho whole ample grounds for a belief that tho loyal determination of her. own people and armies and the assistance of her Allies may enable Italy to recover all that sho has lost and continue to play a great part in tho war.