PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 9, Issue 2669, 15 January 1916, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Some definite light is thrown upon the position in the Balkans by the news that the Allies have blown up railway bridges at Demirhissar and Kilindir. This is official news, and it implies nothing less than that thepossibility of an enemy attack upon the Salonika lines, .oven of'such a converging attack as is_ spoken of in one nlessage to-day, is seriously regarded by the Allied commanders. Both' the places mentioned are in the northern part of Greek Macedonia, near tho Bulgarian frontier, and they stand, not upon the main railway, which runs down the Vardar Valley toj Salonika, but upon the line by which the latter place is linked up with Constantinople. So far as the immediate aspects of'the campaign are this line represents an alternative approach to Salonika from Bulgaria. Demirhissar, 45 miles north-east of Salonika, and 15 miles south of the Bulgarian frontier, is the point at which this railway is crossed by a main road running south from Sofia, the road down the Struma Valley. Kilindir lies almost due north of Salonika at a distance of 35 miles. It is a junction from which a short branch line connects the Salonika-Constantinople railway with the maiu line down the Vardar Valley to the west- At some points betwen Kilindir and Demirhissar the Salonika-Constantinople railway runs within about five miles of the Bulgarian frontier. _ Destroying railway bridges at Demirhissar and Kilindir, the Allies have put out of action for the time being a military transport route which would bo very useful to the enemy if he attempted an attack^upon^Salonika. This is the most definite evidence yet afforded that an attack on Salonika is contemplated by the enemy. It. gives colour to unofficial messages to-day in which preparations for such an attack are described, while the statement of the Daily Mail correspondent at Athens, that information indicates simultaneous enemy attacks on Mesopotamia and Egypt, with probably a diversion in Macedonia, is correspondingly discredited. Whatever the plans of the enemy may he regarding Mesopotamia and Egypt, tho action of the Allies in destroy-, ing railway bridges , clearly implies an opinion on their part that _ the _ enemy meditates no diversion in Macedonia, but a serious attack 011 tho Salonika lines.- Consideration for

Greek property and regard for their own future convenience would equally have restrained them from this action had they not considered such an attack at least probable. Big railway bridges like that destroyed at Demirhissar are not to be restored in a day, and when the Allies ultimately assume the offensive they are likely to stand in need of both the Demirhissar and Kilindir bridges, representing as they do essential links in two of the three great military avenues through the Balkans to which access is to D 3 had from Salonika. When the Allies retreated from Serbian Macedonia they blew up tunnels and bridges on the Vardar line, but this affords no true precedent for their latest action. The section of 'the Vardar railway which was damaged as much as possible runs through territory which had been resigned for the time being to the enemy. The Demirhissar and Kilindir bridges are'in Greek territory, which so far as is known has not yet been entered by the enemy, and the destruction of these bridge? means not only that the Allies expect an attack, but that thoy expect the enemy to advance over the Greek frontier considerably to the east of the Vardar Yalley.

This in its turn would imply that the. Greeks intend to leave their northern frontier open to the passago of the enemy, not only the Vardar Valley, but at otljer strategic points further oast. F.rom this standpoint the destruction of the bridges on the eastern railway does not appear to be a favourable symptom nf the Greek attitude and the trend of Greek policy, but in this respect it is something less than conclusive. If the Greeks are not prepare'.! to take risks by' defending their northern frontier they are apparently freely granting all possible facilities to the Allies. Both Kilindir and' LVmirhissar lie a long way outside th > Allied lines at Salonika, t»nd eyen i f the Allies aye maintain? ing outposts right up to thp frontier they, can scaicely be in a position to assevt themselves in these outlying districts There is a Greek army located at Seres, onlv about 15 miles away -from Demirhissar, and the latter piste itself would naturally be uudtir clost {juard, since it is one of the most important strategic points in Northern Greece. On all grounds it is practically certain that the destruction of the bridges must have been carried out with the consent or connivance of the Greek Government, and this consideration must materially modify the conclusion, also implied, that the Greeks do not themselves intend to close, the eastern section of their northern frontier any more than the Vardar lijie, against an enemy crossing'

A clear line must be drawn between the official news which implies that the possibility of an enemy advance into Greek Macedonia east of the Vardar is seriously regarded by the Allies, and the unofficial news which speaks of maturing preparations for a converging advance into Grcece by three separate enemy armies. It need not now bp doubted that the enemy is heavily concentrating on the Greek frontier, but the converging attack from : three sides mentioned in the unofficial news, would imply ,that the enemy contemplates an' advance along the Monastir Railway from Western Macedonia, as weir as by the Vardar line and the route from the east. Even with the tentative evidence now afforded that the Greeks do not intend to oppose an enemy advance by way of Demirhissar, it is difficult to believe that they will be equally complaisant where the Monastir route is concerned. Eetiring everywhere- from their northern frontier, they would lay .-the whole of their northern territory open to enemy occupation, together with the larger part of their'railway system. It is hardly likely that- they will voluntarily submit to such a strangle-hold as would thus be involved. Even where Greece is concerned, there are limits to the policy of refraining from action in order to preserve liberty of action. x it * * Taking it that the Allies anticipate ai\ early advance against Salonika and have set themselves to delay the enemy's approach the interesting question arises; Where is the enemy to find the army capable of delivering the formidable attack thus'implied'! It has been unofficially stated that the Allies have over 200,000 men at Salonika, and the length of their entreuched line in "itself suggests that thoy are in very strong force. Considering the burdens 'already imposed upon Bulgaria, she should be unable to find more than s portiou of the total force required. Unless the success of the Russian southern offensive in diverting Austro-German < strength from the Balkans has been exaggerated, the Central Powers can hardly be in a position to make good the deficiency with their own troops. The possibility remains that Germany may "contemplate using Turks against" Salonika. Reasons, which have been frequently traversod, exist for doubting whether it is feasible to make use of the Ottoman trob.ps in this service, but_ at the moment there are fairly positive indications that the Allies are faced by a serious threat of assault at Salonika,, and it is difficult to see how Germany -can give effect to the threat except by drawing upon the considr erable reserves of men which Turkey undoubtedly possesses.

Whaiever the-actual position of the enemy may be as regards available forces, -it is evidently in the interests of the Allies to stave off attack at Salonika as long as possible. If the Allied force at Salonika were non-existent the enemy would no doubt bo concentrating upon preparations for an attack on the Suez Canal. ITow .his attention is divided. He cannot afford to ignore the threat to his vital communications from Salonika, and perhaps even considors it necessary to postpone execution of his designs against Egypt until he has eliminated this danger. Salonika, in a word, is an advanced defence of Egypt, and in addition each advancing week brinjgs the enemy nearer to the time when he will have to choose between dividing his available forces in order to attack the Suez Canal and Salonika simultaneously, or givo up his Egyptian project, in order to concentrate in resistance to an Allied offensive in tho Balkans. e » * ■ The opinion has hitherto been fairly general that a Turkish attack on the Suez Canal may take shape at any 'time, but an opposite view is stated by Mb. Hilaire Beli.oc in an article in Land and Water, from which some extracts arc cabled to-day. Mr. Belloc, who speaks perhaps from special infoiv mution, is of opinion that soma of tho half million Turks he thinks.

will be employed against. Egypt cannot be equipped before the summer. This, for what it is worth, strengthens the possibility that the Germans may rae&ntiiui} employ some of their available Turkish reserves against Salonika. They would thus risk forces >vhich will be needed for the contemplated attack on Egypt, but unless they can eject the Allies from Salonika, the attack on Egypt will be a very risky enterprise. _ If the Allies remain unshaken in Greece it is distinctly possible that the half million Turks of whom Mr. Belloc speaks will fine} serious work nearer home than the Suez Canal before much of the summer has passed over their heads. • * » * evidence that reports of the Kaiser's serious illness have not been exaggerated is to be found in the announcement that the Imperial Chancellor 'opened the Prussian Diet on his behalf. Here Be'thjiann-Hollweq seems to have played his part well, and talked as blatantly as the Kaiser iliimsclf could have done, but/even in his bombast he must have been' acutely conscious that anything he might .say would be completely transoended in interest by the fact his presence portended—that the King of Prussia was unable to be present to open his Diet. Another indication that the Kaiser is in serious plight is supplied in the news that the Queen •of Greece, his sister, has been summoned to Berlin. ■< * * No material change is reported on the Western front. Various minor attacks by the Germans have been repelled, and the Allied bombardment of the enemy lines, it is reported, has been very violent. Evidently if the enemy is bent upon developing an attack of serious proportions he has not yet succeeded in doing so.