RUSSIA IN RETREAT

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2558, 4 September 1915, Page 9

RUSSIA IN RETREAT

— 9 A PRECEDENT FROM 1812 •_ 1 ■■■"'■■■ '1 THE LURE OF SPACE .] 1 (By Ronald M'Neill, M.P.J in the Lon- , don "Morning Post" of July 10.) The hopes that were raised by tho 1 Russian advance in tho' spring to the crest of the Carpathians have been dis- : appointed, but those peoplo who have - been mado, despondent by the. retreat : should study the famous precedent of : 1812, and take courage in the reflection 1 that the present Russian generalissimo is pursuing a traditional Russian strategy, which so far he has. conducted with masterly skill. He is using that most potent of Russian weapons, the lure of space. He must know by heart every detail of the memorable retreat that destroyed Napoleon's Grand Army, and ho doubtless feels some confidence that strategy which overcame Napoleon will prove, the undoing of Mackensen. But whilo the great example of 1812 must be an inspiration and encouragement to the Grand Duko Nicholas, and, wo may hope, to tho instructed portion of the Russian people, the authors of it had no. notion, when they 'were retiring before Napoleon that the methods they were forced reluctantly- to adopt were to prove a decisive-turning-poirit in the European confiiot of a hundred years ago, nor that'they would become a classical model of Fabian policy for Russian strategy of the future. It is true that Wellington had already, shown in the Peninsula how baffling to the enemy such a policy might be made, but it was {the force of circumstances and not the inspiration of genius that'led the.Russian generals to lure the French Emperor to'his ruin. Nor was ■ their' 1 retirement viewed with favour by any means at the time, either by the Russian Government or the Russian people,.who,',when .they saw Barclay de Tolly'. abandon I .one position after another—just asi the' Russian Army has retired in the last; few weeks:;from tho Dunajctz to the San and from the; San. to one; tributary of the Dniester after another—raised an agitation for his removal, , which led to - his supersession by.Kutusoff just before;.t-ho battle of Borodino. - ■ A Hundred Years. Ago. ' ; The country into which Marshal von Mackensen'is now. driving, his phalanx is even more: hazardous to ari invader than- that which Napoleon . entered in the ' summer of 1812. It " is true, indeed, that unless the German .'advance', can be checked, it may become imperative for- the Grand .Duke temporarily to sacrifice .Warsaw 'and withdraw hisarmy from Vistula, to 1 tho Bug. But ■beyondtho line of tho latter river. it is practically, impossible for the invading troops to eontinuo their , advance in -a north-easterly i direction.' ■ Even -if ' Mackensen ■ were to' succeed in his ob- • ject of -driving a 1 wedgo : between the Russian armies iri Galicia and those on the Middle.-VistulaJ' th'at'i wedge could . not take advant-age 'of : tho gap so made ; without plunging iiito the impenetrablo district : of, the' Pinsk Marslics,; which stretch; on both: sides.-'.'of tho; River Pripet over the wholo of tho immenso area between the Bug and the Dnieper. Napoleon's invasion.; of Russia left these marshos to t-h'o' south of -his ad,vanco. • Before' the campaign opened,the Emperor, was already in. possession of.-all, and more-.ihari all, 1 the territory which tho Gerriians';have '-taken. eleven months, of war to gairi and -hold;.' His . arniies'were , assembled ori the "line of tho Niemen, which 1 was crossed 011 June - A. Russian Corps, .under- Princo Bagration,. wa«.UhGh;.iiear tlio Tiver to the . south of Grodno,: .'but.: tlio nisiin army, commanded by Barclay de Tolly, was ' concentrated round Viina, . about 50 miles '.further to tlio; oast;, It was towards' this latter pcin.t that Napoleon, in'command ■ of .tho main French army,- du'ected }iis march, while away ' :on the right his brother Jerome pushed forward through Grodno, in the endeavour to . engage Bagration's corps and cut it off frbm Barclay's army further . north;. Both these attempts to. bring about rapid, dccisivo results were frustrated by, the retirement 'oftlio Russians to 1 avoid a pitched battle , against overwhelming', superiority 1 of numbers, while "they worried and delayed the enemy's .progress,; just as they 'are'doing to-day, by stubborn rearguard actions and -the- skilful handling cavalry; ; When;' Napoleon : .Vilna, ' on: June 28,';. he found it' '..evacuated. -Barclay/was well on his way to Drissa, wliero a'-defensive position, on the ; model. of Torres Vcdras, had been prepared on the: banks of the Dwina; Bagration had iat the same time made good his retreat in a' due easterly direction to Mogilef, on the .Dnieper,-,pursued by Davout, by whom Jerome Bonaparte had heen superseded.; A Croat Retreat. ' The Russian, retreat before the French had now covered a distance of about two hundred'miles, the -same distance, roughly, as their present retirement before tho Germans, from'the Dunajetz to the Zlota 1 Lipa.". Thoir main armies, moreover, were some two hundred miles . apart, ,thus l apparently, offering, a splendid opportunity for the essentially Napoleonic tactics of defeat in detail; Our :own -feelings to-day enable ,us to imagine what contemporary Europe would have thought of 'tho' situation in July, 1812, if information' had then been obtainabls from day to day of the profress of events.';-. .They had not then the nowlcdge which we have of' what the great retreat was to accomplish, and it ' i 3 not surprising that the Russian Gov- : ernmont and'. people were seriously alarmed' by Napoleon's - apparently re- , sistless advance'into the heart of their country. Yet,: in reality, -the retreat .was.'.-only-beginning. Barclay, making no use of:the -lines of Drissa, retired through Vitebsk to the south-east, and the simultaneous march of Bagration I from Mogilef to the north-east, brought the two armies together at Smolensk, on "August 3. ' ■ ' ■ ■ At Smolensk it was the intention of tho Russian Generals, who now ihad' a compact army of 120,000 men, to 6tand 1 and give battle to the French. Fortunately, as wo;inay now beliove, this in- , tention was frustrated by mismanagement. An abortive advance to meet the approaching enemy was abandoned, and 1 after retiring again to the town, the 1 Russian columus deployed for action be- ■ hind-tho Dnieper. Siriolensk was gal- • lantly, defended against a French at--1 tack on August 16, but the Russian re- • treat was once more continued by , on the 17th; and during the following 1 three weeks persistent rearguard actions ; covering nocturnal retirement harassed ■ the invader and depleted his ranks, , without ever allowing opportunity fori a decisive general engagemerit. By 1 the beginning of 1 September, Napoleon 1 had advanced no less than 500 miles I east of the 'Niemen, without sufferipg a i reverse, and 1 110 was approaching within 1 a hundred miles of the ancient capital ' of Russia. No wondor the dissatisfao I tion, amounting to consternation, at St. Petersburg grew to such ft pitch that ' tho appointment of a new leader of- the ' Russian Army became imperative. Kut--1 usoff, who replaced Barclay de Tolly, ■ felt bound under thoso'circumstnaces to -. fight a great battle in defenco of Mos- • cow. He was beaten at ,Borodino, hut i ho succecded in extricating his army, > after it had infiictcd! a loss on the 1 French not much less severe than his I own. Hhe occupation of Moscow fol- ' lowed on September 14. The great R-us- : sian retreat was at an end. 'The lnem- ' orable burning of tho city, and tho > Tsar's refusal to negotiate,' left ,310 : choice to the greatest soldier of all time ' hut thftt' terrible rotraqiug of bis ntcpu -!.to. CsraiaAi!; ia.the .lata. Autuma tuid!.jyinv

ter months, which destroyed his incomparable army, and led eventually to his own final downfall. The Way to Waterloo. The Russian generals in 1812 were men of mediocrity, but in conducting the famous retreat they -wrought better than they knew. In the present, war tho Grand Duke Nicholas has proved himself incomparably superior as a solaior to Prince Bagration or Barclay de Tolly. But who can doubt that he has diligently studied 1 every move they blunderingly mado in eriticitig Napoleon . over the 600 miles which he had to traverse . at the bead of the Grand Army from Grodno to Moscow? The strategy and tactics pursued by tho Russian armies in Galicia during the past two months point to a deliberate following of and improvement upon the groat j example; The fighting, indeed, has heen ■ infinitely more fierce'than - anything , Napoleon encountered until he reached , Borodino. • But the method has been , the same—-rearguard actions'foujjht just stubbornly enough to cover retirement to a new position; avoidance of engage- ; irients which- could yield to tho enemy decisive results; wise disregard of merely. political or geographical considerations, and the concentration .of all energy, on tho one purpose of maintaining military cohesion while subjecting the invader to the maximum of punishment. The French Emperor in 1812 was no doubt hampered by deficiencies of transport and supply ■ against which German organisation to-day is proof; but in this respect the further they follow the Russians the greater will •bo the difficulties to be overcome. *Aud tho precedent of 1812 teaches Europe: that the Marshals of Wilhelm II may,-if destiny so decrees, pursue a triumphant advance for many a hundred miles further than .their present position without ■ being' a step nearer to their goal of subjugating the. fortitude and the resolution'and the patience of Russia. And if we, who are allies to-day, as we were then, of the gallant Slav, are still hindered'by our. traditional unreadiness from giving all tho help we would wish to the common cause, let us not forget that ;Napoleon's march to Moscow was the way to Water-, 100, and let us brace ourselves for the supreme effort to give the knock-out, as we did a hundred years ago, to the enemy whose undoing was the Russian lure of space. -~' j-i ' ■ ' / "'" ' ' ;