PROGRESS OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 8, Issue 2550, 26 August 1915, Page 4

PROGRESS OF THE WAR

• — e Silence as to the details of tho battle in the Australians and New Zealanders trebled their a-rea'of occupation in-tho Gallipoli Peninsula is at length broken by a dispatch from Mr. Ashmead Bartlett. He has a story to tell which will make all Now Zealand thrill with pride, for it is a record of achievement by New Zealand soldiers which stands out gloriously even against the background of the terrible campaign that has been fought in the Gallipoli Peninsula. What the New Zealanders achieved in two nights and a day of frenzied battle is splendidly tolcl in Mr. Bartlett's glowing story. The telegram from the Secretary, of State to His Excellency the Governor in which the valour of tho New Zealanders is commended speaks of "a magnificent night march over- country so nearly impracticablc that the Turks had not believed that such a feat would be attempted," but as the story is told by Mr. Bartlett, this night march was a long-continued battle fought over miles of rugged and precipitous hill country—a battlo in which tho bayonet and the rifle-butt were tho only weapons favoured bv the assaulting troops though they were helped as far as possible by the firo of cruisers, destroyers, and monitors. In this great storming of the Turkish heights, Maori aud pakeha fought side by side, and there seems to have been nothing to choose between them. Even the deeds of the landing will hardly compare with this wild onset on positions and a range of country which the Turks might'liave expected to hold against a host, let alone the hiuidful of colonials who were to be stayed neither by ravines nor ridges, nor the utmost efforts of the Turks. k * * * s Bomb of the place-names mentioned sjby Mit. BarMIX are unfamiliar but

the main fact is dear that the New 11 Zealanders gained' some miles of < ground along the ridge running ] north-cast from their Anzac position i (and therefore north-west of the Nar- | rows), and that incidentally they i stormed the highest ground yet oc- i cupied in the peninsula, perhaps the i summit of Sari Bair. On the south i the Australians, reinforced by In- : dian troops, also launched an at- ' tack, but at time of writing no de- < tailed story of what they accomplish- ' cd is in hand. -As t-o the landing at ! Suvla Bay, Mil. Bartlett speaks of 1 two divisions advancing inland and < establishing lines two miles or more ; from the coast. It is probable that ' the situation has developed materially since the big battle was fought, 1 but on the facts available if the Allies now command the Turkish road , communications north of thenar- ' rows, it is by virtue of the'positions : won by the New Zealanders on the heights looking down on Bogha-li; north of Maidos. It is another great ' achievement to the everlasting credit of our gallant troops. «»«»'" There is a message originating in Constantinople which speaks of thousands of wounded coming from the Dardanelles and thousands of fresh troops proceeding to the scene of action. This might seem to imply that the land communications on Gallipoli arc not severed, for the sea-passage of tho Narrows would hardly suffice for such a transportation of troops and wounded - men. Tho question is really quite open, however, for operations in the region ■ of Suvla Bay might in themselves account for the movements described. Assuming a normal development of the operations, Mr. Bartlett _ so vividly describes, it is quite possible that tho Turks in the short section of the peninsula south from the Narrows to tho Allies' southern line are by this time isolated save for a limited passage of supplies across the strait. Suoh a state of affairs, assuming that it exists, might be interpreted as setting a very definite limit to their further resistance. * , * . * ' * The later sections of Mr. Bartlett's dispatch aro still coming through at time of writing, but one very important fact is already made clear. A junction has been effected between the colonial troops, who advanced from the i.nzac zone, and the new forces landed at Suvla Bay. There is thus a continuous line of battle in the western zone of the peninsula, and the situation may easily have developed as favourably to the Allies as was indicated in some recent messages _ from Athens and elsewhere whidi in the absence of confirmation seemed unduly optimistic. * # # * ■ A development is'rcp'ortcd to-day in the Eastern campaign whicli seems likely to be followed by a further considerable retirement of the Russian line. In a Pctrograd communique it is mentioned, __ almost casually, that enemy attaclcs have been stopped east of Bielsk. _ The point is that Bielsk is a junction on the railway which, runs south from the' Pctrograd lino to Brcst_Littj,wsk. This fortress is only fifty miles south of Bielsk. Assuming the message to bo correct it seems an obvious inference that the Russian armies covering Brest Litowsk and holding the front to the north must now oliooso between meeting an attack in flrink or falling back. It is a factor in tho position that behind Brest Litowsk there lies a great _ area of marshy country which will presumably divide tho Russian northern and. southern armies in their retirement'.' The' resultant situation may favour a Gorman concentration against one or other of the two sections into which the Russians may be divided. On the other hand, the Russians may be able to turn their intimate knowledge of this great tract of marshy country to good account. * * * * Delay in the transmission of a full and detailed account of the _ naval battle in tho Gulf of Riga is accounted for to-clay by a message which states that the Russian Admiral's dispatch has not yet been made available. The same message confirms earlier reports, however, in stating that tho Russians inflicted enormous losses on the enemy at cheap cost to themselves, and_ that they yield unstinted recognition to tho British submarines-for the part they played. In'chronicling these facts the Times correspondent at Petrograd touches upon an aspect of the naval victory which has perhaps been given less prominence than it deserves—its iroral . effect upon tiie Russian people. This will undoubtedly be very great, and it is a factor all tho more important in face of the reverses which Russia feas suffered, and is still suffering, iii the land' campaign. * if * » An addition to the growing array of peace rumours is made to-day in a Dutch report of a conference at which the German Chancellor (Here Bethiiann-Hollveg) and Count von. Moltks met a number of politicians and.others with a view to inspiring a more pacific tone in the Reichstag. It may seem wildly improbable that tho leaders of the German bureaucracy would trouble their heads about .what the Reichstag mighty do, for that assembly has about as little power as a debating society—to use an analogy that has-been often employed. Against this, however, it is not at all unlikely that the German Chancellor and his associates may bo really anxious to use tho Reichstag as a tool in formulating peace proposals or paving tho way for their discussion. If this is tho position, and the notables . of the Reichstag ,are declining to be made use of, the situation is not'lacking in a touch of ironic humour. * * * * More definite and eomprehensivo information than has been available for a long time past regarding , the available military strength of -Germany and in the_ two main theat.es, and their losses in tho ' war, is presented to-day in a London message, saicl to be based upon tho best information available. _ This i apart, no specific authority i 3 eifed i in support of the statements made, I but they gain a measure of official ! sanction from the fact that the lead- ! ing totals of enemy strength and . losses are transmitted as news by the > High Commissioner, It may bo regarded as quite certain that these - figures aro based in part, perhaps in great part, upon estimates and not ! upon exact, information, but this . docs not of necessity detract from • their value and reliability in any l material degree. These figures differ i chiefly from a number of previous csi timates which. have been recently ; made in crediting the eilemy with a . lower numerical strength. Tho Lon- ■ don message, repeated by the High ; Commissioner,'credits the enemy with a total available strength in the two main theatres (on July 31) of t -1,320,000 men. ■ Some previous estij mgfe.B .have credited uje .Germans

alone with a numerical strength of <1,000,000 men or even more at a com- : paratively recent date, but the estimate now under review gives the aggregate German strength in' the two main theatres as 3,200,000 men, :-®kl it is suggested that this is the maximum number the German Government is able to equip and maintain , in the field. This would imply that Germany has a considerable number of military effectives whom she is unable to' place in the field owing to lack of equipment and the explanation is offered that a large number i of men eligible for military service aro required in the war lactones. This is strictly reasonable, and it is I probable that some computations of German strength have made insufficient allowance for this factor. A great deal has been heard about the work that women and superahnuated men are doing in munitions factories in Germany and in Entente countries, but the fact remains that much of the work in these establishments must of necessity be done by ' able- ' bodied, men, not merely on account of their physical qualifications, but because it is only from the ranks of such men that tie necessary supply of highly-skilled and proficient ■ tradesmen 'is to be drawn. * * # » It is supposed that Germany at the beginning of the war had eight million men available for service, and that another million or milHon and a half have since been obtained by drawing upon elderly and very young men. The forces in the field .and the aggregate of permanent losses might account for only about five millions of this total, but it is likely that the total in the first instance is a considerable over-esti-mate; making insufficient allowance for the percentage of men incapacitated, for various reasons, from performing military service. Taking this factor into account, and making allowance also for the employment of a very large number of men in munitions factories and war industries generally, and for the necessity that Germany labours under of maintaining large garrisons and frontier guards; it is quite possible that an aggregate of 3,200,000 men represents the maximum she is now capable of maintaining in the fighting line. Nor does it follow that she can •maintain the quality of her field armies by drawing upon tho able-bodied workers in war industries and upon garrison, frontier, and line of communication troops. Skilled workmen in war industries cannot be replaced to any effective extent —their training is a matter of years —and it will only be possible to profitably reduce their number when the wastage of war has gone so far with the armies in the field that the effective consumption of munitions is reduced. This is a remote contingency, for even if the effective strength in the field were very greatly reduced the demand for munitions would probably be as great, or greater, than ever. It is also safe to assume that tho troops,in garrison and guarding frontiers will hot become a reservoir of reinforcements for the armies in tho, field until heavy losses make an all-round readjustment of strength necessary. In view of possibilities it is as necessary that Germany should strongly garrison her coasts and guard 'her frontiers as ■ that_ she should maintain great armies in the field. .* * » # . Many details relating to enemy losses and other matters are dealt with in the statement under review which deserve careful reading, but need not bo enlarged upon at the moment. A statistical survey of this character, -owever, apparently based upon an orderly collection and examination of evidence, has a very great value as tending to correct a pessimistic tendency to over-estimate the enemy's resources which has been rather too much in evidence of late. To credit the enemy with possessing practically unlimited resources is only less foolish than holding him too cheap. It should serve as _a ■ healthy antidote to be-presented with a picture of the. German Army as consisting of ■ 3,200,000 men, _ backed by limited reserves, and assisted in the Eastern theatre by an army of a million and a quarter Austrians. Even if this estimate is considerably below the mark there is no reason to be afraid of tho outcome. Russia has been recently credited with having as many as four million men in the field, and it is probable that siho is not far short of that number at- the present day. Aus'tro-German losses in the Eastern theatre, which are believed to have' aggregated a month since May, must have coincided with a heavy drain upon the Russian armies in the field, but Russia stands alone among the Powers at war in her enormous reserves of man-power. As regards the other main theatre it is likely that Franco is still in the position of having an army of 2,500,000 men actively engaged and reserves immediately , available of about half that strength. Whatever the strength of the British Army now in the main Western theatre may be it is a conservative - estimate to suppose that Britain nearer two million than one million men immediately available for service there: Public statements regarding British military strength have been discouraged, and to_ a great extent prevented, ever since the war began, but tno Spectator, in an article published at the end of June, expressed the opinion that Britain had then "(allowance being made, for casualties) at least 3,000,000 ■ men under arms. Italy, Servia, and Belgium between them are maintaining forces aggregating close upon a million and a half.' a . *, * » With opposing millions in ' the field and vast areas of invaded_ territory to be won. back again, it is -idle to look for any early decision in the war or even any early slackening in its intensity, but it is absolutely-cer-tain that the Allies already enjoy a, considerable numerical preponder- • ance and that relief of Russia's pre- ! sent necessities in the matter of , munitions and equipment would , quickly make the preponderance enormous. Numbers in themselves ! afford no guarantee of victory in i war, but numerical preponderance is'one of tho great_factors making for victory, and it is a factor in whioh the enemy cannot regain the . preponderance he has lost unless by [ the withdrawal of somo one of tho . principal Powers leagued against him or by a strategical blunder on . the part of tho Allies involving their ' armies in overwhelming disaster. i -i i A reply - was given in the House of Representatives yesterday by tho • Prime Minister to Dr. A. K. Newman, . who hail asked if tho Government pro- . posed to introdueo legislation tlus session to close hotel bars at G p.m. (lurinj; tho period-of, the_\v«r. Air. Masse.v's reply was that in ease of neeos--1 sity hotel'bars may bo closed bv order ' of the Mayor of the city or borough : and in country districts by war regula- : tion. Tho Government (lid not intend • to introduce licensing legislation during i the present session.