GERMNY'S EASTERN FRONTIER

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2243, 1 September 1914, Page 7

GERMNY'S EASTERN FRONTIER

ITS PRINCIPAL DEFENCES FEW OBSTACLES TO RUSSIAN ADVANCE A good description of tho frontier country of Germany and Austria-Hun-gary bordering on the Russian Empire is contained in the work of a wellknown, German geographer, Dr. Partsch. In his volume on "Central Europo," published in London a, few years ago Dr. Partsch devoted a final chapter to "Tho Geographical Conditions of National Defence." In tho portion of this chapter dealing with the eastern frontiers of Germany and Aus-tria-Hungary he 6aid:— "While it is certain that Germany will never covet a square mile of Russian soil, no' one can answer for it that che Russian Colossus, in its unceasing expansion, may not some day attempt once more to push its western frontier forward. No natural barriers, difficult to cross, protect Germany on the east. Only the power of tho German people to defend itsolf can protect this boundary.

"The task is rendered mors difficult by the length and its 'retreating curvo to tho westward. The frontier measures 750 miles from Memel to tho Three Emperors' Corner at Myslowitz, and while the direct line from tho eastern ends of East Prussia and Silesia passes' through Warsaw, tho Russian territory on the middle Warta pushes so far westward that Berlin stands at a distance of only 180 miles from the frontier. This wedge of Poland points menacingly towards the • German capital, and leaves the military strength of Russia free'to choose upon what part of the long frontier line it will direct the full force of its onset, East Prussia, surrounded.on the south, east, and north by Russian territory, exposed on the north-west to the "attack of the Russian Baltic fleet, is connected with tho main body of the Empire only by a length of 15 miles, and lies in the greatest danger. The first' effort of tiny Russian attack would be to paralyse this wing of the Prussian Eagle. * If the armies of Germany were compelled to act on the defensive here, they would find their task lightened only along the southern border, where there are woods and the tangled waters of Masuria. Between the long lakes with their many arms, the roads have to go across narrow passages which would be easy to defend, even if tho closing of them had not been prepared in time &. peace, by. building little forts like Fort Boyon and Lotzen. For great hostile undertakings this tract of country is in any case loss suitable.

Natural Lines of Russian Advance. "The natural line of Russian advance are tha broad valleys of the Pregel and the Vistula. The Russian railway system has prepared, in the junctions of Vilna and Warsaw, points of departure for both these lines of attack.' The fortifications of Kovno, at the orossing of the Nieineu, form a base from which an army which was not opposed by an equal force would find the way open through the Pregel district as far as Konigsberg. A wide ring of forts has of late years made this place into a fortress of the first rank, which cannot bo fully surrounded so long as the Frischo Haff, with its fortified entrance) the Pijlauor Deep, are not in the enemy's hands. With. Konigsberg as a base, a lesser Prussian, army _ might maintain its footing upon the island of the coast between the Haffs and the mouths of the Pregel, whoso branches fall into them; or, stationed behind the Deime and the Alio, such an army could, protect all East Prussia. Its situation would only be seriously endangered if a Russian army from tho Vistula were to gain a decisive success, and to cut East Prussia's - communications on tho west. The strong fortifications on the lino of the Vistula have been erected to meet this danger._ Thorn, in particular, has a large ring of detached forts commanding both banks of the river, and able with an energetic and aotivo garrison to extend their influence, north-eastward, as far as the- Prussian lakes country, and south-westward as far as the lakes of the Upper Netzo. Only thirty miles further to the north lies Graudenz, at the head of an important bridge, which' 1 I has recently been strongly fortified, and 1 lies half-way between Thorn and the delta of the Vistula. The area of the delta ready for inundation strengthens the position of Dantzig which tho forts on the western hills and at the mouths of the river have made into a spat most capable of being defended. It is connected with Konigsberg on one side by tho Frischo Haff. The Importance of Posen. "With the great military strength which Russia has at command, it would bo possible that, simultaneously with an invasion along tho Pregel and Vistula, an advance should be attempted towards Berlin. The advancing army on the left bank of the Vistula, would be threatened on the flank by Thorn, and could not go on until it had completely invested this fortress; but if it did succeed reaching the eastern border of the province of Posen, it would come into a country much cut up by long lakes running from north to south, and offering many positions favourable to the defence. Be-

yond lios the reach of tho Warta that runs northward, and upon it tho strong fortress of Posen. Here the lines of communication from all tho eastern portions of the Empire converge. An interruption of these communications, by the surrounding of Posen, would be a heavy'blow which the German military leaders would have to use every exertion to prevent. Tho wide ring of forts and the modern methods of construction give to Posen a great power of resistance to a siege, tho materials for which would havo to be brought from a great distance, and by very difficult roads. Taken together, Konißsberg, Dantzig, Thorn, and Posen form a rmg of fortresses that enclose a natural division of territory, and greatly enhance its power of defence. The lino of tho Oder is of but secondary importance. Since the razing of tho defences of Stettin, it has possessed but ono strong fortress, Custrin, which has outlying forts, and stand at tho embouchure of the "Wartha, in a considerable area of easily-flooded country. South of the Obra Bruch, which connects the Warta and the Oder, and abounds the sphore of influence belonging to the fortress of Posen, lies but ono fortified place, at the hoad of a bridge, Glogau. Silesia is less important for the purpose of protecting tho eastern frontier. It does not lio in tho natural lino of a Russian advance, and is in somo degree, defended by tho far nro-' lection eastward of ,tho Austrian Empire. A Horder Difficult to Hold. "Tho whole conditions of national ueionce along this frontier, with its unfavourable peculiarities, suggest that this border cannot bo satisfactorily held on the defensive, and that serious injury can only bo averted by a vigorous ohensive. In the eastern provinces where no river runs, like the Rhino, parallol with tho frontier, making a basis of defenco, tho place of some such basis would havo to bo supplied artificially by railway lines running along tho border. Tho carefully laid out system of communications has everywhere created two, and sometimes for long distances three, independent lines of railway running parallol with tho frontier, and these—if satisfactorily secured agamst destructive attacks by. bodies

[of Russian cavalry—would render possible a rapid displacement of troops. Thoy can, liowovcri only bo so guarded by a considerable advance of Gorman troops. As the different sizes of tho areas to be covered, and the differences in railway development in the two empires would undoubtedly assure to the Germans the advantago of being more quickly ready for battlo, it is obvious that Russia must reckon, in case of war, upon taking up at first a purelv defensive attitude. She has prepared for )t by constructing the square of Polish fortressos—Novo, Georgiowski, Jvangorod, Brest-Litewski, and Goniondz— winch will enable her to collect her forces behind the great river frontage of tho Bobr, Naraw, Bug, and Vistula, and there to await with confidence the approach of any attack. Warsaw has als ,9™»? on raado into a stronghold. tins conception of tho position depends upon the paucity of railways, economically so much required in the great district on tho left bank of the Ustuja. Russia trusts for protection, even m this first stage of a war, to her superfluity of space, and to that "fifth element which Napoleon discovered with terror—tho unfathomable mud of the roadway, which paralyses the most active strategy and tires the most valorous soldiers. The offer.sivo side of national defence, therefore, presents serious difficulties to Germany. But the rich cultivation and increased population of Poland have in tho course of a century- changed tie character of tho battlefields, and deprived Russia of the exceptional position, which she appeared to occupy after tho experiences of Napoleon. The Russian Empire cannot be regarded as so invulnerable and so unapproachable for hostile troops at the present day as'it was in 1812. The method of defence which was possible then cannot bo .repeated.

Austria-Hungary's Position. "Calm and expert judges," continues Dr. Partsch, "are inclined not to overestimate the danger of a war with Russia. Much would, of course, depend upon whether Germany had to bear all the weight of it alone, or whether it could reckon on the aid of its present ally, Austria-Hungary. Tho position of that Power in regard to Russia is essentially different. The greater part of the Empire is sheltered by the Carpathians. Only Silesia, Galicia, and the Buko-vina stretch down into the plain of Eastern Europe, and absolutely demand an armed defence against their great neighbour. -Three railways lead from Moravia and five from Hungary into the district where the Oder rises, and into the basins of the Vistula and Dniester. Of these railways, six debouch into the valloys of the Vistula and, San, behind which the principal defensive force would have to assemble, supported by the two great fortresses of Cracow and Przemysl, which are connected by two' independent lines. Use could also be made of the lines in thb valloys of the Waag and the Hernad, deep in the mountains, if troops nad to bo carried from one side to the other. The choice of two points of concentration, only 150 miles apart, bears witness clearly enough to the conviction that a, strip of land so long, and at tho ends so narrow, as the! outer border of tho Carpathians from Teschen to Czernowitz (100 miles), can only be defended by forces well held together, and ready to take .'the offensive. The attraction of the enemy by a strong army serves better than a dispersion of forces to secure districts that lie at a distance While the army of Cracow, in a well chosen position, would face towards the Polish seat of war, and at the same time be ready, in case of an alliance, for cooperation with tho German forces, the army of Przemysl. and Lemberg would be required to advance towards Volbyhia. and Little Russia. In consequence pi! (the. .division of the country into ,a northern and- southern field of opera-.' tions, separated by tho great marshy district of the Bug and the Pripet, this army would choose an independent aim, namely, Kiev."

As to the shooting of the. various armies, says •an exchange, though the British army shooting may look poor beside ifes target shooters' score, these people being provided with every apparatus for assisting their shooting, any selected- position, and a target which does not retaliate, and are not fatigued by marching and having to carry a heavy pack, it will presently be found that the British Army can shoot a good deal better than' a Continental army. This was indicated by tho results of the various Bhooting matohes held to amuse the international troops in North China after the Boxer rising. Also once the British soldier got used to the conditions of South Africa ho could account for the Boer. At the battlo of Driefontaino a Britih brigade of four battalions attacked from the open a strong Boor force carefully entrenched on selected ridges, turned the enemy out pretty quickly by effective rifle fire, and twice as many dead Boers were found on the ground as the British lost, 'and some may have been' carried away. To talk in a superior way of the bad shooting of the Army is merely to show one's ignoranco of shooting under battlo conditions.