STRATEGY OF THE WAR

Dominion, Volume 7, Issue 2218, 3 August 1914, Page 8

STRATEGY OF THE WAR

IMPORTANT FACTORS SOME INTERESTING SPECULATIONS Tho principles of strategy never chango, but their application to suit over changing conditions of warfare liccessarily change with them. Tho tactics of a general five years ag;o would be considerably, very considerably, changed to-day. for oxamplo, ' in re-sponse-to Hhe phenomenal development of aviation within that period. A nation's military strength cannot he estimated solely by tho number of battleships or army corps which can bo employed. Financial resources, the degree of direct and organised control exercised by tho Government over the various services of the State, the relative positions of frontiers and fortresses, tho topography of the tracts of country available for operations, as well as tho efficiency and spirit of botiK the men and their leaders, have nil to be considered. It is, moreover, very difficult to estimate the number of men which any Rower can really put in tho field. Figures of army corps seem to bear little relation to the number of trained men available. Lastly, war is not an exact science, and anything may happen. Few things are morp misleading than "arithmetical warfare." With this proviso, says a writer in s tho "Round Table," it is interesting to consider what would be the probable developments in the early stages of a war between the Dual and the Triple Alliance, should such a catastrophe unfortunately take place. In what follows it is assumed that Germany or Austria-Hungary, as the case might be, could count ,on tho help of the other members of the Triple Alliance, and $iat France and 'Russia would similarly support one; another, thoiv it must be remembered that tho exact circumstances in which the various Powers aro bound to assist their allies are not publicly known. Hemmed In. ' 'It, is dear that.ia war on land between the Triple and the Dual Alliance would-be waged in two distinct theatres of "operations.. The ' Triple Alliance, wedged between France and Russia, must facc both ways. On tihe eastern side the prpblem for Germany and Aus-tria-Hungary consists, in deciding, what number of divisions must bo employed against tho Russian troops and; what number must be. kept, to watch, necessary,' act against the Balkan States. - -The action of the latter, as pointed out above,.is quite uncertain; but this very uncertainty may prove a trouble to. Austria-Hungary. Moreover, the, composition of. the Austro-Hungar-iain army, as it doe's so large a proportion .of Slavs,. makes it. difficult for her to. count with certainty, on' employing .her. forces against either Russia or t|he. Balkans in accordance:' With purely ■ strategical', needs. JProbablyj therefore, she .' could..not., dispose . of more than half ' her army.'for direct, action against Russia; 'and Germany would haveto make up . the. balance required. What this balance would be it is difficult to say. It must be toniembered that the Russian arrangements for mobilisation and concentration aro probably not so complete .-fs ■those"of.other',Powers, and slip would not be ablo to exert her whole strength in tho first few weeks of war.. .Moreover, tho new fortresses 'contemplated by the Gorman Army Bill 1 aro bre-, sumably intended to hold back a) Russian advance. The German General Staff has, indeed'been'credited with the plan of first hurling their armies on Francb to crush her, and then hasten-' ing back to. meet Russia. The plan.- is enticing on paper, but war, is so'uncertain, and tW mere transportation problem is so difficult, that it is hardly' likely to be adopted. On the whole. it is probablo that Germany would have to detach a very considerable force to guard her eastern , frontier. Italy and Her Allies. . The position of Italy,' tho third member of the Triple Alliance, is somewliat uncertain. She is sometimes supposed to be a rather lukewprm partner, and her relations with Austria .have certainly not always been as cordial as they might have been. She is, besides, now engaged in a military, adventure in. Tripoli, from Whicli she could hot. withdraw, and may become, further involved in -Albania., Probably therefore she could not act against Prance with either the strength or the vigour Which would be desired in -Beetin.' It_ is':'even possible that her attitude might be so. doubtful as to coinpel Austria to detach troops to watch the Italian frontier. France, of course, tvould have to do so in any case. In the western theatre of operations. According to instructed opinion on the Continent, it anpears. that, after allowing for the forco required, to' make up the balance against Russia on her eastern frontier, Germany' could still put in the field a' somewhat' greater number of. troops than France. Everything seems to indioate that-Germany would attempt to take the offensive against France. Such a course is in accordance with all the teaching of the German. General Staff, with such preparations as aro known, and -with the stratejgical necessities of tho case. Clash on the Frontiers. An examination of the French' frontier from Luxemburg to Switzerland, a distance of 140 miles, shows the 'difficulty of a German direct attack. Of this extent only some forty miles aro iiot' fortified. From the SViss frontier to 'Epinal runs onp practically continuous line of fortifications; _ worth of Epinal is a gap of twenty miles to near Toul, whence another line of forts continues to. Vordun, ..which; is i.abeut twenty miles , from the Belgian frontier. If, therefore, Germany were to attack France across' the . frontier actually common to tho two countries she would have an almost impossible task, or at least a dreadfully costly one, in forcing this lino and in employing a mass of probably well over a million men in a space of 140 miles. If the Germans consider that they'cannot go throuch. they would certainly, try to get round; and it is hardly likely that the rfglits of smaller nationalities would he held sacred by either side if there was. any. ■advantage to bo gained by violating them. If • tlia actual' Franco-German frontier is to be turned, it can only be done by crossing the territory of ', either' Switzerland or Belgium,, or nossibly of both. An advance throush Switzerland must mow south of the French quadrilateral,' Belfort-Bosancoii-Dijon. Lahgres. If made in, considerable force, it would bo dangerous to France, as it would cut the northern Fre'ncli armies off "from tlie supplies and sui> liort of southern France, but it would be liablo to utter disaster if defeated, owing to tlie presence'- of' the tiloovonamed quadrilateral 011 its (lank. On tlie . whole, if wo consider tho nature of the country and the probable ntt.itiido. of tho Swiss themselves, h tierjnan advance in force through Switzerland seems possible hut doubtful. Tlie violation of Belgium- by Germany, however, stands 011 quite a different footing., It may be regarded as a practical certainty in ,the event of war. The map shows how the small point of Holland which includes Maastricht protects' the., north and' northeast sides cf Belgium. If only Belgnim is to be violate! the German armies must cross south of Maastricht. Some .years ago the Germans completed a series of detraining stations on their railways closo to tlie Belgium-Luxem-burgl frontier. .These, miles of sidings deal with no traffic in peacc time; they can only be meant to teem with troops in war. An advance across Belgium and Luxemburg,''-'north of 'Verdun-"and fit

frontier fortresses mid leads direct on Paris. From the southern frontier of Luxemburg to the defences of Liege in i Belgium is a distance of about soventy miles, and a .turning movement by superior German numbers through this opening would place Franco at a considerable disadvantage. Belgium in the War. The altitude that might be adopted by Belgium in such a war is therefore a matter of , groat importance to Franco.: If Belgium is actively.-with Germany tho fact will be worth far more to tho latter than merely the addition of tho Belgian field'army to her strength. In tho lirst place no detachments would be required, suci. as-would bo essential in a hostilo country. In the second place the(-German advance would gain enormously in rapidity and freedom of movement if all the administrative facilities of the Belgian Government wore placed at its disposal. On tho other hand, French action in Belgium would be correspondingly hampered'. If Belgium were definitely ranged on the side of Franco, the position would bo reversed. If Belgium remained neutral, the difficulties in tho way of the German advance, though greater, than in'tho first would not be insuperable. Unaided, Belgium would not bo able to protect Iter territory from violation.' Liege, which is indifferently garrisoned in peace,.might' be "jumped 1 ! very early'in' the war, ajid with that place held or masked, tho German armies could secure their flank by masking Namur and the bridgeheads over the Maas. Indeed, there if a considerable body of Belgian opinion which holds that in' her own interests Belgium should treat all the country south of the Sambro and the Maas as a' sort of no-man's-land where'tho big-, ger Powers can. fight it out among themselves. Unable to protect herself unaided, no wonder Belgium wishes to sit on the fence and side with the winner. There ,is a further point to be considered. It is possible that: Germany would makfj the turning movement through Belgium oh an even wider front than we have supposed. She might wisih to marcli troops through the space between. Liege And Antwerp: to do -this' she must- pass through Holland. . In that-case as -well as ; Belgian, territory would be violated;- and the same considerations' as have been pointed out in the case of Belgium would apply. • • . ' Britain Metier. , What will be tile position of Great Britain in this hypothetical Armageddon? It is quite clear from tilt! statements of.. Ministers that sho is under ho treaty obligation to "intervene in a European, war, and this fact is a great safeguard of peace. It is, however,' essential to . her security at tho-. present time, as has been pointed out above,that France should not be crushed, and the foregoing analysis of the military situation goes to show;' that without British assistance Franco, . evea if backed by Russia,, would; probably .be iii a' position,..of inferiority-:-in a'war with' the . Triple Alliance; If it was decided .that help should/bo' given,- the form it would, >take W'ov.d .depen'd-. ori circumstances. . is. primarily a naval: po.wer,. and the * greatest assistance sho could-give; France would bo that of .her fleet. This-would be of immense value. It, would at once neutralise the German" naval superiority, would .prevent..a- blockado of French ports,., and would keep open Prance's communications with her African garrisons. If. Germany violated die territory of Belgium. or Holland or both, the British - fleet could bVing'powerful indirect pressure to bear by cutting off supplies from Dutch and" Belgian ports! Indeed,:t'hei importance to Germany of receiving supplies through neutral ports might be so great that the. fear of such a blockade might of itself deter her from Violating 'tW'.V'neutralit.y' of Holland, though" for the reasons given above it would hardly suffice to protect Belgium. " . \ Naval action iii' itself, however, is.! not sufficient to' deoide a European war.Trafalgar was.followed by Austerlitz and Jena, and England'had to undertake the Peninsular, war before s'lie . was secure from the domination of Napoleon. It might be that in spite of the British fleet Germany, would persist in crossing the Belgian frontier, and Great Britain would bo faced with the question of assisting the other members of. the Triple Entente with an expeditionary force. ,• As \ve have seen, Belgium is the key to the French defence. A British expeditionary force of six divisions would certainly hot bo a negligible factor in that defence, especially as its presence would probably decide Belgium to throw in lier lot'with France, with the result that for every British soldier landed a Belgian Tfould I)o_found: fighting by his side. lt;is to this point, therefore, if at all, that British reinforcements would probably bo sent ; arid it must be borne in mind t'hat, if help so. given is to be'of any real use in assisting; France or influencing Belgium, it must be given at-the beginning of. the war. But Great Britain has an even more vital interest in the defence of Belgium and Holland. If she stood aside, thetee two might be compelled to side with Germany, and the probability of a French defeat would bo increased. The result of such , a war would probably' be the establishment of a German domination in the Low Countries, even if they were not actually annexed. The Scheldt is '300 miles nearer .England than Wilhelmshaven, and the Dutch and Belgian coast might j)e turned into a formidable base for naval operations against Great ißritain! The balance of power would' be permanently upset, and Britain's naval supremacy would be gravely imperilled.