IS ENGLAND READY FOR WAR.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1361, 12 February 1912, Page 8

IS ENGLAND READY FOR WAR.

0 LORD ROBERTS'S INDICTMENT, THE SHACKLED FLEET, The practical spirit in which Australia is proceeding with the development of its system of land defence (writes a London press correspondent under dale of December 22) is now being almost daily cited as a contrast to tho evasivo and irresolute attitude adopted bv Lord Haldano, apparently with the tacit sanction of the Army Council, in relation to the military needs of Great Britain. The difference Ixitween Hie two countries, it is clearly shown, is that in one the Federal authorities aro carrying out a reasoned and generally accepted national policy, and in the other we havo a Government which persists in dealing with defence on party lines, and in refusing to alter its chosen course by a hair's breadth through fear that it might incur some unpopularity with voters of the wageearning class. The dangers of the position here are being discussed with increasing energy and feeling for various reasons, including the continued failure of the War Office to make up the deficiency of 50,000 men in the Territorial Armv, the general anticipation that the strength of this force will soon fall still further below the minimum strength originally fixed for it; tho inadequacy of the trained reserve available for the support of tho regular army in war; tho hampering effect, of weak land defence on the movements of tho fleet; Sir Edward Grey's admission that Great Britain was recently "on tho brink of war," and tho need for o. stronger expeditionary force, first as a factor in diplomacy, and secondly as a means of strengthening the Anglo-French understanding. Lord Lansdowne (a former Chief of the War Office, as well as an expert in foreign affairs), Sir Edward Grey, Mr. Asquith, Mr. Bonar Law, and other statesmen, agree now that England cannot hope to act alone again in European diplomacy. She must have friends on the Continent capable of instantly becoming allies in certain contingencies. France is equally aware of this; but. it is said that she will never consent (a convert the Entente Cordialo into an actual alliance unless and until England provides itself with an army large enough to render effective help to the French forces in any future war with Germany. The failure of successive attempts to provide England with an army proportioned to its needs has frequently been attributed to public apathy. But'assuming this to bo at least partly correct, what is the cause of the popular attitude? It can only be assigned to the continuous clash of authority on the subject—on tho one side Cabinet Ministers (mostly adroit lawyers) declaring that everything is all right, or presently will be; on the other -distinguished, soldier?, including most of those who served in • South Africa, not only denying the soundness of the official ease, but asserting repeatedly, that tho ennnfry is being left in absolute - danger, which increases day by day with tho growth of the German navy.In a remarkable letter which Lord Roberts has issued to the press he returns to this subject with sledge-hammer force and candour. Like other men of military experience, ho gave the organisers of the Territorial Army support at the outset of their effort. 'Thev have failed to justify their optimism, and ho feels constrained, in view of the risks to which the country has recently been tubjectcd, to force them by continued -riticism into tho adoption of better methods and greater energy. But it is not solely to the shortcomings of the voluntary home defence army that Lord Roberts applies himself. He shows that slackness . and indifference are injuring thi. interests of (he entire military service of the country. "Inefficiency," he states, "always breeds inefficiency. We have just been on tho brink of a great war; yet what is the condition of even our regular army? I have no hesitation in saying that in many important respects the regular crmy is not fitted for war Our rifle is very inferior to the riflo with which the French and German troops are armed. It is proposed to provido a new bullet for it, but even with that bullet our men will be at a disadvantage. Tho point-blank range of the French and German rifles is £00 yards; that of the British rifle at tho highest is GOO yards. The equipment of our artillery is scarcely more satisfactory. Our fuse setters are not up-to-dite, with the result that our gun is not an automatic firing gun. Again, in aviation, we nro liebind other nations. That science is in its infancy, but it has already proved of tho utmost service in detecting the movements of an enemy, and thus in eliminating to a gieat extent in military operations that uncertainty w-hich we are accustomed to call 'Hie fog of war.' "Franco and Germany have recognised the supreme importance of tho command of tho air. Tho former already possesses a Meet of 200 aeroplanes. Germany proposes to spend next year (1912) .£1,500,000 on'nviation alone. In England there are only four aeroplanes fit to take the field. The Army Council has not even entrusted this most imparta.it military subject to tho Genoral Staff, and Lord Haldano and his associates assure us ■ suavely that if we wait we shall profit by the success or failure of others, and eventually obtain information as to the host design for a dirigible or an aeroplane. This assuredly is riot the lino of policy for a country famous beyond all others for its invention and enterprise, whether in pcaco or war. We may wait, but war will not wait. The idea is'absurd; it is of a piece with that other unaccountable idea of the Secretary of State for War—that it will 'be time enough to begin serious training when war has been declared!" Lord Roberts asserts that the great majority of the members of both Houses of Parliament, no matter to which party they belong, arc in their own minds persuaded that compulsory service is not- only advisable but essential to tho future greatness and stability"of the Empire, and that they are restrained from giving utterance to these views, not from lack of conviction, but from party considerations. The principal points in-this striking indictment are ignored by Lord Haldano in the course of a reply which ho has attempted in a speech at Bradford. He seems content with the prospect that the main body of the fleet will havo to be employed continuously on the defensive in homo waters. Ho al=o calmly acquiesces in tho view that England will he starved into submission in a very short period if Hie fleet should bp defeated. ."Whether tho home defence force consists of 1.10,000 men or 100,000 men," he slates, "we are done if the sea oasses out of our control. Not a shot need be fired. All the foreigners have to do is to cut off our food supply." The present, food supply would run short in a week, and in two weeks there would be a famine.. The Government has long known this, and regards it with fatalistic resignation. For the rest, Lord Haldane went, on with the customary unproved assertions of the Radical politician that comoulsory training would "kill the patriotic spirit," and the "enthusiasm" of the volunteers would in the stross of war go a long way to compensate for the inadequacy of their training, and that, wo get a 'better expeditionary force with volunteer eulistment than wo could wt without it.