THE BELGIAN DEFENCES.

Dominion, Volume 5, Issue 1360, 10 February 1912, Page 6

THE BELGIAN DEFENCES.

I'ATE QF THE COUNTRY IN a GKKAT WAR.

One satisfactory result of tho recent war scare (says the military correspondent ot the London "Morning Post") has bion to arouse some little desire in Belgium for placing the natioual defensive resources on a somewhat less unsatisfactory footing than they at present stand. Iho country compares very unfavourably with most European States, both in respect to the relative number of soldiers maintained in peace time, and in respect to the relative amount of money spent upon protection against externarattack. nith a population of 0,700,000, the peaco -tivnglh oi the army is under -13,000; so that only one man per 155 head of population is serving in the ranks, whereas in iraiico (even without counting white troops in tho Colonial Arniy) the proportion is one per 70 head, while in Bulgaria —to take a small country—it is tr.o Iran per 80 head. Belgium again only pays seven shillings a head per annum 'for defence, while the United Kingdom pays thirty shillings, and while Italy (a poor country) nays thirteen shillings. Tho neutrality of the kingdom is, of course, guaranteed by the Great Powers; but Belgians must indeed be sanguine if they suppose that other countries will take up tho cudgels in their defence unless it suits thi interests of those countries to do so, and they are probably well aware that their neutrality is menaced by at least ono of tho very Powers which has guaranteed its integrity.

At. present the country positively invites ■ tho Germans to. pass through it in tlie event of another Franco-German war The short stretch of frontier between tho two belligerents is very strongly fortified on the French side, and the experiences of the Japanese before Port Arthur have taught the General Stiff in Berlin that permanent fortifications possess a value under modern conditions which had not been realised during the few years which immediately preceded tha irrra't Far Eastern struggle. But these defences can bo completely turned by a German march across tho south-eastern portion of Belgium, and, that tho Germans are thoroughly aware of this, is proved by railway construction that has been proceeding feverishly on the German side of tho kingdom s eastern frontier in recent times. A glance at any man of the Low Countries will show that the natural lino for . German troops to take on their way through Belgian territory to the north-eastern parts of France, is across tho triangle of which the Mouse aiid Sambrc form one side, the Franco-Belgian frontier another side, aud tho frontier between Belgium and Luxembourg and between Belgium and Germany the third side. It is, roughly speaking, an equilateral triangle, with a side of about 70 miles, which does not represent a large area. It happens, moreover, that both Liege and Namiir are fairly strongly fortified—too strongly probably for them lo bo rushed, unless taken unawares; and the consequence is that a German advance along both sides of the Mouse might lead to an awkward separation of columns. It results that if serious obstacles were placed in the way of an Army traversing- the southeastern corner, the probability of Belgian territory being utilised in unceremonious fashion by -German Armies in time of war would be appreciably diminished. The move would be a matter of military expediency, not of hostility to Belgium; and if the move ceased to be expedient in a military sense it might not take place.

Prevention is generally better than cure, and the sound defence policy for King Albert's Government to follow would seem to bs one which wonld render violation of tho country's neutrality objectless, or at all events, uninviting. That triangle at the south-eastern corner is a hilly tract, clad in many places with extensive forests, and it presents.the type of country in which armies on the march are confined to a few great lines of railway and road communication. Once block those lines, aud then advance becomes a slow process; and time counts for much in tIK-sp days in war. A few. barrier forts in the Belgian Ardennes would have tho effect of greatly retarding the movement of German 'armies (or for the matter of that, French armies) through this region, and they would make it questionable whether any strategical advantage would b<? gained by violating the neutrality of Belgium at all. The importance of fortifications can easily be exaggerated but few experts deny their value for tho Tiurnosc.- of delaying an enemy, where delaying, may servo an important purposo in the pbn of campaign. Jf a mere traction of the money which has been .sunk in those v;tf ditches round Antwerp had been spent in the Ardennes, the neutrality of Uelgium would be a good deal te-ciii-d- than it is to-day.

The Belgian War Oiiice deserves credit for a reorganisation of the contemplated field army, which )m recently been carried out. The Reserve Infantry Brigade ha? keen cut cut of each of the fnur field divisions which are to be mobilised. It is perhaps even more essential for the Belgian iielil army than it is for most field armies to mobilise rapidly, and in such an army Reserve formations nre wholly out nf place. The effect has been to ?oi'nr-.vhat weaken the war strength on napfi , , tut combats are not won with what: is shown on paper but with what can be brought up in a. reasonable state of efficiency to confront tho enemy. Much, however, still remains to bo done before the kingdom's modest little field army of I'O.flflO men or so arrives at the stab of preparedness for war that might be expected from n country of such wealth and of such vast natural resources.