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THE MOROCCAN CRISIS.

D KAISER AND HIS ADVISERS. SATISFACTORY TREATY EXPECTED IN PARIS. CESSION OF FRENCH CONGO. By Telegraph—l'rcss Association—Ooiiyricht (Rec. July 31, 51.50 p.m.) Berlin, July. 31. The Kaiser's interview with his Ministers has concluded. Tho "Frankfurter Zoilung" stares that it has been assured from a competent source Hint the Kaiser thoroughly agrees with the action of his Ministers. CONFERENCE ON ROYAL YACHT. Berlin, July 30. Ren von Dethmann-Hollweg, Imperial Chancellor, and Herr von luderlenWacchter, Minister for Foreign Affairs, have joined tho Kaiser on board the Imperial yacht Hohenzolleru. The inspired press predict that the visit will strengthen the Foreign Minister's policy in regard to tho occupation of Agadir, in Southern Morocco. ANGLO-FRENCH RELATIONS. Paris, July 30. Sir Francis Bertie, British Ambassador in Paris, has conferred with M. de Selves, the French Foreign Minister. Tho newspaper "Lo Temps" states that the two representatives discussed what portion of the Congo France was prepared to cede to Germany in exchange for a freo hand in Morocco. M. do Selves, after a Cabinet Council, stated that ho was hopeful a new treaty would be concluded satisfying the parties interested. GERMAN SOCIALIST ATTITUDE. THE SOLIDARITY OF LABOUR. (Rec. July 31, 9.50 p.m.) Berlin, July 31. In, welcoming visiting French trade unionists, the Socialists held a. demonstration, and pledged themselves to do all in their power to prevent the Moroccan crisis from eventuating in hostilities. Tho Socialist newspaper "Vorwaerts," in commenting on the situation, declares that German workmen will show that the international solidarity of labour is not an empty phrase. EVENTS PRECEDING THE CRISIS. THE COURSE OF FRENCH POLICY. The course of French policy in Morocco—from which ths present international crisis has since developed—was reviewed in an important tlebato in the irench Chamber on June IG. M. Paul Desehanel, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Chamber, reviewed tho action of France in a speech which occupied 20 minutes, and was a model of lucidity. In his judgment the essential cause of the crisiswith which France had had to deal was the irresolution of her- policy. The French Government, or rather, the permanent Departmental officials, had to such an extent delayed the decisions which tho Kultari's want of resources and lack of troops had rendered necessary that' France had seemed, to submit to events rather than to foresee and forestall them. At the same time ho expressed the conviction that there was nothing in the treaties to which Franco was a party that could have prevented her from advancing on' Fez by the Taza route from the east.

"With regard to the future, M. Deschaucl laid it down that there could be no question of a general and prolonged occupation of Morocco, which would paralyse French action in Europe. , The essential thing was that France should not have to do tho work of pacification all over again. The roads and lines of communication with the interior must lie kept open. In tho future, as in the past, the other Powers would find that they would lose nothing in consequence of French policy, the primary object of which was to maintain the Sultan's authority. Germany's coonqinio interests, iu particular, which by the FrancoGerman Agreement of 1909 were declared to bo that Power's fole concern in Morocco, worn safe. As for Spain, thero was a secret treaty between her ond France, and lie himself had condemned arrangements of this kind. But the Algevir.is Act superseded all interior agreements which were in conflict with it.

Statement by M, Cruppi. j 'The then Foreign Minister, M. Cruppi, replied to the interpellation by retracing the incidents which led to the French operations. 51. Cruppi demonstrated that, in tho opinion of the French ConMil at Fez and of other competent judges, tho military situation of the capital rendered relief urgent, especially after Major Breniond's return from the Sherarda country, when the insurgents closed round tho city nnd cut it completely off from the outside world. For a time the outlook was critical, and those who had friends or acquaintances in Fez passed many anxious moments. The Frencli relief force was organised at the Sultan's request. The advance was made from tho west because this was the region in which were asFemblerl the Shereefian forcea with which tho French troops were to co-operate. As for the future, France was determined to vindicate her rights and maintain her interests.' The signatory Powers had been notified of her intentions. The organisation of the Shereefian forces would signify the restoration of order and, with it, the creation bf revenue for the -Maghzen. Both these results would redound to the advantage of ill Europe. Tho French pro.?ramnio was in conformity with tho Algeciras Act and could not excite misgivings in any quarter if Parliament and public opinion enabled tho Government to carry it through. ■•

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https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/DOM19110801.2.48

Bibliographic details

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1194, 1 August 1911, Page 5

Word Count
801

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS. Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1194, 1 August 1911, Page 5

THE MOROCCAN CRISIS. Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1194, 1 August 1911, Page 5