FORTHEFIRST TIME

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1035, 26 January 1911, Page 6

FORTHEFIRST TIME

l{ ;: ]S .REAL CRITICISM. I:; . '.THE FIELD" DAY: >f KARORI. T; -TRUTH FOR .TERRITORIALS. ' , 1, ■ ■■_: . ,„. :■ .-.'. .. : . .■'..-. .■ ~ .. , j., '.: Trenchant'though kindly, is the truth '.'■ .'now :being. handed out to our- Territor- [;:■ j ialsi."Under expert eyes the. old blots |\ :; R-liich' N havo* disfigured manoeuvres year jo;" after'year. in the past are being pointed ;■ ;-7 Dut."They are biots.'clue to'the' defective' J.';.'"';-. knowledge.of-many of our company'and r...; regimental officers; to say,nothing .of-the iy.: rank.and file whoso notions of-,tactics are ;';;,usually vague. Lieutenant-Colonel J. T. !■;-/Burnett-Stuart, D.S.O (Director of Mili- !;, iary .Operations and Intelligence on' the 1;.'., New "Zealand General Staff) in a, very in- ?::. : teresting. memorandum thus reviews the f /; -battalion field : day at Karori South on ;':'... Monday last:—' ■ . ,: -•■ I; ' .'' : V.'l'■ THE CRITI.CISM.";.;. ; !..v,'.. "It-appeared to that the', situation I created by .-the : scheme, as I. understood [■ -it,} yr'ifi a little iunreal,.in that one side; f .;•.■', was'sjipposed.to represent an v out-post lino {-:';■, (or a.jine of defence, just taken over from' !.:.-■• an out-post line) which was beyond 'the I;;.;: reach; of; support , for a- period of : .24 [V hours. , Such - a .state.'of affairs is,-., of I',.- course, -very improbable. '■• i J.,' '-'. : v Also. the relative : strength of "the at- ? .'--tachers to the ■'defenders vrasi far, too■ p, email, both sides being of equal strength. I;'. In -.such a country ■ the: attackers" should fi:y. have: been to,tho defender a(; least r as two f , .-_.-' or three .to- one, ~■'. •,■ •.. ••' - , '' l -'- '■:. ■ I '.;, Finally ' any scheme which-> introducestv...imaginary forces into , the battlefield itK : eelf/or which in any way represents.local-[',';■-■.ilies';;or; troops to bo other ■ than-•' they/ [r ■;, ieally' ; are, cannot be satisfactory or hold fiV-V-the■ interest.; of the troops.-.-! Commanders 1:,.' should be tan£bt.-tp. take the. troops-.'and; {.:: the Brqnnd,exa'ctlx ; andi'malte ; ihe';^est'';;of--T;liein';' ,; ''The'-"6cheme'-wns--iJbl;' ;'; ..quite .suitable. to,..t_ho : . numbers ..of .troops. Ki-'i. engaged., I, know,, of course, how very r : . difficult it.is to; connect a scheme with C- '■'.*'"-.realistic baoltground for-sinall bodies ;-.';''■ of troops,, arid this particular" scheme did r ; ■ at'least-produco-an instructive fight'atf;:.'.the proposed time-and place. ''■ .-'" ' ii ; .The- extent of front taken-' up .by : the f.'. defenders .was too'-gi-eat-. for: the ; number tj.~ of'•_ men-available to hold , . ifc-r.-.-I did not f./ 7 think it was well chosen: -Had I-been j-.-.v in .'.the. place .of tho: Commander -of-the 0: ■■■■ Defence, I .would havei-held •■the! ridge' be- ;".' ■■ hind ,(where..tho dressing'station-was), as. S ■ my main position,', arid would.'have occu- , f;: ■ pied'-the; forward ridge by i.-few:gronps '■'.-.'■/ only, just.sufficient to check the ,enemy!s '>, ■■'• scouts, and. to make ihim. deploy to ref :■: iinforce them. -.-'.■'. > ; '■'..' '•■■ • .-. /■",-;' ..The.groups would. j : . to,retire:on,to the,main position long be- -.'-■ vfore.they.werb,Vard pressed.'; They.would'I: , have caused the enemy to waste a great '~.'deal-of time without suffering much loss ;•■..--■. themselves, and time was .ofyery great c - .importance to-the, defence";-: .-/;■;•,

;■ I;; v. Faulty Line of Battle. ; - ?■■"■"" : Nor didil think- that the position, ence ;v ; chosen,, was well-occupied. The, line was ;- ; .:-!reak : everywhere andrstrong nowhere. Tho '~-'_ : 7nen , dispersed that■' lire '.'control,t ■ : which is of the, utmost importance, was f.,! : very; difficult, if not impossible, , and were i- ; ; for. th'e.;most part placed;on'the.skjijjne, !*.'■ , -when tliey.should:have been a littlo t'.pwn ;. , the' forward slope where. the field of (fire i'- '..xfas.better, and 'i they' themselves less!coni*.,.,: epicupus.' The .reserve;!\vas' so far-back £:■'■•■' that;:it .could . n0t...b0 used ,at~'all.*•,'. Tho i';'.'■'■ : dressing:statioii was also, too, far away. :.I '■■~; liavo 'been do.wnvby the ;.'■';: etteam; ihj'.rear , of the centre! of-the posi-;---i-'!*!tion;. ;■,:.;'. ,'i -.;*';'■' '■'.;.,- '*~: i :*.; ■-, : -.'.-_ :■'■: The country is, ..of. course,!- extremely ; ; (difficult, bat, if anything, it.favours thr t ;; defence. .It-is full, of .tactically.nominating K .joints." ''The Commauder- would, in my v'-opinion, have done* better to have picked v! ■ out these points, of which the point where ;,, the attack eventually came was the more ;! -important; anil.'occupied-^''them strongly. ?;': .-with, well-ordered fire units, leaving; the ; -spaces-between watched -but -unoccupied.. :T-''*lt mflst;bGi'remembered ' that in suph.'ftJ ;.**.'' country fhere'are ; very.- few 'lilies. of"Sα- ;.'■'..■' .vance .feasible -for men in marching order, ; ■..especially when nnsu2portcd byi'artillery. i- These, lines' of advance .are generally-"ap-li -:parent'if the lie' of'the ground.is studied, k'! end'it is on them that the-defence , should r . "be, concentrated..' ':*' ';:'!';.! ':.'■■:■.'■'.: I-.-. !' .Another important tactical ■■ characteris- ;.; Hie: of such,"country lies in t!>c-- fact that ; ! dt is. extremely difßcult to.evacuate' posijV : tions-pnee :takcn-up.- ; For instance,: no ;■ :. retirement on a largo jealo would! have S . .been possible from.the , poEitioji-'held.this ? morning,, unless commenced, at-least one* i- .'hour!'before the enemy, .'could- get > on ;;'■; to. it. . If- stuck to;, too'long, if.'be- :'! camoJa, fighting .there, to'/ a,I finish", an unpleasant thing to' have to 1 '(Iα •. : in :a-position so cutoff from :th'e reach' of i\' leinforcementS). so far. from-' -the-; point , i;:. whichj'it was.supposed to coyer,- and sqout. ■■■-'■'• of reach of (he maih.rtiadi' : ; : ..: ':s,. [.",-' Tho! ridge:'behind ..suffered.' from.. noi.e {. v \ of". thqse. disadvantages, and •jAsp J &f[ orded,' !*.V>j'physically, a better position toxoid.. !

'■ ; ' Unknown- though as 'old as. Napoleon. !, v :-; r The. attack was open to the samo criti- }. j..cism';as the defence-T-jf. suffered,, from. 100. »/: great" "dispersion. 'A- frontal'l attack on f. .-'. Buch a posiiion .was, , of'.cburjeiimpossiblo ■(■".[■'■withl-'aify chance 'of success, The. only way .to. compete with ; sucli"'a.' : po'sitio'ri ;.■■;•.' would 'be' to reconnoitre it thoroughly •', by scouts', so ns to try and' discover the ';■ :-' enemy's-strength,, select, the -point. of-.at-,v'; tack,", and-then put"every available .man■ !.-.';•: at', that point, leaving'only suffioietit-men. I ,: : along, .the front'.to'subnort the. : Scouts'-'in SV . keeping the .defender"to • the'-rest'- of ; hfs , f :■: line.; ' \ . .\.!,U--. .>.',.■:'•'•: /,;,. ~'..;■,' ■■ ';■'.•.■.;.>, The, flanks.were clearly, .indicated as. ['■. ■■, - practically the only poi'nts "at ■ which' ■'.'.success''could bo honed: for; 'the point '{■'■:• -selected (tlie enemy's yleft).'. wa's "■ well i-.. chosen, and .the attack ' on' it. carried, out ',■;'■•,. with great.'spirit. ■ I thought: the', work.: ; ; : ..'; "done,: by- the Highland- Company;; and tiio ;'.■ .College. lliflcs. was very, good-indeed. , : But. ;v,. they stracl; me as being so 'surprised at *■':■■■ their success as to bo incapable.of taking r. -full-advantage of■ it. Nevertheless it.was '":.•-.-. a'great pleasure to see'tho-attack, carried' ';■ out with so much'spirit over.such difc ;;'■; cult, and steep ground. ■■'-. •'.■•••_.•■.:.•. '' . \ : . •'-. : ■ There were, numerous opportunities for. ■■;.'. small counter attacks on tho part of'the ;':. defenders, but not" taken - ady -vantage of. It is very. easy'. ia .;.:th.eso. . 'Small fights'in very steen coun'tTy'-'for'. ;.;.■ fresh men on the top of a position to ; l :- ■ push; the .esliausted attackers' dp*n' : again:-' ;,., even, thongh, they may have ' been snr-' ':.,: pnsed into p. temporary retreat." .' ' , ;;■.'■'■■ '.•:■■■''• No Umpires!" ':,.■, i •'..': .- It. struck mo as a'yery great, pity'that :■ '-■ there were,no unmires, and no arrange-' ' -..meiits for controlling the fight. .Umpires ;-. ..should always bo obtained, and I. should ;-■■ think, that officers of other arms would i-'!:.-.-willingly lend their services for the sal;e ■ " of the instruction afforded.

I think tho' chief lessou to bo learnt by all.ronks from the mornings manoeuvres is , the danger of 'dispersion '.ami tho necessity for keeping the -men -in hand as long as possible. .: Troops, get out of hand in a modern battle .quite soon enough' without scattering them broadcast from the start. And the less .thorough . tho, training and discipline of ' the troops, the' greater : the necessity' for; keeping them together as long as possible. ■ It, is the natural tendency of most commanders of. bodies of-troops in an. extensive and difficult country to try and cover too much ground. Nothing is moro dangerous.- Experience shows that the commander who keens His force the longest in hand eventually controls the battle. One round of ball ammunition: was fired to my certain 'knowledge, fortunately without-result. This might have'led t'o a very _fprioiis accident, and points to carelessness in the inspection of pouches. Such a contretemps should never occur. I heard'the "ccafo fire" blown early in the day, There is no such field call. The only call that can be sounded during the operations by anyone except the director of the operations is the "charge." The operation orders were very well and carefully written. But I think it would .have been better practice if orders had been written oil the ground—after the troops had reached their rendezvous. The' map used did very great credit to the officers who compiled it. It wasclear and accurate. ,"