BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

Dominion, Volume 4, Issue 1027, 17 January 1911, Page 4

BRITAIN AND GERMANY.

It _ is clear from the cablegrams published yesterday and on preceding days that Germany has. gained something through her recent negotiations with Russia regarding the. Bagdad Railway, but details as to what she has gained are wanting. The Vnssische_ ZeiUtng states that the Potsdam interview has put an end to intrigues whereof the object was to encircle Germany and oxclude her from commcrcial competition. That is probably the German paper's way of "describing British policy, and' if the assertion that neither Britain nor France were consulted, even by Russia,- is to be credited, it is certainly not superfluous for tho Vossischc Zeitmg to add that the Potsdam interview has not modified alliances or ententes. Similarly, the situation has in it enough grounds for uneasiness on the part of Britain and France to call for the. declaration of the German Ghancollor "that Germany and Russia would not enter into a combination conceived in a spirit of aggression against other Powers." Such declarations are notoriously open to suspicion—or perhaps it would bo more correct to say thatthey are not to be literally accepted in simple faith as binding over a long period, and that those who make them do not expect them to be so accepted in the quarters primarily interested. It may easily be balioved that Russia is not just now in an aggressive mood, but can the same be said of Germany? Do Germany's colonial . ambitions, her naval activity, her designs in the Balkans and Asia Minor mean aggression, or peaceful development and- natural expansion ? And if the latter, aro tho policies in question of such a character that, if persisted in, a collision with other Powers is bound to result ? And would Germany so persist and bring on a' European war 1 These are some of the most important and most difficult questions which the statesmanship of tbo Old World has immediately beforo it. Some light is thrown upon them by an articlo which was contributed to the December number of the Nineteenth Century by Sin Harry Johnston. Acting' on tho belief that frank public discussion of the questions alienating Britain and her allies—France and Russia—from the two great Clerman Empires of Central Europe would pavo the way for diplomatic efforts towards a better understanding, Sir Harry Johnston, during a recent visit to Germany, discussed tho position with officials, politicians, men of science, and leaders of industry and commerce. - As a result he is able to set out, in the

article mentioned, what 110 believes to be the views of enlightened and intelligent Germans, leaving out of account the unreasonable aspirations of jingoes and the unrealisable hopes of tho few who, in the interests of their country's internal welfare, would abandon all efforts towards political expansion. "Tho crux of the problem" is thus stated by Sir. Harry Johnston: " G-erniauy, Austrian Germany, Hungary, and oven til? Slav States of the Austrian Empire, are resolved—like us, like Franco anil Ru>sia—to play a great part in tho future liistoiv of the Old World. They propose as their theatre of political influence, commercial expansion, and agricultural experiments, the undeveloped lands of the Balkan Peninsula, of Asia Minor, and of -Mesopotamia, down even to the mouth of the Euphrates. . . . German influence at Constantinople would become supreme, whether or not it was under tho bhick-whito-and-ied flag or under the Crescent and Star ensign of Byzantium. Sir Harry Johnston's German acquaintances tried to show him that the three Powers of the Triple Entente had no reason to oppose these designs. If Russia would consent to German predominance at Constantinople and over a great part of tho Turkish Empire, Germany might, they suggested, guarantee the independence of Denmark, involving free ingress and-egross of the Baltic Sea, and would perhaps admit the right of Eussia to a strip of territory on the Asiatic side of the Bosporus, and a sphere of influence in the north of Asia Minor, besides recognising Russia's special need of access to the Persian Gulf.' How much of this'suggested bargain has been effected by' the discussions at Potsdam- is matter for conjecture. In regard to England, the Germans reminded Sir Harry Johnston of a sentence uttered by oxPresident Roosevelt in. an important public speech in London, but (so it is asserted) not reported by the London press. Mr. Roosevelt said: "The best guarantee for Great Britain on the Nile is the presence of Germany on. the' Euphrates." They argued, on this text, that enlightened nations should make common cause in tho task of controlling and developing the misgoverned and uncivilised parts of the world. An Anglo-German understanding, would, However, have .to - include, they further informed the inquiring a recognition that henceforth tho Kingdom of the Netherlands must come'within the German sphere. They added that an alliance for offensive and defensive purposes already existed between Holland and Germany. Belgium the,v would - leave. alone unless "driven to extremes" by being "blocked in other directions."' In that event, the "duel with Great Britain" would be begun, not by transporting an army corps across the North. Sea, but by a German occupation of Belgium and Holland. In transcribing these views of representative Germans, Sir Harry Johnston does not nocessarily endorse them.* What he doss insist upon is that there must be somewhere a point beyond which German ambition ' is foolish, but short of which the restraint of Germany by tho Triple Entente is unwise. If that point were determined by a formal or informal conference of diplomatists, a complete understanding might, hq thinks, be arrived at whereby the military burdens of millions of European people would bo lightened and the. civilisation of many, backward', and savage peoples brought nearer to ; achievement. In this laudable > endeavour to clear the air it is regrettable that Sir Harry Johnston docs not state whether or not tho opinions of educated. and thoughtful Germans, as | expressed to him, .are shared in high official circles,. His outline of those views docs, however, bear a strong resemblance to the official' German policy as summarised .by the Spectator in an article which, although it appeared before Sir Harry Johnston's contribution to the .Viiietccntk Centura, might very well be read as a reply to it. ■ This talk of hemming in, and the assertion that limitation-of armaments, can only be obtained by a political understanding with Germany, 'if translated into plain words, amount to nothing less than this. Britain can only have the kind of understanding with Germany upon which a limitation of naval armaments can be bused on condition that sho gives up tho understandings with Frnnco and Russiaunderstandings the effects- of which, though the British Government have shrunk from putting them into such sim-. l'lo terms, are as follows: If cither Franco or Russia, or both, should bo attacked by Germany and her allies, -ivo shall go to their assistance, for we .daro not allow Germany- to . dominate the Continent and have Kuropo at her mercy. Thero is the whole thing in black and-white. . It will be seen ,that the difference between the two versions of German, opinion is mainly a. difference' of tone and does not amount to a contradiction. And we should think that until Gorman ambitions arc considerably modified, responsible Britons will prefer the tone of the Spectator article. Nevertheless tho full and frank discussion desired by Sir Harry Johnston would cause existing dangers to be defined and possibly diminished.