RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.

Cromwell Argus, Volume XVII, Issue 833, 31 March 1885, Page 3

RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.

WHY RUSSIA DESIRES WAR. The St. Petersburg correspondent of the St. James' Gazette, writing of the present position of affairs in Russia, says : " Symptoms of fear, not only for any personal safety of the Czar, but of a gen ral rising, and especially of a military revolt, abound on every side. Peculation and official corruption, after receiving a momentary check, are as rife as ever. Immediately after the Russia-Turkish war the Czar made a spasmodic attempt at reform in this direction, an attempt which almost resulted in his bringing one of his own near relatives before a court-martial ; but of late he has seemed to acknowledge that the task of cleansing such a gigantic Augean stable as the Russian Administration is beyond even his theoretically uubounded power, and things have gradually drifted baok to their former deplorable state. Jew-halting, Nihilist hunting, oppression of the Baltic provinces in the west, and extension of the frontier in the east on the principles laid down in General Skobelofi's celebrated letter, suffice to fully occupy the time and attention of the Emperor's present counsellors, who would regard any attempt at internal reform as a most dangerous proceeding. The more intelligent and enlightened members even of the Conservative party view the situation with undisguised alarm. * The higher the pressure at which the machinery of despotic government is being driven, and the tighter every safety valve is screwed down, the more violent and disastrous, they prognosticate, will be the final explosion. That the present state of affairs cannot last ranch longer, unless public at'ention is distracted from Home matters

by a great war, is an article of faith with every sensible man throughout the Empire." AX ARM* OEFICEn'S OPINION. As an officer who has served in India and travelled in Afghanistan, Sir K. W. Cumming, who is at present in Auckland, takes a lively interest in Indian affairs. His opinion is that if Earl Beacousfield had been allowed to carry out his Indian policy the present trouble would never have arisen, at all events the struggle would have been postponed for a generation. It was too late now to remedy that mistake, and the contest for empire between Russia and India would yet have to be fought out on the plains of India. Anyone who had travelled in Afghanistan—who had seen the character of the country and its passes—would understand the difficulty under which Russia would labor in an invasion of India. Even with strategic railways the difficulty of feeding an army and keeping it supplied with munitions of war, so far from a good base, would be enormous. The moment a Russian army debouched from the passes on to the plains of India, they would be confronted with a European army of 60,000 men, with a rich country behind it, and a Native army drawn from the hill tribes and most warlike sections of the population of India, who want nothing better than fighting. A Russian army suffering defeat in such a position would either be annihilated or go into captivity. The Afghans would cut them to piece* in the retreat; not that they had any great hatred to Russians, or love for the British, but just for pure love of fighting and devilment. In view of the physical difficulties of the route which has to be taken by the Russians in invading British India, he regarded any serious attempt of the kind as impracticable for a generation or two to come.