THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1989. Avoiding a Soviet backlash

Press, 22 November 1989, Page 20

THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 22, 1989. Avoiding a Soviet backlash

It is tempting to regard European Community leaders, who gathered last week-end in Paris for a summit, as wet blankets at a dizzy party. The Europeans were cautious, unspectacular but realistic; they were, in other words, very different in utterance, attitude and action from the human tide that is toppling or modifying Governments in the East and exciting the attention and awe of the world. The cool message from Pans is exactly what Europe needs. The summit successfully addressed the core but frequently overlooked the issue of Europe’s ferment. The continued integrity and security of the Soviet Union must not be threatened. The equation is simple: reform that threatens the Soviet Union has no hope of success; reform that is unthreatening may succeed. In so calculating, the Kremlin is doing no more than exercising the fundamental instinct of national selfprotection, an instinct that Western leaders respect because they share it. The Soviet Union has probably read the mood in East Europe correctly and has done nothing to dissuade either the ordinary people or the East European communist leaders from accommodating this mood. The thrust is not necessarily a huge diversion from two generations of communism, any more than the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in Peking were a thrust towards democracy as it is known in the West. Both movements, though carrying the slogan of democracy, represent more precisely a feeling that the system has failed to deliver a reasonable standard of living, has applied undue repression, has failed to keep promises, and has tolerated bungling management and is due for reform. Reform does not inevitably mean wholly throwing out communist ideals and wholly adopting Western styles of government and economic management. The mood certainly seems to drive towards more responsive government, more efficient management, greater personal freedom and greater respect for diverse opinion through parliamentary representation. All this is in line with the Gorbachev theme; it is not an automatic rejection of the ideals that have been instilled in the people for decades. Least of all does the Gorbachev theme imply shattering the security of integrity of the Soviet Union or the shield of its East European allies. On this kind of appraisal the Paris summit constructed its stand. European security — the military balance between N.A.T.O. and the Warsaw Pact — should remain undisturbed; borders are not at issue; the reunification of Germany is not a priority; the West will not attempt to make clients of the states of the East; the West will not indulge itself with inflammatory ~ propaganda against communism under strain; economic and technical aid will be rewards "to those regimes that significantly reform. , ' ' These policies have not suddenly

emerged. In somewhat haphazard fashion they have been implemented by Washington, London, Paris and Bonn since President Gorbachev ushered in the new era. What the Paris summit did was formalise and unify the European Community’s approach, which is an important advance. On the one hand it must increase the Kremlin’s confidence, and on the other hand it lessens the widespread feeling that the West is fumbling in its response to the historically signficant reshaping of Europe. The speed and radical extent of the reshaping had taken the Western allies by surprise; their policy-makers seemed not to have thought the issues through, and the politicians as a consequence were inclined to seem passively inadequate. The Paris meeting will have significantly altered that. The Community now has unity of purpose. Further the stand has such a foundation in common sense that the United States will probably give its support. The American policy towards the events in Eastern Europe has been level-headed and restrained. However, there is suspicion in the Community that President Bush and President Gorbachev, meeting in the Mediterranean on December 2 and 3, will do a deal over the heads of the Europeans. The Paris summit was, in part, an attempt to forestall that by signalling to the Russians and Americans that they must deal with a united Western Europe, that the Community’s interests have to be taken into serious account. This, though, is a side issue, at least for the moment; it would be uncharacteristic of the cool heads in Washington and the Community conspicuously to divide over the handling of the Eastern crisis. It is so overwhelmingly in everyone’s interest that European security (both Eastern and Western) be maintained that a divided approach is improbable. Unity and restraint and confidence-building are needed. No-one among the Western European leaders is trying to revive the Cold War or obstinately resisting hopeful signs of people getting a better deal in the Eastern bloc. The old and repressive rigidities of communism are likely to go; virtually all the East European Governments now recognise that a tide of dissatisfaction cannot be held back. Reshaping their economies may take years; the formation of new parties and policies will take at least months and the East Europeans must be allowed time to take stock. All this is duller than, for instance, hacking at the Berlin Wall or abolishing the Communist Party in Hungary; but it is a necessary policy to secure change. The emotion on the streets of Europe must not be translated into emotional international policies if a repressive backlash from a threatened Soviet Union is to be avoided. Mr Gorbachev does not look like a man who would order such a backlash; but he, too, has to stay in office to keep his policies on track.