Flawed story of winning a war

Press, 22 July 1989, Page 23

Flawed story of winning a war

World War ll—The Untold Story. By Philip Warner. The Bodley Head Book Reps, 1988. 308 pp. $49.95. (Reviewed by Oliver Riddell) This useful book, rich in insights, is marred by too many errors of fact and by too many assertions that cannot be sustained. It is aimed at the casual general reader rather than serious students of the affairs of 1939 to 1945. But serious readers will find much to enjoy and ponder over, too. Warner’s greatest strengths are his penchant for one-liner interpretations of events, usually pithy and very much to the point, and his ability to synthesise the electronic and intelligence activities of all sides so they fit into and explain the general pattern of events. His judgments of the use both Allied

and Axis commanders made of the brilliant intelligence coups their boffins presented them with are harsh but fair. Sadly, there are too many mistakes at the heart of his account to make this a reliable general account of the Second World War. At one end of the scale, he says Smolensk is only 100 miles from Moscow. Such a contraction of distance prevents the reader from comprehending how well the German Army did to get that far, let alone to the suburbs of Moscow. At the other end of the scale, General Douglas MacArthur is credited with the Allies’ islandhopping strategy against Japan. Admiral King and Admiral Nimitz fought hard for that strategy against

the mulish obstinancy of General MacArthur. Eventually they had to rely on President Roosevelt to make a War-winning decision in their favour. This is symptomatic of the way Warner plays favourites. The neurotic and egocentric General Montgomery may not have been as attractive a person as the austere General Auchinlech, but Warner must be one of the few who thinks the Auk was a better commander than Monty. Sometimes in his urgency to make a point Warner strays into the bizarre. Does he really think Stalin purged his top generals in the 1930 s because they were opposed to tanks? Nor, judging by the early successes of the German invasion in 1941, is it easy to believe Warner when he says these purges enabled a more capable leadership cadre to take over. New Zealand readers will be particularly interested to learn that the only mention of their soldiers is that they joined British units because the New Zealand Government failed to support British war aims. Otherwise, New Zealand only rates a mention as a supplier of armaments (?) and food. There are simply too many instances of such generalised inaccuracy. Yet there is also a great deal for a reader at any level of expertise to enjoy. Warner does not shirk from moral judgments about the commanders and the strategies. Too often historians do shirk it. He is certainly right in saying that this was a war that, for the future of the planet, the Allies had to win. They took an awfully long time to do it, given their preponderance of men and material. Warner is very good at explaining why it took so long, and how they did it in the end.