THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1989. Not on speaking terms

Press, 28 June 1989, Page 16

THE PRESS WEDNESDAY, JUNE 28, 1989. Not on speaking terms

The United States Secretary of Defence, Mr Cheney, made a mistake when he said that he would have been willing to see the Prime Minister of New Zealand in Washington and that the only reason why he did not see him was that Mr Lange did not ask for a meeting. This was an understandable mistake. Mr Cheney was simply applying his common sense in replying to a question. If he had been briefed fully he would have been told by his officials that it was not the policy of the United States Administration for him to receive New Zealand Ministers. Having not received such a policy briefing, or without knowledge of the policy, there is no way that he could have arrived at that conclusion through using his common sense, through considering the long-term interests of the United States, or by just applying common courtesy.

The incident illustrates very well the bizarre situation that has been reached. Mr Cheney had talked to Mr Don McKinnon, the Deputy Leader of the Opposition, but not to the leader of the Government. Just to make sure that the policy is not misunderstood again, an official Pentagon spokesman has since said: “It is our general policy to meet equally with representatives of governments and opposition parties. However, given the posture of the current New Zealand Government, our general policy doesn’t apply in the case of New Zealand.” The only other obvious instance in which high-level contact between the two Governments has been banned by the United States is that of China. This policy is a response to the massacre in Tiananmen Square. It may be expected that the snub to Chinese leaders is somewhat academic anyway and will be a short-term measure. The Chinese leadership is too preoccupied to bother in the meantime. If the present differences between New Zealand and the United States persist, high level contacts between China and the United States may be restored before those between New Zealand and the United States.

The ban on high-level contacts was one of a series of measures taken by the United States in response to the New Zealand Government’s ban on visits of nuclear capable warships to New Zealand ports. The other measures were the suspension of the United States security guarantee to New Zealand, the refusal to conduct military exercises with New Zealand, the suspension of intelligence information, and a refusal to give continued priority to New Zealand in the procurement of weapons. The ban on highlevel contacts has been confined to political and security affairs. It means that New Zealand Ministers and the New Zealand Ambassador to the United States cannot see the Secretaries of State and Defence, the President or the Vice-President. They are able to talk to Administration officials up to the level of Assistant Secretary. Those who favour the ban on nuclearcapable warships may be presumed to be prepared to forgo some of the military connections with the United States, including the A.N.Z.U.S. arrangements. But there is a pettiness about the ban on high-level contacts that does not befit the relationship between two generally like-minded countries that treasure democracy, place high values on human rights, and cultivate tolerance as a national characteristic. When many New Zealanders see that the United States President will receive the leaders from a host of countries whose political systems and behaviour are abhorrent both to Americans and to New Zealanders, and yet does not receive the leader of the New Zealand Government, who has faced two elections in the last five years, the effect is chilling and must lead to an increase in public feeling against the United States.

Like Americans who may or may not have voted for the President but still accept

him, New Zealanders accept that Mr Lange is their Prime Minister and, as such, represents their Government. It is a slight if members of an opposition party are accorded greater respect than the Prime Minister. Part of the problem lies in the reaction to Mr Lange himself. Both the former Secretary of State, Mr Shultz, and a former Secretary of Defence, Mr Weinberger, considered that they did not want anything more to do with Mr Lange. The causes were diverse and for a long time included the mistaken belief that the anti-nuclear policy was a personal crusade of Mr Lange’s. Another mistaken belief was that Mr Lange could have led the Labour Party away from the anti-nuclear stance, and even that he misled the American Administration on the ships question. Personal antipathies can be understood, and both Mr Shultz and Mr Weinberger were important enough to the Reagan Administration to impose their own will on the question of whether they would meet Mr Lange or other New Zealand Government Ministers. The policy of imposing a ban on high-level contacts may have arisen out of the whims of Mr Shultz and Mr Weinberger. However, such personal attitudes are an inappropriate way for a mature country to continue to conduct its affairs. Now that neither Mr Shultz nor Mr Weinberger form part of the United States Administration, the time would seem right to rethink that type of response.

New Zealand has much to gain from closer political contact between the two countries. The United States has something to gain from closer political contact with New Zealand as well. China, Antarctica, the South Pacific, and Cambodia all require concentrated attention from both countries and perhaps some co-ordinated action. New Zealand officials, with whom the United States still deals, are public servants and, under a Westminster Parliamentary system, can offer advice but can neither formulate nor implement policy without the authority of the elected Government. Thus the United States needs to deal with the country’s political leaders for effective communication. For the United States, the ban on nuclear ships by New Zealand presented a problem of precedent. If New Zealand seemed able to adopt that policy without cost, other countries of far greater strategic importance to the United States might also adopt similar policies. So the United States was making an example of New Zealand. Personal hurt affected the attitude of a great many high American officials. Long military and diplomatic links were broken and many American officials were aware that politicians, not diplomats, had banned the ships. Measures were adopted to keep politicians away from inner circles. The wider interests of the United States might seem to dictate continued disapproval of New Zealand, but surely not a policy that is marked by pique. However angry the United States was about the ban, it knows very well that there was a world of difference between what happened in Tiananmen Square and what happened when New Zealand refused to accept the U.S.S. Buchanan. The political snub may well have been devised as an alternative to the more drastic action that some United States politicians were seeking a few years ago. In this light, the snub can be rated as the least of possible actions. Against that, it is highly likely that the discourtesy has done much to raise moderate New Zealand opinion against the United States and against A.N.Z.U.S. The effect on public opinion of the personal slight may be more profound than the more sophisticated arguments about security, nuclear weapons and ship visits. The American Administration would do well to ponder the effect of public bad manners.