THE PRESS SATURDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1988. Dealing with the P.L.O.

Press, 17 December 1988, Page 20

THE PRESS SATURDAY, DECEMBER 17, 1988. Dealing with the P.L.O.

The decision by the United States to deal directly with the Palestine Liberation Organisation has the potential for the biggest change in the Middle East at least since the Egypt-Israel peace agreement of 1979. The seriousness with which both the P.L.O. and the United States are treating the subject may be judged from the willingness of the P.L.O. leader, Mr Yasser Arafat, to make pledges using a form of words which met Washington’s requirements and by the swiftness of the response of the United States to that formulation. Mr Arafat explicitly recognised Israel’s right to exist, endorsed two key United Nations resolutions, and renounced violence. Within hours the United States said that it would open talks with the P.L.O. and soon after that the United States Ambassador to Tunisia, Mr Robert Palletreau, spoke to the P.L.O. headquarters in Tunisia by telephone. The United States move came at a time when the chances for progress in the Middle East had begun to look bleaker. Last month, Mr Arafat had been denied a visa to enter the United States to address the United Nations. This was because he was assumed to have knowledge of terrorist actions, including actions against American citizens. As a result, the General Assembly debate was shifted to Geneva. Mr Arafat was clearly straining to make concessions and the United States was demanding still more. For a while it appeared that the United States • was determined to refuse to deal directly with the P.L.0., very probably because it knew that any direct link would offend Israel. Mr Arafat knew he had some widespread international support for his moderate approach but the big prize for him was a more favourable attitude from the United States. In the end, the statement Mr Arafat made was sufficiently clear and unequivocal for the United States; and the United States showed its good faith by responding. The full details of what occurred may not be disclosed until the United States Secretary of State, Mr Shultz, writes his memoirs, if that is his intention. It may not be his intention. He is a vastly different man from one of his predecessors, Dr Henry Kissinger, who wrote extensively about his time in the Government. Suggestions have inevitably been made that Mr George Bush, the President-elect, was influential in changing the position of the United States. That may have only a limited accuracy. During the Reagan years the United States has been staunchly pro-Israel in its attitudes. This support for Israel has been linked with the religious fundamentalism which was very powerful for much of the Reagan Presidency. The Christian religious Right found Biblical justification for many of Israel’s actions. The emphasis given to military might during much of the Reagan Administration and Israel’s demonstrable strength may also have been factors which influenced Mr Reagan. Mr Bush does not have the political debts Mr Reagan owed to the fundamentalist sects or Mr Reagan’s disposition to appease the religious Right. He may also give more weight to diplomacy rather than the jingoistic beliefs which characterised much of Mr Reagan’s approach. Nevertheless, while it is true that Mr Bush would have been consulted and would have approved the move to deal directly with the P.L.0., it seems very likely that Mr Shultz devised a strategy to get the P.L.O. to commit itself openly on the three issues. Having been satisfied on those, he produced the United States response. The refusal of the visa to Mr Arafat is reported to have been made by Mr Shultz himself and this may have been part of his over-all strategy.

The effect of the United States move will be that fresh momentum will be given to the proposal for an international peace conference on the Middle East. That will probably mean that both the United States and the Soviet Union will favour such an international conference. The United States

has not yet said that it backs such a conference. Its official position is still that it favours direct talks between the Arab countries and Israel. But if the moves within the United Nations towards establishing an international conference gather backing, the United States may be prepared to take part. Certainly the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union on the Middle East now appear to be closer. Within hours of the Arafat statement and the United States action, the Soviet Union made an official declaration of recognition of Israel. Among the Arab countries, only Egypt recognises Israel diplomatically. A number of the moderate Arab countries may be influenced by the new position of the P.L.O. and by the hopes raised by the American readiness to deal directly with the P.L.O. A more conciliatory view of Israel would help to provide a favourable climate for an international conference. Of the Arab countries, Libya and Syria will be those most implacably opposed to any settlement. In the Muslim but non-Arabic world, Iran will take the same view.

The Israeli Government, which greeted the United States move with great dismay, is likely to oppose absolutely an international peace conference. The Israeli Prime Minister, Mr Shamir, has been sternly opposed to an international conference and the leader of the Labour Party in Israel, Mr Peres, while favouring a conference, has been opposed to P.L.O. participation.

The outcome of such a conference is bound to lead to the establishment of a Palestinian State based on the West Bank and Gaza. Some people in Israel consider that such a State would be a base for terrorism against Israel and, because of the closeness of the two countries, they believe that Israeli citizens would be in constant danger from attacks either from terrorists or from a large Arab contingent which would be able to get closer to the heartland of Israel itself. A Palestinian State would also mean that Israelis who are living in settlements in the West Bank and in Gaza would probably have to be relocated within the borders of Israel, whatever those borders were. Many in Israel still believe that it is the unchangeable aim of their Arab neighbours to destroy the State of Israel.

Although Mr Reagan has said that the United States remains committed. to the defence of Israel, pressure from the United States as well as from many other countries may persuade many Israelis to change their minds about settling the problem of the Palestinian refugees. Mr Shamir may be the last to change his mind, and religious extremists are unlikely ever to change their minds. However, the ordinary Israeli may in time come to see that the problems of the uprising in the Occupied Territories will have to be dealt with, that international pressure cannot be ignored forever, and that there may be a possibility that at last Israel will be able to live in peace with its neighbours. If that occurs, politicians will in the end have to take notice.

For a number of reasons, the United States will be the most powerful player in any moves. Many of Israel’s policies have been hinged on United States support. Within the last 12 months, Mr Shamir, in an article in the influential magazine, “Foreign Affairs,” wrote of Israel’s goals. Among them he listed “Solidifying Israel’s friendship and cooperation with the United States.” The United States is a major financial supporter of Israel and Israel cannot be indifferent to its attitudes. Israel has been able to shrug off much international criticism because it has had the backing of the United States. The United States decision this week to deal directly with the P.L.O. will send shock waves throughout Israel. Israel may now ask itself whether it has any friends at all. There is a chance, however, that a careful approach to the new situation by Israel will mean that it does not have to face the worse turmoils which have formed so much of its history.