Gaps in Australian air defence shown by successful ‘attacks’

Press, 25 August 1988, Page 32

Gaps in Australian air defence shown by successful ‘attacks’

TERRY O’CONNOR

By

NZPA-AAP Canberra

The Royal Australian Air Force cannot guarantee the safety of northern Australia even in an exercise, let alone a real war. Although the R.A.A.F. faces an almost impossible task in defending the “top end” given its present resources, it is not entirely blameless for that failure — as demonstrated by the numerous successful "attacks” against Darwin during a northern air defence exercise recently.

The attacks were made against defending R.A.A.F. fighters which had the advantage of borrowed American equipment and knowledge which, in all likelihood, would not be available in war.

"Pitch Black 88,” the R.A.A.F.’s largest exercise, was designed to test Australia’s northern air defences against the attack of a mythical Orangeland about 300 km to the north. As an exercise it was supposed to show up flaws

in the system so that they could then be rectified. But Orangeland was equipped with aircraft and technologies not yet available in our region in order to simulate a “high level threat,” even though official defence policy is that no such threat is likely to eventuate.

Senior R.A.A.F. officers emphasised the need to train against such a threat to ensure the R.A.A.F. is better able to handle the expected — rather like training to meet the All Blacks to prepare for a local 6th Grade match. So the United States Air Force and Marine Corps provided Fl 5 fighters and 852 and A 6 bombers to join R.A.A.F. F.lll bombers on the attacking side.

The defenders had R.A.A.F. FAIB Hornets and an American E 3 Sentry airborne warning and control system (A.W.A.C.S.), with both sides using American air-to-air refuelling aircraft.

From the start of the exercise on July 18 the defending Hornets and

Army Rapier missile batteries faced an impossible task — trying to stop every aircraft in every attack from reaching either the Darwin airfield or targets around it, or the radar site at Port Keats, west of Darwin. It was no surprise to the R.A.A.F. that the defenders failed in that task.

If there was any doubt about that failure, the low level bombing pass by four Fills just after 6 a.m. on the first morning dispelled it.

Senior R.A.A.F. officers had a long list of excuses to explain the failure, such as the defender’s disadvantage in always having to react, the huge distances in northern Australia, and the lack of vital equipment. They emphasised that when the Jindalee over-the-horizon radar system, an airborne early warning system and air-to-air refuelling capability came into service by the mid--1990s it would all be different.

Jindalee would pick up approaching aircraft well

out to sea, the warning system would clearly identify them as attackers, the Hornets would intercept and the attack would be stopped well before it reached land.

That, at least, is the R.A.A.F.’s theory.

But even in “Pitch Black,” with a warning system far more sophisticated than Australia would buy, the defenders were unable to stop all the attacks.

Over all the R.A.A.F. pronounced the exercise a success, with the United States forces slotting into the exercise with only minor problems, the warning system functioning - perfectly, and the pilots gaining valuable practice in fighting in a “hot” environment. But the command and control function of the air defence system did not work as well as it should have.

Senior officers admitted that from the first day there were problems coordinating the system.

To be fair to those involved, they were step-

ping into the job with little or no previous experience in working with those beside them, and in a complex environment, but if Australia was to enter a period of heightened tension with a neighbour those people would be expected to step straight into the job. If the first morning’s attack was anything to go by, they would be unlikely to function at maximum potential.

The final lessons of “Pitch Black” will not be known until the R.A.A.F. completes a detailed study of the records which will no doubt show that the individual components operated effec-

tively, although the coordination needed tightening.

So for the people of the “top end,” who still remember the first Japanese air attack of February, 1942, Exercise “Pitch Black” provided the comfort of the R.A.A.F.’s presence — as well as the sobering knowledge of its limitations.