Chemical weapons talks

Press, 1 February 1988, Page 18

Chemical weapons talks

Negotiations for a treaty to eliminate chemical weapons have been continuing sporadically since 1968; they appear to have made more progress recently. The Soviet Union is now hopeful that an agreement can be reached this year. These negotiations will continue at the same time as negotiations on shorter-range nuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles. Although they are all arms control measures, and progress may be easier because of the lessening of tension between the Soviet Union and the United States, the chemical weapons talks are not formally linked to progress on nuclear weapons. Poison gas was a dreadful feature of World War I, resulting in casualties estimated at more than one million and more than 100,000 deaths. In 1925, the Geneva Protocol prohibited the use of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, and of bacteriological methods of warfare. It was feared that the protocol would be ignored in World War II; but it was generally observed, although Italy used poison gas in the Ethiopian war. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute believes that, outside the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the Warsaw Pact, a growing number of countries possess poisonous-gas weapons. These countries include Afghanistan, China, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Pakistan, South Africa, Syria, Thailand, and Vietnam. The 1925 protocol banned the use of the weapons, but not their manufacture or storage. The convention now being negotiated would ban the manufacture, storage, or use of chemical weapons. In 1972 a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction was concluded. The aim is to have a similar convention on chemical weapons.

The usual problem of verification in arms control measures is particularly complicated for chemical weapons because it is possible to manufacture the components in several, widely separated places. Two or three chemicals which, by themselves, may appear innocent and have innocent uses may, if combined, produce a deadly weapon. The binary weapons held by the United States consist of two non-lethal elements

which form a deadly compound when they are combined during the flight of a shell or on the impact of the shell. Even if on-site inspections are approved, the inspectors would have to know the industrial or agricultural requirements of that country before making a judgment about whether an excess amount was being produced and this might be put into chemical weapons production.

A country may not even need to produce the chemicals itself, but import them from other countries. A list of likely chemicals has been drawn up and several Governments, including the New Zealand Government, are instructing their chemical manufacturers not to export certain chemicals, particularly if the order comes from a country which might want chemical weapons. Chemical manufacturers worry lest the list of banned exports continues to grow.

Even the definition of a chemical weapon will not be easy. Chemicals which may be herbicides in peacetime may be used to strip trees bare to remove cover for an enemy in time of war. Incapacitating gases used for the control of rioting crowds, or chemical sprays used to repel an individual attacker can be described as chemical weapons. Although it may be considered acceptable to quell a prison riot with a form of tear gas, would it also be acceptable to use the same gas to control a riot in a prisoner-of-war camp? All these considerations will have to be accommodated by the convention.

The United States and the Soviet Union undoubtedly have the will to reach an accord on banning chemical weapons. A number of other countries have contributed substantially towards an agreement; and unless the Soviet Union and the United States agree to support such an agreement, it is doubtful whether one will be reached at all. If a convention is concluded, it will still be up to individual countries to decide whether they will sign and abide by its provisions. Because of the comparative cheapness of chemical weapons, smaller countries may see them as an economical form of defence — or aggression. Thus, even if a convention is concluded and the major Powers sign it, the battle to stop the deployment of chemical weapons will not be over.