In defence of State Sector Bill—the Minister’s view

Press, 28 January 1988, Page 12

In defence of State Sector Bill—the Minister’s view

The Government’s plan to reform the Public Service embodied in the State Sector Bill has attracted widespread criticism, particularly because many believe it will “politicise” the Public Service. In this, the first of two articles, the Minister of State Services, Mr Stan Rodger, replies to the critics.

Top appointments Question: How will the State Sector Bill prevent the Public Service becoming politicised? Answer: The bill actually promotes a good “apolitical” Public Service. The basic features of an “apolitical” Public Service should be that: © The service is able and willing to service the Government of the day regardless of political persuasion; @ Ministers are not able to interfere in personnel decisions about individual public servants; but

© Ministers do have effective control over the functioning of the Service as a whole and do have confidence that the top people in Government departments will give effect to the Government’s policies effectively and well. The bill promotes this sort of system by: ® Setting up a system in which heads of departments are able to operate as effective managers but be held to account if they do not perform; ® Giving the Prime Minister some input into the process of selecting Chief Executives but with appropriate checks and balances (State Services Commission involvement, requirement for public notification in the Gazette when the Prime Minister makes the appointment); and ® Maintaining the requirement that (otherwise) Ministers be distanced completely from personnel decisions about individual public servants. We have two very clear examples of experience from overseas where top appointments are made by the Prime Minister without any danger of “politicising” of the Public Service. The first example is Australia where secretaries (permanent heads) have been appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Prime Minister since 1984 without dire consequences of “politicising” the Public Service. The Prime Minister in these cases receives a report relating to the vacancy from the Secretary to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The Australian act also allows for the removal of a secretary at any time by the Prime Minister. It is interesting to note in their experience that the vast majority of secretaries appointed have been career public servants and I would not expect New Zealand to be much different in this respect. In Canada, this experience of senior appointments (called Deputy Ministers) for permanent heads by the Prime Minister has amply demonstrated that the Canadian Public Service has not been politicised. There has been

some speculation that the incoming Government would fire many Deputy Ministers but this has never occurred. There are, in practice, very few clearly politically dominated appointments and when this does occur, there is a media and public price to pay for such appointments. The Canadian Government has adopted the view, also shared by myself, that the Public Service will have the capability of working more energetically and efficiently to achieve well recognised goals, if there is better management control of the bureaucracy. In the light of overseas experience and following almost totally the recommendations of the McCarthy Royal Commission, we have implemented a system of chief executive appointments where power and responsibility is matched. Question: What safeguards will there be to prevent the Prime Minister consistently picking chief executives who have a convenient political background? Answer: Under the bill, the Prime Minister can appoint someone who has not been recommended by the State Services Commission. That does not mean, of course, that any Prime Minister would make a series of blatantly political appointments. Any decision by the Prime Minister to make an appointment would be very public. The appointment would be announced in the Gazette as a direct appointment and the Prime Minister would have to be willing to justify his action in Parliament, to the public, and to the news media. The Cabinet already appoints significant public office holders such as the military chiefs, the Commissioner of Police and the State Services Commissioners. The Attorney-General appoints members of the Judiciary. There has never been any suggestion that this or previous Governments have made these decisions on any ground other than personal competence.

Question: How will the selection process ensure that Chief Executives are selected on ability, capacity and integrity? Answer: Quite simply, we want the best person for the job. The State Services Commission will report and consult with the Prime Minister on the needs for the job in question and then make a recommendation from either within the Public Service or from the private sector following the usual process of advertising and selection. In considering who to recommend for appointment, the Commission will certainly be looking very carefully at the past performance, the potential, and the personal qualities of the people under consideration. Question: What proportion of chief executives will be dismissed by an incoming Government? Answer: That can only be answered by an incoming Government, but it is clear from the Canadian and Australian experience that very few — if any — permanent heads of departments have been dismissed under these circumstances. I would not expect the New Zealand experience to be any different. Under the bill (section 23(4)), the Commission may — with the agreement of the Prime Minister — remove a chief executive from office for reasonable cause. However, this provision is subject to any contract of service and I would expect the issue of early termination to be dealt with as part of the new contracts for chief executives. Question: How can senior public servants give neutral advice to their Minister if they have been handpicked to reflect the Minsiter’s views? Answer: Chief executives will not be picked to simply reflect the Minister’s view. Experience in other countries such as Canada and Australia has certainly not found this to be the case.

The Chief executives will be selected because they can effectively lead a department which will: (a) provide good quality advice to the Minister; (b) be run according to sound management and personnel management principles; and (c) implement the Government’s policies effectively and well. As the McCarthy Commission clearly explained, Ministers are entitled to have departmental heads they have confidence in and further, Ministers are entitled to know those positions are occupied by people who will loyally implement Government policies. The permanent head is not only a managing director of a large concern, but is also the Government’s adviser on matters of policy and cannot be effective unless the Government has confidence in him or her. Question: What safeguards will exist to prevent a Minister delegating all his/her power and responsibility to a chief executive who may be a “political hack?” Answer: First, there will be no “political hacks.” Chief executives will be appointed because they are the best people for the job. Second, there is no question of Ministers delegating all of their power and responsibility. The bill provides for a Minister to delegate powers to the chief executive of a department. There is nothing sinister in this. It means the Minister can have some things done by a chief executive rather than doing every thing himself/herself. There are important limitations on the delegation of power. The chief executive is not able to “sub-delegate” powers that are given to him by the Minister and

other staff of the department. Also the Minister can delegate power but the Minister cannot delegate responsibility. Ministers will continue to be responsible to Parliament and the country for what is done by departments in their name. Question: How will the Government ensure that while chief executives are selected on ability, that greater numbers of females and members of other disadvantaged groups are considered for appointment? Answer* I expect the State Services Commission to consult widely and to adopt a positive approach to equal employment opportunity considerations in deciding who to recommend for appointment as chief executive.

Senior Executive Service

Question: Do you consider that the Prime Minister’s and Ministers’ involvement in the appointment of chief executives will hinder free and frank discussions with senior department staff, or interdepartmentally? Answer: No. ! Question: The Public Service Association claims the S.E.S. represents the creation of a “master-race.” Why are they not accountable to the community as other public servants are? Answer: That is the whole point of the Senior Executive Service — they will be even more accountable for their actions than individuals in the rest of the Public Service. These positions, possibly two or three hundred in number within a service of currently 60,000 employees, are likely to be similar to those senior positions where appointments are -currently made by a panel of selected permanent heads. The positions to come under S.E.S. are yet to be determined. Appointees will become members of S.E.S. by virture of their appointment to the appropriate senior position. Most will undoubtedly come from the ranks of the Public Service through promotion. On attaining an S.E.S. position, these people will be required to perform better and more effectively than ever before. They will be offered contracts up to five years, be required to undergo training programmes up to 15 days per year and be judged against performance-based objectives. They may enjoy greater benefits, but they will also be personally judged in more demanding terms. Tomorrow: New conditions of employment

'There will be no political hacks... chief executives will be the best people for the job 9