How to destroy missiles

Press, 25 January 1988, Page 20

How to destroy missiles

From the “Economist,” London

How do you get rid of 2611 medium- and short-range nuclear missiles in 18 months? That is the riddle President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev set themselves when they signed the intermedi-ate-range nuclear forces (1.N.F.) treaty in Washington on December 8.

It is no easy matter to get rid of missiles without starting a war. Expect some hitches — especially in Russia, which has more missiles, more widely distributed, to be destroyed. Once the treaty has been ratified by America's Senate, Russia will have to dispose of more than three missiles per day, on average.

The missiles will not be the first to be destroyed by the two super-Powers. Both sides have disposed of many in the past because of age or faults. This time is different because of the number of missiles involved, the tight schedule, and the need for verification. •

Missiles have two nasty parts: their nuclear warheads, and — for most of the Russian and half of the American rockets — their solid-fuel stages. Solid-fuel stages are made of concentrated hydrocarbon compounds, such as the hydroxyl-terminated polybutadiene that fuels Pershing II rockets.

They can be dangerous: if crushed or cut into, they are liable to explode. Solid fuel powers 1576 of the 1752 Russian missiles and 400 of the 859 missiles that Arnerica is planning to destroy. The only way to deactivate it is to use it. The

easiest way to do this is to fire off the disarmed missile towards the sea or a sparsely populated area of land. The Russians are keen on this. They have more solid-fuel rockets, spread over a wider, more remote territory than the Americans. The missiles could be pointed north to fall harmlessly on the Arctic wastes of northern Siberia. America’s missiles are deployed across crowded Western Europe. Also, Western Europe is well served by roads and airports through which the missiles can pass to return to the deserts of Utah and Nevada for destruction.

Large concrete fixtures that were previously employed to test rockets in static firings will be used to deactivate them. The concrete stands hold down the missiles while their fuel is burnt off.

The Russians have fewer test stands to use. Whereas the Americans regularly develop new booster systems, the Russians modify existing ones — which means less testing. When the Russians suggested each side be allowed to shoot off 200 missiles, Washington came back with 100, all to be fired within the first six months. This is now written into the treaty. Because neither side wants the other to use this chance to shoot missiles off as tests, no monitoring instruments will be allowed on the rockets. Some of the American missiles will be fired in deep pits. This will involve laying them horizon-

tally and igniting a line of plastic explosive that has been stuck to the side from tip to tail. Although burning off rocket fuel in explosions fills the air with hydrochloric acid, several tests — including the explosion of a Pershing missile in the Utah desert in late November — have convinced environmentalist groups like the Natural Resource Defence Council in Washington D.C., that pollution will not be a problem. According to the treaty, warheads, along with the missiles’ guidance systems, must be removed before the rest of the missile is destroyed. The secrets of the guidance systems will thus be kept away from the prying eyes of observers. The radioactive material in the nuclear warheads, which is mostly refined plutonium, can go into new missiles.

The rest of the operation is a matter of crushing and chopping up metal and machinery, and destroying launch pads and surrounding buildings “by excavation or explosion.” The treaty does not shy away from detail. After describing how to chop up the erector machinery that raises and aims the missile on transporter vehicles, it adds that “a portion of the vehicle chassis, at least 1.10 metres in length shall be cut off aft of the rear axle.”

Verifiers of the treaty had better bring tape measures as well as hard hats.

Copyright — The Economist