THE PRESS MONDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1987. The State Sector Bill

Press, 28 December 1987, Page 12

THE PRESS MONDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1987. The State Sector Bill

Rapid and radical change has been the hallmark of the Government. There has been reasonable acceptance of this throughout the community. The risk for the Government is that its energy and enterprise will decline into dogmatism and ideology, allowing the Government to be regarded not merely as radical but as extreme. The State Sector bill, which has the potential to alter fundamentally the way in which New Zealand regulates the processes of Government administration, may be the litmus test for moderation. The bill had a birth that was not reassuring for those who value an orderly and open approach to change. It was among as big a pile of last-minute legislation as any introduced by the previous Government. In opposition the Labour Party justifiably criticised the last-minute rushes that have characterised New Zealand parliamentary sessions. It is hard to escape the conviction that this year’s rush was not merely a clearing of the decks of unfinished work but was partly stage-managed to swamp the impact of controversial legislation. More than that: more than one report has it that the State sector legislation was not prepared by parliamentary counsel. Having introduced the legislation, the Government is in a bind if it does not follow through. Not even the present Opposition would be likely to let a back-down pass. Opponents of the bill thus have a fight on their hands if they want the bill withdrawn; the Government has a major political stake in making it law. Yet the country will be damaged if the bill goes through in its present form. The bill not only allows a Prime Minister to appoint the heads of departments, but it gives these heads the power of hiring and firing and of appointing people to their departments from outside the public service. All of this will be without safeguards, except that if a Prime Minister rejects the advice of the State Services Commission about the appointment of a head of department then the name of the Prime Minister’s appointee will have to be published in the New Zealand Gazette; and department heads will be appointed for limited terms. The opportunity thus will exist for a politically appointed head to stack a department with people sympathetic to the Government of the day. That would be a regrettable departure from the present tradition of having a politically neutral public service. It would be a constitutionally undesirable course because New Zealand would have no safeguards to prevent cronyism and to prevent the inept from becoming senior advisers to a Government. To be fair, the Government is probably not aiming at the politicisation of the public service. The Government has been open about using talented people whatever their political persuasion. If anything, it has shown a disposition to use people who once would have been regarded as the natural opponents of a Labour Government. But this does not guarantee that this Government, armed with the new legislation, will not develop a taste for political conformity among its senior advisers. There certainly is no guarantee that future Governments would not seek thoroughgoing politicisation of the civil service. The proposed bill does not strike simply at the top of the State services; it also affects other ranks. For instance, the appeal system and the merit provisions would go. Under the appeal system, appointments can be overturned. The procedure is seen by some people as designed to keep Public Service jobs to public servants. However, it can be

argued that the system ensures that the appointing bodies observe strict procedures and that they make appointments that can stand scrutiny. This system, combined with the merit system — that is, public servants being promoted on merit rather than on age, length of service, political affiliation, family, or friendship — has been in use in New Zealand since 1912. Before that, political cronyism was practised. Such practices are so far removed from the present day that it seems inconceivable they should reoccur. But they are uncommon today not because human nature has changed but because a body of practice and law has evolved. If the State Sector Bill is adopted as presented, then core parts of that practice and law will be abolished. If the appointment of people from outside the Public Service to the most senior positions in departments became widespread then the chances would be strong that the Public Service would find difficulty in recruiting able staff. A career path leading to the top of a department would become more obstructed than it is at present. The Government has justified allowing a Prime Minister to choose a head of a department by referring to the 1962 Royal Commission on the State Services. It is true that the 1962 report recommended such a development but the State Sector Bill abolishes practically every other practice commended by that report. It is not necessary, however, to go back to 1962 to find the key arguments on which the bill is based. They are contained in detail in the Treasury brief to the incoming Government — Volume 1 of “Government Management,” published this year. Of the appointment of heads of departments the Treasury says: “It would be a difficult argument to sustain that New Zealand politicians were less trustworthy than those anywhere else, yet in every comparable country top appointments are made by the Government.” That is untrue. In other countries similar to New Zealand there often is a channel for Governments to influence the; selection of a head of a department, just as there has been in New Zealand. There is a good reason for this; the head of a department is a chief adviser to a Government and someone whom a . Government did not trust would be unsuitable, as a chief adviser on policy. But no head of a department in Australia has not been a public servant. The head of the department of Foreign Affairs was working in the Australian National University before his appointment and he was invited by the Minister of Foreign Affairs to apply for his present position. However, he had worked as a public servant and was on a list drawn up by a committee of high officials. In Britain it is unusual for the recommendations of the committee of senior public servants that makes the selections the top posts not to be accepted by Governments. In Canada a parliamentary committee holds hearings to investigate the fitness for office of a head of a department, whether he or she is a career public servant or not. The committee conducting that hearing has no power to reverse an appointment but it has the opportunity to embarrass a Government. In the United States the Senate conducts hearings to judge the fitness for office of presidential nominees for senior public service positions. All of this emphasises the political, constitutional and administrative traps that lie ahead for the State Sector Bill. It would be to the good of the country if one of those traps closed lethally over this misguided legislation.