Covert action questioned

Press, 20 November 1987, Page 10

Covert action questioned

NZPA correspondent Washington

The Iran contra affair raised fundamental and troublesome questions about the secret inteJli-» gence operations of the United States Government, the Congressional committees which investigated the saga said yesterday.

In their 690-page report, which held President Reagan accountable for the subversion of the rule of law which took place in the selling of arms to Iran and diversion of profits to the Nicaraguan contras, the committees studied the role of covert action in a democratic society.

Covert action is defined as a specific type of clandestine activity that goes beyond the collection of secret intelligence being instead “an attempt by a Government to influence political behaviour and events in other countries in ways that are concealed.”

An executive order issued by President Reagan in 1981 referred to covert action as "activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which

are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and functions in support of such activities....”

The report poses three questions about secret intelligence operations:— Can such operations, and particularly covert action, be authorised and conducted in a manner compatible with the American system of democratic government and the rule of law? Is it possible for an open society such as the United States to conduct such secret activities effectively? And, if so, by what means can these operations be controlled so as to meet the requirements of accountability in a democratic society? These particular questions had become the centre of public debate in the mid-19705, after revelations of controversial Central Intelligence Agency activities, particularly allegations that the agency had destabilised the Allende Government in Chile, that Presidents had ordered assassina-

tions of foreign officials, and that the CIA had become involved in domestic activity. One of the main issues identified by Congressional investigators of intelligence abuses in the mid-1970s was the misuse of “plausible denial,” a concept which has applied to covert operations since instituted by President Harry Truman in 1948. One of his directives said United States action in support of indigenous groups, at the time anticommunist trade unions, political groups and the press in post-war Europe, was to be “so planned and executed that any United States Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorised persons and that if uncovered the United States Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.” The Iran-contra report said the result of the 1970 s inquiries was a concerted effort by the executive and legislative branches of the United States Government to adopt laws and procedures to control secret intelligence in-

eluding covert actions.

Each covert action was to be approved personally by the President, funded by Congressional appropriations, and Congress was to be informed through “timely notice? “Experience has shown that these laws and procedures, if respected, are adequate to the task,” said the report. “In „the Iran-contra affair, however, they often were disregarded. The flexibility built into legislation and rules to allow the executive branch (the President) to deal with extraordinary situations was distorted beyond reasonable bounds. “Laws intended to reflect a spirit of comity between the branches were abused when that commitment to co-opera-tion was abandoned.”

The report harshly criticised the former CIA director, William Casey, the close confidante of President Reagan and fervent anti-communist who died during the summer hearings before he could be properly questioned on his role in the Iran-contra affair, and other key players.