Mr Gorbachev’s ‘huge’ concession

Press, 17 March 1987, Page 14

Mr Gorbachev’s ‘huge’ concession

Soviet acceptance of the Reagan “zero-option” proposal for missile reductions in Europe would not have been forthcoming if Europe had given way to the anti-nuclear panic of the “peace” movement, according to the “Economist,” London. The authoritative magazine also argues that the curious European tendency to thank Mr Gorbachev for what Mr Reagan has wrought is a pointer to the troubles a semi-nuclear-free Europe could face in the 19905.

THE EUROPEANS who may soon be living in a semidenuclearised continent are a curious lot. Most of them seem to think that this happy possibility is the result of a “Gorbachev initiative”; whereas in fact the zero-option proposal that Mr Mikhail Gorbachev embraced on February 28 was put forward by Mr Ronald Reagan in 1981, rejected by the Russians, then half-accepted but with a crippling star wars condition attached to it last year, and freed of that ball and chain by Russia only now, 5 l / 2 years after it was first suggested. Provided two obvious things are done, and preferably with one variation on the zero theme, this slow Russian swallowing of an American idea is good for Europe, and a cause for heartfelt thanks that the “peace” movement did not succeed in unilaterally throwing away cruise and Pershing before Russia had agreed to give up its SS-20s in return. That curious European tendency to thank Mr Gorbachev for what Mr Reagan wrought is nonetheless a pointer to the troubles a semi-nuclear-free Europe could be facing in the 19905. Before saying “Let’s go, then” to Mr Gorbachev, the West has to make the obvious proviso that he cannot expect to hand on to the advantage Russia sought with its SS-20s by means of the SS-20’s younger brothers — the SS-21, 22 and 23 — which Russia has been deploying in central Europe in the past few years. They too must go, in whole or in large part. Mr Gorbachev’s February 28 statement, though fuzzy at the edges, is fairly encouraging about this. The other obvious condition for a deal, the verification issue, could be trickier. It should not be too hard to check that the lumbering SS-20s are removed and dismantled, though it will be necessary to make sure that the ones Russia is allowed to keep in the Far East stay in the East. The missiles that have more recently arrived in central

Europe are smaller and quickermoving. Snapshots from satellites will not be enough to make sure the things have really gone. It will be necessary to insist that both sides have the right of on-site inspection if they suspect the other is not punctiliously honouring the agreement. This will be a test for glasnost. The preferable variation on the zero theme is the belief, shared by the French Government and the “Economist,” that it would be better to keep a small number of cruise and Pershing-2 missiles in Europe than to cut them right down to nil. (The Russians could keep the same number of SS-20 warheads.) These American missiles were brought to Europe to be a visible symbol of America’s nuclear protection of its European allies. The Europeans have not devised a substitute for that protection. Better that the symbol should remain. A lot of Europe’s soldiers think France is right to say this; but most of Europe’s politicians, with a deal apparently in sight, are disinclined to dicker about “details,” and will probably plunge for zero. This points to the one genuine cause for concern in an otherwise admirable prospect. Of course, a Europe from which both America’s middle-range missiles and their Russian equivalents have been removed ought to feel comfortably relieved. It will be a Europe back to where it was between 1963 and 1975, after President Kennedy had taken his Thor missiles out of Italy and Turkey and before the Russians started to deploy their SS-20s — but with one distinct improvement. The Russians then had in service an earlier generation of medium-range missiles, clumsy brutes but capable of doing huge damage to Western Europe, and the Americans had nothing of the sort in Europe at all. A solid zero-zero deal in 1987 promises a future, in this respect, better

than the past. It is good that Europe did not give in to the anti-nuclear people’s panic. A self-confident Europe would now be congratulating itself on this, and asking how it can reduce its dependence on American protection in other ways. Alas, the Europe of the 1980 s is even less self-confident than the Europe of the 19605. In those days, the Europeans were basking in their recovery from wartime ruination, and in the expectation that their economy would before long be the equal of America’s. They had just started, in the Europe of the Six, the process which most of them thought would lead inexorably to the political unification of the western half of the continent. Twenty years later, disappointment has set in on both counts. Europe has seen America and Japan leap ahead of it in the new economic revolution of information technology. It has also found out that, when anything important is at stake, its old nationalisms still eat away its would-be new unity. The result is the glum petulance of the 1980 s. Europe had expected to be a

power in the world again by now, and it has failed to be, and it is unhappy both with itself and with its ally America. On the Right, Europe’s conservatives resent their countries’ dependence on American protection, but say that America must not withdraw a single soldier from Europe because Europe cannot find and equip a young' man to replace him. On the Left, the socialist parties of Britain and West Germany combine protestations of loyalty to N.A.T.O. with policies disloyal to the alliance. There was anti-Americanism in the Europe of the 19605: think of the Cuba-missile demos of 1962. But the anti-Americanism of the 1980 s has a sourer taste, because a generation later Europe has still not discovered how the alternative to the American alliance — self-sufficiency in defence — can be achieved. In Europe as it ought to be, the simultaneous withdrawal of these Russian and American missiles would be a challenge to European self-reliance. In Europe as it is, Mr Gorbachev may think, it is an opportunity for Russia.

Mr Gorbachev has just made a ; huge concession. He has eaten his words about the Euromissiles’ link to star wars. He has thereby removed Western Europe’s main reason for urging President Reagan not to pursue his antimissile programme. He has thrown out a lifeline to the : Reagan presidency. ;• He may have done this because his domestic agenda requires him to reach agreement with America above all things. , But he may also have done it i because he sees a chance of slowly detaching Europe from America. The Europeans will decide whether he is right or wrong. If they find the extra money and men needed to remove Russia’s present superiority in tanks and guns and soldiers, the withdrawal of an American nuclear symbol need scare nobody. If they let Russia stay stronger, and shape their foreign policy to its strength, Mr Gorbachev will have good news for his Politburo in the 19905. The “Gorbachev initiative” which was really a Reagan initiative is Europe’s test. Copyright — The Economist