THE PRESS TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1986. Failure at Reykjavik

Press, 14 October 1986, Page 12

THE PRESS TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1986. Failure at Reykjavik

At the very least, the failure of the Reykjavik summit meeting between President Reagan and Mr Gorbachev represents a serious setback for arms negotiations. Much more dismal interpretations may be put on the failure of the talks, but they scarcely bear thinking about. The American President and the Soviet Secretary-General, according to the accounts from the two sides, almost achieved serious agreements on strategic arms, on intermediate range nuclear weapons, and on human rights. Then the chance slipped from their grasp.

The next few weeks will show whether the positions have slipped further apart in the continuing arms negotiations. The Soviet intention, before the summit meeting, was to try to establish a political will to make progress on arms talks: far from accomplishing this, the problem lies in preventing a slide backwards. The precise details of what each side offered have not been made public. President Reagan said that Mr Gorbachev had turned down a 10-year moratorium on deployment of the strategic defence initiative in return for the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles from the nuclear arsenals of each side. Mr Shultz, the Secretary of State, said that the two sides were close to an agreement on intermediate-range nuclear weapons, which would have left only 100 warheads on each side and these would have been located in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, and in the United States. This would have meant that Europe would have been rid of American and Soviet nuclear weapons. Mr Gorbachev agreed over the nuclear weapons in Europe and said that the two sides were close to agreeing on cutting strategic nuclear weapons by 50 per cent. The Reykjavik meeting will be remembered for this as one of the most important and tantalising meetings between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Both sides agreed that the obstacle to progress was President Reagan’s insistence that planning should continue on the strategic defence initiative. President Reagan seems devoted to his “star wars” programme. Any suspicion that the S.D.I. was simply to be used as a bargaining chip in the arms negotiating process is now removed. President Reagan shows every sign that he considers work on it as a matter of principle. Possibly he believes that the programme has the potential to eliminate the threat of nuclear attack. If he does, his view is not widely shared among independent scientists, and the Congress is showing a great deal of scepticism about the programme. Even if it were possible to put satellites with laser beams around the Earth and these laser weapons could destroy other objects, including Soviet missiles, the technology needed to determine whether another object is a missile and then to destroy the warhead is still close to fantasy.

To some researchers, therein lies much of its appeal. Not all who are engaged on research for S.D.I. believe that it can work. Some have privately communicated reservations to other scientists. But if S.D.I. does not offer a system which will defend the United States from a nuclear attack, it offers work almost without end for those who obtain

the contracts. Mr Reagan, perhaps on idealistic grounds, is pushing for the programme. When the President wants it and calls for it, who are mere scientists who believe it will not work to say nay?

The Soviet Union has two main reasons for not wanting the United States to deploy the system. The first: it believes that, although S.D.I. is being promoted as a defensive shield, S.D.I. could have an offensive side. It might enable the United States to launch a first strike attack on the Soviet Union from behind this defensive shield. Second, and important: the Soviet Union realises that if the United States goes ahead with the programme, the Soviet Union will have to develop a similar system. In this respect, the Soviet Union seems to have a greater belief in the practicability of the scheme than have many Americans. The Soviet Union is much less developed technologically than is the United States and Mr Gorbachev’s aim is to see the Soviet Union become more technologically advanced. Concentrating resources on a defence system will mean that the Soviet Union will not be able to advance the country’s standard of living as quickly as Mr Gorbachev would like. Perhaps President Reagan was buying time for the scientists working on 5.D.1.; certainly he was not giving away all that he holds out as an ultimate defence system. Either way, he put Mr Gorbachev in an awkward position. One of the most difficult matters to judge is how the failure of the summit meeting will affect Mr Gorbachev at home. He clearly has his own priorities for the Soviet Union. These include industrial development and increased international trade. He is desperate for an understanding with the United States so that he can get on with the reforms he believes that the Soviet Union needs. But, just as President Reagan is constrained in his policies towards the Soviet Union by some in his Administration who believe that the Soviet Union cannot be trusted, so Mr Gorbachev will have to justify his attempts to reach an understanding with the United States to those who think such an understanding cannot be reached. One possible consequence of the failure at Reykjavik is that the Soviet Union will conclude that it cannot deal with the Reagan Administration. If that is so, arms talks will be set back for some years. The Reykjavik summit meeting was called for — and agreed to — at short notice. The number of issues before it was high: strategic missiles, intermediate range missiles, conventional troops, human rights, regional wars. These are all big problems and need a great deal of preparation, more than they could get at short notice. The Reykjavik summit meeting illustrates the potential that summit meetings have for making progress and the dangers that lie in failure. Neither the Soviet Union, the United States, nor the rest of the world can afford total failure in arms talks. It seems unlikely that the Washington summit meeting, for which the Reykjavik meeting was to prepare, will be held soon. Nevertheless, it is essential that some progress on the issues raised at Reykjavik shall be made. The most positive outcome of the Reykjavik failure should be a determination that there cannot be an ultimate failure.