Bay of Pigs analogy seen

Press, 15 April 1986, Page 10

Bay of Pigs analogy seen

NZPA-Reuter Washington

Twenty-five years after an invading force of United States-backed Cuban rebels was crushed at Cuba’s Bay of Pigs, experts see parallels in Nicaragua, where America is again backing anti-Left-ist guerrillas. On April 17, 1961, a force of 1400 anti-Com-munist Cubans trained and equipped by the C.I.A. landed at the Bay of Pigs aiming to oust Fidel Castro. They were quickly routed in a stinging setback for President John Kennedy, who had just taken office.

Experts on Latin America predict no such sudden defeat for the

estimated 14,000 Nicaraguan “contra” guerrillas seeking to oust the Leftist elected Managua Government. Many analysts doubt, however, that the Honduras-based "contras” will be any more successful than the Cuban Brigade 2506 in the long run.

There were some clear analogies between the Cuba operation and the "contra” campaign, said a Harvard historian, Richard Neustadt, once an adviser to Mr Kennedy. The Kennedy Administration was alarmed that Dr Castro, whose guerrillas took power in 1959, had aligned with the Soviet Union and threatened to export revolution

throughout Latin America. The Reagan Administration has expressed similar alarm about Nicaragua, which has close ties with Moscow and Havana. Washington has accused the Sandinist Government of supplying arms to Leftists in Central America.

Both Mr Kennedy and Mr Reagan turned to the Central Intelligence Agency to support rebel operations and in each case there was debate in Washington over how much military aid to provide.

Another analogy involves unfounded optimism in Washington about the degree of support rebel forces could expect

at home. Mr Reagan’s advisers hoped for a groundswell of “contra” support in Nicaragua when guerrilla action began in 1981. This has not happened, say diplomats, because the Sandinists have jailed potential dissidents, instituted popular social reforms, and because key “contras” are linked to the unpopular regime of the dictator, Anastasio Somoza, ousted in 1979. Mr Neustadt said a crucial difference is that the “contras,” unlike Brigade 2605, use hit-and-run, small-unit guerrilla tactics, making defeat in one decisive battle almost impossible.