Marcos must go—U.S. officials

Press, 28 January 1986, Page 26

Marcos must go—U.S. officials

By

LESLIE GELB

of the New York Times

(through NZPA) Washington

A consensus has developed in the Reagan Administration that the departure of President Ferdinand Marcos is critical to a non-Communist future for the Philippines and for American interests in that country. This widely-held view was made clear explicitly or indirectly last week by key officials from the White House, State Department, Pentagon and Intelligence agencies.

The Administration has decided not to push Marcos from power by covert means, or by public attacks on him, although both these options were considered by some officials.

Instead, the policy is to distance the United States from its old ally by publicly questioning Mr Marcos’ statements that he is implement the

economic and military changes the United States has sought. Another element of the strategy was waiting, the officials said. Very soon, they said, they expected that Marcos’ health would force him to withdraw from the scene. The officials all said that President Reagan, the Secretary of State, George Shultz, and the Defence Secretary, Caspar Weinberger, had approved the policy of distancing expressed by their subordinates.

The public position of the White House and other Administration officials is that they will work with the winner of the presidential election on February 7, whoever that may be. Privately, the key officials involved say they expect Mr Marcos to win, and maintain that he must go if the necessary changes to get the country back on its feet are toibe put into effect >

Because Mr Reagan agreed to the new policy without having taken a major role in its formulation, some officials said they were uncertain of how he would react if events worsened in some way, such as a dramatic improvement in the fortunes of the insurgents.

Administration officials fear American identification with the Marcos Government at a time of a growing anti-Marcos sentiment in the Philippines. They worry that Mr Marcos is unwilling to introduce what the Administration considers are needed changes, and that his moderate opponents might unite with the Communists to try and oust him.

United States officials have urged Marcos to stem an economic downturn by taking steps to reduce corruption and break up monopolies, many of which are believed to be controlled

by figures close to the Marcos family. The administration has also asked for greater efficiency in the military, with promotions based on merit.

Administration officials do not appear to have any idea of who would succeed him. Most of the officials are also wary of his opponent in the election, Corazon Aquino. In spite of a variety of statements from the two candidates throughout the campaign, their positions on American military bases in the country are essentially the same. Both say they would keep the bases through the life of the current agreement, which expires in 1991, and would negotiate a new agreement -.according to the situation at the time.

Both, at different times, have talked about the possibility, of putting any new agredpent to a nationwide refesKdum, and both

have said they believe any new agreement would have to be a formal treaty rather than the current executive agreement between the presidents of the Philippines and the United States.

The public side of the Administration policy is not to choose between Marcos and Aquino, but to stress free and fair processes and change. This, in itself, represents a dramatic shift from Reagan’s statement in the 1984 presidential debate that the “alternative” to Marcos was “a large Communist movement to take over

the Philippines ” The Administration has decided, for the time being, neither to do whatever is necessary to support a dose ally whose hold on power seems increasingly tenuous, nor to help oust him from power and thereby accept greater responsibility for Whatever might j come—iS* . . , A