Spying: the friendly industry

Press, 16 January 1986, Page 16

Spying: the friendly industry

From

HUGH NEVILL,

a New Zealand journalist now living

in Washington

The case of Jonathan Jay Pollard, an American accused of spying for Israel, is raising the question what the limits are when you spy on a friendly nation. No-one seriously pretends that the Central Intelligence Agency does not keep tabs on New Zealand, particularly with the present emphasis on A.N.Z.U.S. Embassy reports on the state of New Zealand political parties, unions, and pressure groups — the upcoming and the downgoing, their philosophies and their funding — can all be categorised as intelligence. Crucial reports are marked “NOFORN” - not for any foreigners, including allies. Spies are referred to as “HUMINT” — human intelligence. Routine reporting about New Zealand includes bulletins on the state of the economy, agriculture, employment and even long-range weather forecasts. The anger in Washington against Israel — and it is real — is because that nation broke the Western spies’ honour code. The first principle of that code, unwritten, but well understood, according to a former Central Intelligence Agency director, Richard Helms, is that you do not get caught. The second principle is that when you are spying on allies you do not “turn” their civil servants, including their own spies. If you do, then you must not offer them money — that is reserved for informants in “enemy” countries. “We use all kinds of human agents in countries all over the world,” Mr Helms said in a recent television interview. “The only sin in espionage is getting caught, and that friends spy on the United States surprises me not at all.” When the White House aide, John Ehrlichman, accompanied President Richard Nixon to Paris

in 1969, he retrieved his coat in the official guest house one morning to discover a pin with a miniature microphone stuck in the lining. He was quoted this week as saying: “I gave it to the Secret Service boys, and they shrugged. It was business as usual.” The one surprise about the Pollard case is that the Israeli intelligence services have the reputation of being the best in the world, cooperating with other intelligence services when need be, but avoiding leaks and embarrassments. The line from Tel Aviv was that this was a “private” operation undertaken without approval from the top, and that the previously “unknown” unit which ran Pollard will be disbanded. That may work for the diplomats — it will satisfy both sides — but it does not gel with those who are familiar with the Israeli intelligence services and who describe them as highly disciplined, and without “rogue” units. Most cases of “friendly” spying end with a diplomat catching the next plane home, but no announcement to the newspapers. An Israeli Parliamentarian and a former ambassador, Simcha Dinitz, told an American television interviewer that similar cases in the past “would always be dealt with in a very discreet manner, away from the public eye,” and complained that the United States had treated the Pollard case as though Israel were a “hostile country.” American commentators, in turn, are complaining that Israeli politicians are concentrating on the domestic implications of the brouhaha, and not taking into account the hurt felt by Israel’s many supporters in the United States, which keeps the country alive both militarily and financially. Some Israeli politicians have

been saying that the United States depends on Israeli intelligence from the Middle East, including inspection of advanced Soviet planes shot down, and weapons captured. They have brushed the affair off as unimportant, and alluded to past attempts by the United States to penetrate the Israeli intelligence services. The Israeli Minister without Portfolio, Moshe Arens, a former ambassador to the United States, made a secret visit to Washington in early December to talk with the Secretary of State, George Shultz. This was not revealed until after Mr Arens had returned home — and then from Tel Aviv, not Washington — and neither side would reveal the contents of the talks. American officials indicated though, that they were to set up the parameters of American interviews with Pollard’s Israeli “handlers.” . The “Washington Post” recently quoted a retired — and anonymous — senior intelligence official musing on allied spying. He theorised about Israel’s Dimona nuclear power reactor, and the long-held suspicion that Israel has the capability to manufacture a nuclear bomb. Israel refused for many years to allow American experts to inspect the reactor. “Let’s suppose,” the retired official said, “the American Government thought it was so important to find out what was going on in that reactor, as well we might, that we would mount an intelligence operation to find out.” The Israeli Government admitted last May that it had been receiving nuclear krytons from the United States. Israel said these devices were being used for peaceful purposes, but they are also, according to Israeli newspaper reports, sophisticated timing mechanisms that can be used to trigger nuclear

explosions. The krytons were allegedly shipped to Israel without United States Government permission, and a State Department spokesman said at the time that the United States had expressed its “serious concern to Israel about this alleged violation of United law ” In the 19505, the Netherlands — a N.A.T.O. ally — planted an agent in America’s powerful and secretive National Security Council. The United States bugged the Blue House, the South Korean presidential mansion, to obtain evidence on South Korean C.I.A. bribes to American Congressmen some years back; and Canadian authorities are reliably reported to have authorised an espionage campaign against French diplomats suspected of aiding the Quebec secessionist movement. The United States was also reported to have tapped Israeli Embassy telephone fines when Richard Nixon was president, and to have had ample information on Israeli intelligence objectives when Iranian militants occupied the United States Embassy in Teheran.

Israel, about that time, was said to have blackmailed, bugged, and offered bribes to United States officials. Their priority, according to the C.1.A., was “the collection of information on secret United States policy or decisions, if any, concerning Israel.” A secret message from America’s Defence Intelligence Agency in 1981, marked “NOFORN” (not for any foreigners) instructed United States military attaches and other intelligence officials to provide detailed information on allies’ intelligence services. The D.I.A. asked for “locations, operations, capabilities, intentions, effectiveness... personnel, equipment, communications and capabilities, power and influence, pro-

cedures, funding and support (internal and external), training, doctrine and policy, uniforms, insignia and credentials,” according to the “Washington Post.” It can be taken for granted now that the United States is undertaking a major intelligence operation in the Philippines, to glean the intentions of President Ferdinand Marcos, opposition chances in the upcoming elections, the strength of the communist insurgency, and prospects that the United States may be forced out of its military bases in the Philippines, or have to raise the ante to remain there. Among allies, mounting a sensitive camera under a military attache’s light plane is apparently considered “0.K.” — as long as it is not too obvious — as is electronic interception of telephone calls and telex messages.