THE PRESS FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1986. Exemptions from unions

Press, 10 January 1986, Page 12

THE PRESS FRIDAY, JANUARY 10, 1986. Exemptions from unions

A novel ground for exemption from union membership has been tested by the Union Membership Exemption Tribunal and found to be sufficient. A Christchurch cleaner has been granted exemption from membership of the Cleaners’, Caretakers’, Lift Attendants’ and Watchmen’s Union because he opposed its affiliation to the Labour Party and its financial support for the party. Taken to its logical conclusion, this decision would mean a return to voluntary unionism for many employees, and the union movement has been quick to recognise the threat to its guarantee of a captive membership. Mr Pat Kelly, the secretary of the organisation to which the newly-exempted cleaner would have belonged, describes the implications of the decision as “horrendous.” He asks what it means for members of his union who object to the union’s anti-apartheid activities, its support for the Working Women’s Charter, or its support for the Government’s policy on ship visits. What, indeed? These are all contentious issues, matters on which people have opposing and “deeply held personal convictions” — the latter phrase being the definition by which the Union Membership Exemption Tribunal granted the exemption in the present instance. Unions themselves usually regard deeply held convictions as matters of importance to be respected. In effect, the tribunal has ruled that a condition of employment should not be the requirement to subscribe or belong to a group that, if only by a majority decision, espouses a particular cause. The law on human rights says much the same: work shall not be denied to people because of particular beliefs. Compulsory union membership has been found to be at odds with this principle. In recent years, unions generally have presumed to act or to pronounce on an increasingly wide range of matters that — even by a generous interpretation — could not be considered the defence or furtherance of their members’ interests in the work-place. This does not make such union action improper; but many union members object to unions imposing themselves as a social conscience; many more are at variance with the particular stands their unions, adopt on controversial issues. It now appears that •it' will, be sufficient reason for

exemption from union membership if a person finds any particular aspect of a union’s policy sufficiently repugnant to make the effort of going to the tribunal with a persuasive case. It might be no bad thing if the tribunal’s decision had the effect of making union executives consider more closely what the primary purpose of their union is, and of limiting their actions and pronouncements to what has the near-unanimous support of members. A close vote on a hotly-contested issue — such as affiliation — could conceivably result in the union losing a high percentage of its members. The unions might also find that, if they stand aside from matters that are of no direct, industrial concern to their membership, they will then be able to rekindle some enthusiasm from apathetic and uninterested members. This same apathy probably means that the initial expressions of concern from the union movement could be an over-reaction, the exemption procedure is a very public one requiring some time, effort, and determination on the part of the applicant. For the most part, applications for exemption will continue to come only from those people who are very committed in their opposition to union membership. Most union members are likely to view the procedure with the same indifference that a great many of them seem to regard union affairs. It would be helpful and reasonable, however, as well as allaying the worst of union fears, if a workable appeal procedure could be constructed within the union membership legislation. The lack of a means of review of the tribunal’s decisions is a curious omission that would not be hard to remedy. Apart from this, the decision of the tribunal will direct attention to the prime objects of unions and to the question of how far a union can go in extending its policies and activities without upsetting the rights of members to keep their own deeply held beliefs intact. Collectively, a majority may agree on what is best for the group. At the same time, it is fairly asserted that the right to work should not be subject to the need to act against one’s conscience or deep beliefs. The tribunal has produced a nice problem for unions and their members — but only if members really care.