Ugly parallel confronts U.S. in the Philippines

Press, 25 July 1985, Page 13

Ugly parallel confronts U.S. in the Philippines

ROBERT WHYMANT of the London “Guardian” reports from Manila on the insurgency that has embarrassed Presidents Marcos and Reagan.

It is unfortunate for President. Reagan, in his fight with Congress to send President Marcos more military aid, that his intelligence agents cannot come up with even the thinnest evidence of foreign support for the Phillippines’ expanding insurgency. No one in Washington can point to an external threat to the archipelago, but if a captured Cuban advisor or an aerial photograph of fraternal weapons being landed could be found, American legislators might be more easily persuaded to close ranks and approve the $2lO million military aid Mr Reagan has asked for fiscal 1986— four times what Marcos is getting this year. The Administration's cause is not helped by the well-advertised inefficiency, corruption, and brutality of the Phillippine forces of law and order. In the words of one despairing American official, the insurgents are now perceived by many Filipinos as “the good guys, because they are anti-Marcos,” and the armed forces as "the bad guys.” To try to remedy this situation, high level United States officials, including the CIA chief, William Casey, were seen arriving in Manila in the first half of this year to apply pressure to President Marcos to whip his armed forces into

shape, and to arrange for clean elections, as a way to beat he insurgents and win the approval of Congress. It has not been an easy job. “It’s hard to advise the President (Marcos). Maybe you can suggest this or that—but we get labelled as interferring,” according to one source. The assessment of visitors from Washington who have come to size up the threat from the New People’s Army, is that what was once a marginal insurgency is growing to national proportions, and a more determined effort is required to halt it. Richard Armitage, as assistant secretary of defence, told a congressional committee a few months ago that the growing strength of the N.P.A. could tip the balance of military power within the new few years. One Western military expert says: “Give the bad guys two more years of expansion and you all have a problem that is not reversible.” Last summer, Admiral William Crowe, commander of United States forces in the Pacific, was reported to be “distressed” with the poor performance of the Philippine military. It was his idea that an interagency task force be established to map out a response to the insurgency. Comprising members

from the Pentagon, the State Department, and intelligence agencies, the task force prompted comparisons with similar interagency groups of the 19605, before American troops were poured into Vietnam on a large scale. United States officials are extremely sensitive about the parallel being drawn with Vietnam in the early days. In the early 19705, Green Berets were discovered using their expertise in counterinsurgency to train Philippine armed forces in “civic action” exercises in the countryside. Apparently because of the publicity, the then ambassador to Manila, William Sullivan (who had formerly been chairman of the “Interagency Vietnam co-ordinating committee” reporting on Communist infiltration) called off the exercises. Special Forces based in the Philippines were in the news once again this June. A Filipino university professor told journalists that the naval Special Unit Warfare One, based at Subic Bay, and the First Special Operations Squadron

at Clark airfield were “specialists in direct military intervention” and could be used as “a cutting edge” for any future United States intervention in the Philippines. The U.S. embassy at once issued a statement which said that neither these, nor any other American units, have been involved “in any combat or combat support operations” in the Phlippines. The fact remains, however, that the United States has special units trained to operate as antiguerrilla forces which could be deployed if the need arose. Recently President Marcos said in a television interview that he might invoke Manila’s mutual defence treaty with Washington and call in United States troops “if the infiltration and subversion is sc massive it gets out of control.” Washington does not think much of this idea. Michael Armacost, an under-secretary of state who visited Manila in early June, said he did not think American troops would solve the insurgency problem, “particularly in the absence of

any indication that there is very active foreign support being provided to what is an international insurgency.” It is widely believed that Filipinos residing in the United States are helping to fund the New People’s Army. The insurgents claim that nearly 90 per cent of their weapons come from encounters with the Philippine armed forces. “The more guns America sells the Philippine Government, the better armed the insurgents will be,” says one sympathiser. Under the mutual defence treaty of 1951, the United States could help defend the Philippines in the event of an attack by external forces. But there is a strong feeling among American experts that without United States help, the Philippine armed forces, though numerically much stronger, cannot contain, far less defeat, a homegrown, and self-propelled insurgency. If any justification is offered for assisting President Marcos combat an internal insurgency it is that these are “hardcore Communists” (in the words of one embassy official), and that there are vital United States interests at stake. In March, Richard Armitage told a Congressional committee that the two American bases at Subic Bay and Clark airfield were “essential”

to United States strategy in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and as a counterweight to increasing Soviet naval and air power in Vietnam. The New People’s army has vowed to send the 17,000 American forces home, though its official publication says they would be welcome to return “as tourists.” Twenty-three American corporations according to one tally, have investments in logging, pineapples, bananas, and mining, and American banks are owed a third of the Philippines’ $54 billion externa] debt. Meanwhile a major effort is being made to sharpen the antiinsurgency skills of the Philippine armed forces. American training programmes are being stepped up, and Jusmag (Joint United States Military Assistance Group) which also helps the Philippine forces to keep order and maintain equipment, is being supplemented by the arrival of more advisers. An increase in the United States International Military Education and Training funds will allow the upgrading of skills of selected officers in logistics and communications, areas in which the Philippine defence establishment is seen as woefully deficient. American advisers report deficiencies in training, and in basic equipment. “They (the Philippine

armed forces) don’t even necessarily need new trucks, they need to fix those they have.” President Marcos, who concerns himself with every detail from laying drains to ordering planes, was eventually persuaded to delete FI6S from his shopping list and listen to American advisers who said that what was needed was “basic equipment to handle the insurgency,” like spare parts for trucks, and lubricating oil. The American view is that the

counter-insurgency effort cannot succeed unless there are reforms within the military, and an attempt by the Government to cure the country's socio-economic ills. “It’s not just a military problem, any more than it was in Vietnam,” says one Western source. One man whose job is to monitor the conflict says he is “hopeful the situation can be turned round,” but it sounds almost as if he were seeking to convince himself. “I am hopeful. I am hopeful” he repeats.