Israel lost

Press, 3 July 1985, Page 10

Israel lost

By

NICOLAS TATRO,

of the

Associated Press (through NZPA) Tel Aviv Israel appeared to be the big loser in the Beirut hostage crisis. Israel’s relations with the United States were strained, its arch-enemy, Syria, was praised for helping free the hostages, and the political position of Israel’s Prime Minister, Mr Shimon Peres, and his Government’s policy on terrorism were weakened. Throughout the 17-day affair, the Prime Minister was torn between a desire to help Israel’s main ally, the United States, and the need to reassure Israeli voters that he was not giving in to blackmail. The result was a confusing policy. Israeli officials said that they would not give in to terrorist demands for the release of more than 700 Lebanese prisoners although it planned to release them later. Israel freed 31 of the prisoners and it was expected that the rest would be released and sent back to Lebanon. A former American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, said contradictory statements from Jerusalem about whether the prisoners would be released gave the impression of a weak stand by Israel. Israel, he said in a television interview, “was dancing all over the place, admitting the principle of release, not admitting the principle of release.” Israel was also embar-

rassed because the hostage affair had focused attention on its questionable detention of the Lebanese prisoners, who were transferred from the Ansar prison camp in Lebanon to Israel on April 2. The International Red Cross, Arab and some Western Governments, including the United States, considered the transfer to be a violation of the 1949 Geneva conventions on the treatment of war prisoners. In the middle of the hostage affair, the two allies argued openly. The American President, Mr Ronald Reagan, challenged the legality of Israel’s detention of the Lebanese prisoners. Israel’s Defence Minister, Mr Yitzhak Rabin, countered with a call for Mr Reagan to “stop playing around and ask for the release of the prisoners” if that was what he wanted. Mr Peres finally stepped in to halt the squabbling and offered Israel’s full cooperation. This change in tactics apparently resulted from concern about increasingly negative United States public opinion that tended to view Israel as an ungrateful ally for refusing to free the prisoners of its own accord. Some Israeli officials feared that there would be an impact on support for Israel, including the SUS 4 billion ($8.32 billion) in civilian and military aid Israel seeks this year to help end an economic crisis. Israeli politicians were worried that any sign of weakness would further erode its traditional image

of dealing sternly with terrorism. Only weeks before the hostage affair, Mr Peres’s Government faced a storm of protest in Israel for agreeing to exchange 1150 prisoners for three Israeli soldiers captured in Lebanon. After the prisoners’ release, Mr Peres’s popularity began to drop in public opinion polls for the first time since he took office as head of a coalition Government in September. Defending his decisions, Mr Peres said, “We distinguish between releasing prisoners of war and cases of hijacking. (The prisoner swap) wasn’t under any pressure. It was a free decision... after a war, the exchange of prisoners is a different story.” Israel also was concerned that Syria would benefit from the crisis by establishing warmer relations with Washington. It feared that improved ties between Damascus and Washington would eventually prompt the Reagan Administration to put the Golan Heights on the agenda of Middle East peace talks. Israel seized the territory from Syria in 1967 and annexed it in December, 1981. That Syria was able to deliver the hostages rather than America’s ally Israel also undermined a key argument used to garner support for Israel in the United States: that Israel is the only country in the Middle East that is able and willing to deliver on issues of interest to America.