Gorbachev shaping his public image

Press, 15 May 1985, Page 21

Gorbachev shaping his public image

From

MARK FRANKLAND

in Moscow

The new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, is being coy about exploiting his vigorous public persona. No pictures of him are shown on television or printed in the press even after occasions like last month’s meeting with President Ortega of Nicaragua. Gorbachev has stopped the practice of having his own words quoted at the beginning and end of almost any newspaper article of political weight. Even his two-day tour last month of social services and shops produced no pictures in the press. No official explanation has been offered. One Russian remarked that the old ways were necessary during the reign of three elderly and sick leaders, who had to be shown to the public just to prove

they were still on their feet. It seems likely that Gorbachev also wants to break with the rigid, almost oriental, protocol that has grown up around the Soviet leadership and the rites they perform. Politically, he can afford this. Poor Chernenko, admired by rather few, needed to enhance his dignity in every way. Hence such ludicrous enterprises as turning his modest service as a pre-war frontier guard into a "Boys’ Own Paper” epic. Everyone knows, without apparently the need to be told again and again, that the country has invested a lot of hope in the 54-year-old Gorbachev. His power is going to grow formidably just with the passing of time. Abroad, though, it will be a different matter. There was a

telling incident when Gorbachev left Warsaw last month after the renewal of the Warsaw Pact. Soviet TV cameras and microphones closed in on him when he began to work the airport crowd like any Western politician. His remarks were routine — Warsaw was a “green and peaceful city” — but it was the manner that counted. He is not the first Soviet leader to play to a foreign gallery. Brezhnev did it as long as his health held out. Khrushchev was a glorious ham on such occasions. But Gorbachev is smoother, more self-confi-dent and — more important — appears a man of the modern world.

He is not even readily recognisable as a Russian, which may not

be a plus at home but probably is abroad, where the Russian reputation for apartness and impenetrability is certainly a minus. Gorbachev’s personality has a special importance for Soviet foreign policy. Russians conduct two sorts of diplomacy. There is the classical part, largely done in private until agreements can be embodied in solid documents; and there is the public side, the campaign to influence opinion abroad. Every country tries to do this. But the oddity of the East-West diplomatic relationship is that the

West is very open to Soviet public relations but the Soviet Union is largely closed to the West’s. European and American opposition parties, trade unions, a mass of public societies, and organisations are ready to consider criticism of their own Government’s policies from any quarter. Also, there is one sure rule in Soviet diplomacy. The worse relations are with Western governments, the more attention Moscow pays to Western public opinion. Whether Gorbachev will change the substance of Soviet foreign

eicy is another matter. He has erited four powerful groups all with a finger in the making of Soviet strategy — Gromyko’s Foreign Ministry (but above all the veteran Foreign Minister himself); the armed forces; the K.G.8.; and last but not least the Communist Party’s own foreign policy apparat.

By chance — perhaps another instance of Gorbachev’s luck — three of these groups will soon change leaders. Defence Minister Marshal Sokolov is a stopgap appointment. The Party’s chief foreign strategist, Boris Ponomaryov, is 80. Even Gromyko, though an apparently fit 75, is assumed to be mortal. As for the K.G.8., it is already under a Gorbachev ally. All these four groups have to be

got on board for any change in policy and it cannot be a speedy business. For the moment this may not matter. Gorbachev’s priority is to shake up Soviet economy and society. What is more, there is a strong Soviet suspicion that nothing can be done in classic East-West diplomacy as long as Reagan is in the White House.

The chief value of the Gorbachev image will be to enhance the Soviet attempt to win over Western foreign policy, or at least to undermine support for the United States President.

An influential Soviet journalist said recently: “Gradual increase in public pressure will affect the policies of (Western) governments, although it might not happen at

once, perhaps, not as soon as we would wish to see it happen, or as effectively. But it is still one of the most important factors now in world politics.” Copyright — London Observer Service.