Australia’s official nuclear targets

Press, 13 June 1984, Page 18

Australia’s official nuclear targets

By

STUART McMILLAN

The Australian Prime Minister. Mr Hawke, describes as the “most comprehensive ever” his official statement last week on United States’ installations on Australian soil. The main criticism levelled at his review of the bases has been that he has said nothing new. Both observations are accurate. Mr Hawke put more on the official public record than has been put there before; by the same token, he would not have provided any revelations for the reasonably attentive reader of defence matters. The statement was made to fulfil the requirements of a 1982 election promise. It was part of the Labour Party’s platform that a Labour Government would make known to the Australian public the general purposes and functions of the United States bases in Australia. Mr Hawke dealt with the three main bases: North West Cape, Nurrungar, and Pine Gap. The functions of North West Cape have long been known and have been discussed officially before. It is a communications relay station for ships of the United States navy and the Royal Australian Navy. The base serves as a “key element in a complex system of communications supporting the global balance.”

Pine Gap and Nurrungar were discussed together. They were said to provide warning of missile launches and to monitor nuclear explosions through satellite surveillance.

This description of the functions of Pine Gap and Nurrungar was the first made officially. Other references have been to seismic monitoring or to upper atmosphere research. Mr Hawke’s statement — which was cleared by Washington after a telephone call by Mr Hawke to the American Secretary of State, Mr Shultz — clearly put the installations within the American network of nuclear strategy. Despite the incompleteness of the statement, there is a reasonable amount for the Australian public to chew over. The Australian public now knows that the bases have a role within the American system; that they have an arms control role, a role in deterrence, and a vital role in communications.

The point will not have been missed that the Australian Government considers the bases to be nuclear targets. The defence community has

been saying this sort of thing for years. Practically all the Australian speakers at the recent seminar on “The Anzac Connection”, held at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University, if they referred to the bases at all, took it for granted that they would be targets in a nuclear exchange. This opinion has fairly general currency and is advanced in newspaper articles and also a book on the American installations, "A Suitable Piece of Real Estate,” written by Dr Desmond Ball, now head of the centre. In spite of this, it will come as something of a shock to many Australians that Australia takes’such an active role in deterrence and that their Government believes the bases to be nuclear targets. It is one thing to believe in deterrence in a philosophical kind of way and another to be part of the deterrent itself. It is one thing to hear from people — who might, after all, be expressing personal opinions — that Australia might have nuclear targets for the Soviet Union; it is quite another thing to hear the same statement from the Prime Minister and from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Mr Hawke emphasised some positive sides such as the role the bases could play in arms control and their role in deterrence. He argued, rather more questionably, that the facilities were not military bases. He justified this by saying that they had no combat personnel, no military stores or workshops, no plant or machinery or laboratories for research, development, production or maintenance of any weapons or combat systems of any type. Such a narrow definition of a military base may prove to be less than convincing to many. Mr Hawke argued for the presence of the bases: “We contribute positively to verification and to stable and effective deterrence. Our standing in these matters derives not only from our policy commitments but from the presence of, and the important role played by, the Australian-U.S. Joint Defence Facilities on our soil.”

This was, as it were, a description of the upper side of the coin. Mr Hawke left out a few matters such as the monitoring of international communications from Australia performed by Pine Gap, but it was a fuller and franker

picture than had been drawn before. The under side of the coin got scant attention. Even admitting that there was one was almost too much for Mr Hawke. He insisted that the American installations had no offensive capacity. In the case of North West Cape, an offensive capacity is obvious. A communications network can as easily give an order to fire a nuclear missile as it can to order a ship to "Full steam ahead” or whatever the equivalent is for diesel or nuclear-powered vessels. Mr Hawke would be a little hard put to it to sustain an argument that North West Cape has no offensive capability. An offensive capability can also be inferred from the functions of Pine Gap and Nurrungar. Determining whether the Soviet Union or anyone else has exploded a nuclear weapon is certainly part of a verification process.' If a nuclear war broke out, being able to determine the site of a nuclear explosion could help determine whether a target had been struck and therefore whether another missile should be directed there or could be directed elsewhere. More than that. Mr Hawke mentioned nothing about the upgrading of Nurrungar. The installation is expected to be part of the link which the American President would have once a nuclear exchange had begun. By then the President and several top officials would have become airborne to continue the war from a command centre in an aircraft. It could be argued that Nurrungar will become part of the final offensive capability. Mr Hayden, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, came closer to admitting the existence of the under side of the coin at a press conference after the Prime Minister’s statement in the house. He said that instruments such as scissors or a hammer — intended to be used for constructive purposes — could also be used for lethal purposes. In a way the whole argument comes down to the policy of deterrence working so that none of the offensive capabilities are called on. In spite of various comments to the contrary, the official American doctrine is still one of deterrence, not first strike. So long as the Americans stick to that, and it works, then Mr Hawke’s beliefs are well founded.

If the American doctrine did change to one of first strike, then

the role that the American installations have in Australia could not be justified in the terms Mr Hawke used. A great deal depends, then, on the attitude of the Americans and on the co-operation between the Americans and the Australian Government. Mr Hawke said that the Australian Government was satisfied that Australia's sovereigntv in the operation of the joint 'defence facility at North West Cape was now adequately protected. The point is a touchv one in Australia. North West Cape was among the facilities put on an alert during the Yom Kippur war of 1973 without the Australian Government being informed. The point of how much the United States would tell Austalia — and what Australia would do about it — if the United States changed policies, must remain unclear. It is generally easier to find out about the American installations on Australian soil by going to Washington than by asking questions in Australia. This is partly because the United States treats Australians as touchy on nuclear matters (not as touchy as New Zealanders but still needing wary treatment). It is also because various government departments in the United States have to justify their expenditure and make their cases for future spending to politicians, and so information is available. Some Australian Prime Ministers have shown themselves subservient to the United States Government on defence issues. Various combinations of factors will probably determine how far Australia is kept informed of American intentions. It is not reassuring that the Australian public have not been told officially of the upgrading of Nurrungar, even after the Premier of South Australia, Mr John Bannon, has asked for some details from Canberra. One effect of the Hawke statement for New Zealand is minor. New Zealand officials may be less diffident about admitting that Australia is a nuclear target. Hitherto, they have been very cautious on the subject. If they do not now admit it, they may have Mr Hayden to contend with. When he went to Moscow recently, Mr Hayden told the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr Gromyko, that Australia accepted the fact that some of the bases were high-priority nuclear targets. He said that he

did this to avoid being subjected to any bluff or bluster by Soviet spokesmen trying to frighten Australians. If Mr Hayden took it upon himself solemnly to warn the Soviets, then he may be expected to be at least as short with any New Zealanders who want to be reticent about Australia as a nuclear target. The main implication is for the Labour Party in New Zealand. Some people in the Labour Party. Mr Richard Prebble among them, believe that if a Labour Government comes to power in New Zealand and pushes for a nuclearfree zone in the South Pacific support will come from the Australian Labour Party. After last week's events, the evidence for such a view seems doubtful. Mr Hayden said that he had himself gone through a great deal of soul-searching on the question of the bases over the last couple of years. “I believe that deterrents are the only things in place. It is not pleasant, but the alternatives are far worse." he said.

A reasonable conclusion to draw from this would be that Mr Hayden has stared into the nuclear abyss and set his own course and helped to set that of the Hawke Government. He is not going to drop such a conviction because of any advocacy of a nuclear-free zone which New Zealand's Labour Party might make. The alternative for the New Zealand Labour Party might then be to act in isolation. If it tried to find support in the Australian Government, it would have to look to the Left faction. The Left faction is not strong at the moment and the present leadership of the Australian Labour Party would take unkindly to any attempt by the New Zealand Labour Party to play politics among the factions that make up the Australian Labour Party.