Retelling Jutland in naval history

Press, 26 May 1984, Page 20

Retelling Jutland in naval history

The Great War at Sea: 1914-1918. By Richard Hough. Oxford, 1983. 353 pp. $48.50. (Reviewed by George D. Hill) Hough’s book reviews the role of the Royal Navy, or more strictly the battleships and battle-cruisers of the Royal Navy, during the 1914-1918 war and their main opponents, the Kaiser’s High Seas Fleet. The book begins at 1906 with the launch of H.M.S. Dreadnought, an event which sparked off an arms race between Britain and Germany not unlike that currently being pursued between America and Russia. The book comes to an abrupt halt not in 1918, but in early June, 1916, following the Battle of Jutland. This battle, fought on a misty summer evening on the last day of May, 1916, in the North Sea, was a battle in which the Royal Navy lost the most ships, but was ready to fight again in 24 hours. The badly battered German High Seas Fleet was left with morale and ships so badly damaged that it was not to emerge again from its base until it surrendered to Admiral Beatty on “Der Tag”, (November 21, 1918), an event still commemorated in posters hanging in British naval wardrooms round the world. Once again we read of the immense work of Admiral “Jackie” Fisher in setting up the Dreadnought programme and in persuading the Royal Navy that guns were for sinking ships, not just for polishing. The tug of war between Liberal politicians who wanted more welfare expenditure, and the conservatives who wanted to build more battleships in response to the increased rate of German construction, sounds familiar to the modern reader. The young Winston Churchill strides across the scene, poking his nose into parts of the Admiralty where no

political master had ever been before and putting his personal stamp on distant battles thanks to the invention of radio. However, he also started the conversion of the fleet to burning oil, thus doing away for ever with the dirty, tedious job of coaling ship. It was also Churchill, in 1914, in conjunction with the then First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, who made sure that in August when war was declared that the fleet was fully mobilised because reservists had not been sent home from their summer exercises. Fisher and Churchill built a fleet which was the strongest in the world. This fleet, however, was to find itself in 1914 without a base from which it could watch its blockaded enemy because of the submarine threat. We learn of the work of Admiral “Blinkers” Hall and his team of cryptographers and traffic analysts from “Room 40” who kept the 19141918 naval high command almost as well informed of German intentions as did the possession of the Enigma machine in World War 11. The book spends a considerable amount of space in the description and analysis of the Battle of Jutland, nearly four of a total of 16 chapters, four chapters also deal with events leading up to the war. If I have a major criticism it is that the book lacks balance. We hear a lot about top people, especially Admiral Jellicoe’s pessimism, piles and, pyorrhea, little of junior officers, and virtually nothing about ratings. The only junior officers to feature are submarine commanders: in the Baltic the exploits of the future C-in-C Western Approaches, Max Horton; and in the Mediterranean the small band of submariners who were the only people to penetrate the Dardanelles into the

Sea of Marmora and inflict such severe damage on the Turks that they virtually brought shipping to a standstill. The Grand Fleet comprised 90,000 men, but in 1918 there were more than 400,000 officers and ratings in the Royal Navy. We are told very little of the battle against the submarine which although started later than in the Second World War, was almost as serious for the British people. Similarly, events such as the Zeebrugge Raid in which more Victoria Crosses were awarded than in any other single action in World War I, are disposed of in little more than a page. One will also look in vain for details of how the youth of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa were carried safely to Europe to “die in a foreign field.” However, there is a comprehensive bibliography so those who feel that they have missed something can read more. The value of the bibliography is improved by the comments of the author on the contents of each entry. Finally there are a number of annoying errors which should not appear in such a book. Pictures appear in which officers are described as Rear Admirals when they are actually Captains and in two places Rear Admirals are described as Commodores and Captains respectively. Perhaps the most serious error is in Map 3 of South America where latitude, instead of increasing as one goes towards the pole, is decreased which has the effect of putting the dread Cape Horn at about five degrees South. However, for those who enjoy naval history, this book in spite of its lack of balance, and its rather expensive price, is a well written account.