Gulf peace at a price?

Press, 18 May 1984, Page 12

Gulf peace at a price?

After nearly four years of war, Iraq and Iran have fought themselves to a stalemate. For both sides, the gains have been small; the costs and the casualties high. Each is groping for new ways to put pressure on the other, and perhaps for ways to bring other countries directly into the fighting. For both, the flow of oil from the Gulf offers tempting targets. Almost all Iran’s oil exports leave from the Gulf. Much less Iraqi oil is transported this way; but very large amounts of the exports of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait — Iraq’s most vigorous supporters — are shipped through these waters. Iraq has tried to close off the main Iranian oil port of Kharg Island several times, with limited success. More recently, Iraqi attacks on tankers believed to be part of Iran’s oil trade have intensified. This week, the Iranians appear to have responded with attacks on tankers carrying oil from Iraq’s allies. Not that matters are always clear. Identification of attacking aircraft is sometimes impossible. Iraq’s pilots are known to have hit targets up to 100 miles away from those they intended. Not all attacks on shipping have been claimed by one side or the other.

Identifying which belligerent is responsible for an attack, and discovering whether the intended target was hit, will not alter the damage that is being done. As attacks on tankers increase, insurance rates rise and shippers and oil companies become more fearful. The West cannot ignore the implications. At least a sixth of the oil used by Western countries comes from States around the Gulf. The United States Government has given assurances that safe navigation will be maintained. Several Western navies, including those of the United States, Britain, and France, have warships in the area. The prospect of international military action, in a confused and complex tangle of interest and loyalties, must daunt any Western military planner. Labels of “friend” and “foe,” or East and West, do not attach readily to Iran or Iraq. Iraq began the war, using weapons supplied largely by the Soviet Union. Revolutionary Iran responded with the Western arsenal inherited from the Shah’s regime. Since then, the Soviet Union has supplied both sides, but has shown more sympathy to Iraq. Even so, Iraq has sought Western help and help from conservative, pro-Western Arab States. More radical Muslim countries have sometimes assisted Iran. Ayatollah Khomeiny’s regime has also had help from such scattered, unlikely, and politically diverse States as North Korea and Israel. Both the Soviet Union and the West might prefer to see Iraq the winner, if only because its success would represent less of a threat to neighbours. Neither East nor West wants to be drawn into the fight.

The West will have little choice if vital oil shipments continue to be threatened and attacked. After the collapse of American policy in Lebanon, the United States cannot pull back from its commitment to free navigation in the Gulf if it hopes to retain influence in the Middle East. Perhaps a convoy system can be organised in an attempt to give all tankers protection from air attacks, whatever the source of the attacks. The Gulf is a confined area of water, with confined airspace, and with half-a-dozen jittery countries along its shores. Accidents and misunderstandings would have to be foreseen, perhaps adding to the tension. Some such recognition of the difficulties must have precluded decisive Western military intervention so far. Repeated attacks on neutral shipping in international waters would, not so long ago, have brought a clear and quick response. Iraq and Iran have an unspoken common interest in the growing international disquiet. From such disquiet may come a way to end the war without serious loss of pride or territory for either. Iraq, the original aggressor, has been on the defensive for years, but seems able to hold out indefinitely. Iran, technically the injured party, has demanded what looked like impossible conditions for peace, including the overthrow of the Iraqi Government and war reparations of $l5O billion. More recently, the demand for a change in the Iraqi Government appears to have been dropped. The demand for reparations has been reduced to $5O billion. This is still an enormous figure, far beyond the capability of the Iraqis. It is less daunting when measured against the annual contribution of Iraq’s Arab supporters — about $lO billion a year to keep Iraq in the fight. Arab States from the Gulf proposed earlier this year that other countries might pay the reparations — whip round the hat (or the burnous) — and extract Iraq from the unhappy results of its own aggression. The Arabs proposed that Western States, including the United States, should help. The Americans expressed no more than polite interest. On the face of it, the idea of a large Western payment to Iran’s bloodthirsty and intolerant regime is preposterous. If the oil stops flowing from the Gulf, or if supplies can be maintained only at the price of a large Western naval operation — continued indefinitely — buying off the mullahs in Teheran might not seem so distasteful. Iran and Iraq might then both be able to claim victories. Both would have peace of a kind. Iranian honour, and pockets, would be satisfied. The West would again have assured oil — at least until the next eruption of violence in the Middle East.