Loopholes in the diplomatic bag

Press, 9 May 1984, Page 17

Loopholes in the diplomatic bag

After the siege of the Libyan Embassy in London, DAVID BERESFORD of the “Guardian” looks at the sacrosanct privileges of diplomatic immunity.

As the occupants of the Libyan Embassy left the British shores last week, the Government was left with a major headache — the problem of the übiquitous diplomatic bag. It appears as certain as can be that the murder weapon used in the killing of P.C. Yvonne Fletcher was smuggled into the country under the wide cover of diplomatic immunity. And with the trend for foreign nationals to ventilate their bloody feuds on London streets, control of such arms smuggling is an obvious priority for Government. The sacrosanct nature of the “bag” — a term which is something of a misnomer — is set out in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. Article 27 of the convention stipulates, flatly: “The diplomatic bag shall not be opened or detained.” However, it offers no definition of the “bag,” other than that the “packages” constituting it “must bear visible external marks of their character and may contain only diplomatic documents or articles intended for official use.” The effect of this is that any container — a crate, or theoretically, a cargo plane — could be construed as a diplomatic bag, as

long as it carries a government seal. The restriction to articles intended for “official use” is wide open to interpretation — covering, for instance, the Libyan murder weapon if, as suspected, the recent shooting had Colonel Gadaffi’s approval. In practice, most diplomatic bags are canvas sacks, closed with rope and conventional wax or lead seals, usually containing classifed documents and carried by couriers who themselves enjoy special protection. The Vienna Convention bestows a far wider protection for diplomatic smuggling, however, in the immunity it bestows on individual diplomats. Articles 29 and 30 stipulate that the person of a diplomatic agent shall be “inviolable,” together with his private residence, papers, correspondence and — with limited exceptions — his property. With 4933 diplomats attached to 146 accredited missions in London,

plus another 72 people enjoying full diplomatic immunity as representatives of 28 international organisations — such as the Commonwealth Secretariat — the smuggling loopholes are obviously legion. One outstanding instance was in 1980 when a Moroccan diplomatic “bag” — a large crate — fell off a forklift truck and split open, revealing more than half a million pounds worth of cannabis. The culprit in that instance was not accredited to Britain and he was jailed nine years. In 1981, the 15-year-old son of President Saddam Hussein of Iraq and two body guards were found to be carrying loaded guns when they boarded a flight to London from Edinburgh — weapons presumably brought into the country under diplomatic protection. There is also evidence that at least one gun used in the killings of three opponents of the Libyan regime in Britain in 1980 were smuggled in by the then

ambassador, who was subsequently expelled. One “solution” to the problem often canvassed is the use of Xrays to inspect diplomatic bags and baggage. But it is questionable how effective this would be — in that weapons, particularly if dismantled, would be difficult to identify. The Vienna Convention was drawn up before international terrorism became a world-wide problem and X-ray machines were introduced as standard equipment at airports, so it does not specifically canvass the issue as to whether diplomatic bags should be subject to such inspection. But the British Government is taking the position — as, presumably, would foreign governments — that it is prevented by the use of the term “inviolate” in describing the protection afforded to diplomatic property. It is widely believed that the security services do carry out surreptitious searches of diplomatic bags and baggage and some evidence that they have not always regarded them as inviolate is given by the MI6 defector, Kim Philby. In his reminiscences, “My Secret War,” Philby recounts how British agents used to get access to diplomatic bags of neutral States during

the war by distracting the couriers. “Every knot and seal was measured, copied, and photographed where necessary, chemical examination was also made. Then came the task of untying the knots, breaking seals, extracting and photographing the contents. Finally, and hardest of all, was the job of replacing the contents exactly as found, with infinitesimally accurate reproduction of the original knots and seals.” Russian bags were exempted from this treatment, because of suspicions that they contained booby trap bombs, according to Philby. In one instance the red seals of a Polish bag turned purple under treatment and the Poles had to be told apologetically that it had been “lost.” Changes to the Vienna Convention to try to halt diplomatic smuggling is one line which the British Government may pursue. But in the nature of things such amendments to well established international law — and even longer established custom and practice — is likely to take many years to accomplish. In the meantime governments will have to rely on their security services — and, possibly, the occasional nudge to crates on forklift trucks.