Perspectives of naval power

Press, 23 April 1984, Page 14

Perspectives of naval power

(By

Nick Lee-Frampton,

of Christchurch)

Christchurch on the afternoon of Saturday, March 17, was damp and forlorn. Optimistic groups of sailors from the U.S.S. Whipple, wandered past posters decrying their frigate’s presence. Perhaps there were Soviet fishermen also about, from the trawler berthed at Lyttelton. That ship aroused no protest, no posters: it was not regarded as a warship.

Presumably the luxurious QE2 will be free of rebuke when she makes her brief call at Lyttelton later this year. Yet the QE2 has war service to her credit, in the Falklands campaign. Packed with soldiers and weapons, equipped with an improvised helicopter pad, she joined the liners Uganda and Canberra in the south Atlantic.

The absence of such ships prompted Morpasflot — the Soviet cruise-ship agency — to expand its contribution to the British cruise market by more than 40 per cent, offering cruises at fares well below those of the remaining British competition.

Until the Falklands episode, Soviet liners had not been regarded as a serious strategic threat: the emphasis was on roll-on/roll-off vessels.

Once the vital strategic role of passenger ships was displayed, the attitude of the British Goverment changed. “The military value of passenger ships, has come to be appreciated more keenly, and there is concern that the Russians are building up their own fleet while wrecking ours,” said "The Times.”

In the annual report of the Maritime Transport Committee of the O.E.C.D. issued this year, the Soviet merchant fleet, Morflot, was described as having acquired a disturbingly high share of international shipping business. Operating at rates as much as 60 per cent below those of Western conference lines Morflot was responsible, for example, for the carriage of roughly 50 per cent of the coffee and cotton trade between Central America and Europe in 1982. In bilateral terms, Morflot vessels have been carrying 75 per cent — or more — of trade with the U.K., West Germany and Japan. Morflot enjoys certain advan-

tages over Western shipping agencies. While the latter need to insure hulls and machinery, to budget for depreciation and loss, to pay interest on capital, to pay market prices for fuel, and to train crews at commpany expense — and then make a profit — Morflot is immune from such considerations.

Capital is from the State Bank and wages, although high .ir national terms, are low in relation to Western rates, being less than the 1.L.0.’s minimum wage for seamen.

Soviet shipping has at least five objectives: the transport of Soviet trade, the acquisition of “hard” currency, auxiliary support for the Navy, collecting intelligence, and supporting political aims. As the current edition of “Jane’s Fighting Ships” says: “Soviet merchant ships are built to naval standards of vehicle carrying capacity and communications and N.B.C. (Nuclear, Bacterialogical and Chemical) defence — the reverse is true of the Western countries.”

Morflot’s roll-on/roll-off ships have decks strong enough to support tanks and other armoured vehicles. Much of the fleet is passenger-carrying, and readily available for transition to troopcarrying. A similar approach can be seen with Aeroflot’s freighter aircraft.

While many Western vessels are laid up, Morflot continues to expand — by 300,000 gross registered tons in 1981-82 alone. Now edging ahead of British tonnage totals, the Soviet merchant fleet is already four million tons ahead of the United States merchant marine.

Reports that Soviet fishermen are exhausting New Zealand’s stock of second-hand sewing machines and making bulk purchases of cosmetics to make profits back home, may raise a smile. Their trawlers come and go with nary a murmur. There is a trawler “presence” off the west coast of Scotland, not far from Britain’s Polaris submarine base. It is not believed that Soviet trawlers frequent the area for fish. The visit of the Soviet trawler to Lyttelton came neatly between visits by the Royal Australian Navy’s amphibious assault ship,

Tobruk, and’ the U.S. frigate, Whipple. Coincidence? Perhaps. Both the Russians and the United States maintain four naval fleets. They include the Northern, Black Sea, Baltic and Pacific for the Soviets, and the Second, Third. Sixth and Seventh Fleets (respectively Atlantic, Eastern Pacific, Mediterranean and Western Pacific) for the United States. Both nations appear to emphasise their Pacific fleets. The International Institute for Strategic Studies' “Military Balance" year-books show, that between 1976 and 1984 the U.S. Navy’s combined Pacific fleets gradually increased in numbers, and now comprise 140 major vessels and submarines. Overall, the U.S. Navy now has nearly 130 submarines and nearly 190 major surface vessels.

By the yardstick of major vessels only, the U.S. Navy is today below the level credited to the Soviet Navy in 1976-77. The U.S. Pacific fleets are almost at the numerical level of the Soviet Pacific fleet in 1979-80. Both overall and in Pacific terms, the Soviet Navy remains ahead of the United States Navy. Neither side, however, has all of its ships at sea: some are in port, or dry dock. This is especially true of the Soviet Navy. This may be because of the Soviet ploy of developing several new weapons systems in secrecy and then releasing them, en masse, to the consternation of Western observers.

For all its apparent strength, the Soviet Navy does, in some respects, suffer from comparison with U.S. and other Western fleets. Most of the latter have a long history and corresponding traditions, which plays a positive role in the training and attitude of Western sailors. This is more so because Western fleets have victories to their credit, while the Soviet Navy has only defeats upon which to dwell.

For all the tendency to stay in port, whenever a Western task force has been formed, the Soviet Navy has produced one of equal size. A relative lack of aircraftcarriers has been made up with increased numbers of missilearmed cruisers. Meanwhile, the life of a Soviet Navy sailor does not compare favourably with that of his U.S. counterpart.

The impressive weight of weapons and associated equipment on Soviet vessels allows little space for crew. Living quarters are cramped and pay is low. While the ratio of pay between officers and ratings in the Royal Navy is six to one, this figure is 100 to one for Soviet Navy crews. Conscripts to the Soviet Army or Air Force serve for two years, those in the navy for three. The leave allowance is sparse, and opportunities for relaxation rare. Last February the Japanese Defence Agency reported that the Kiev-class aircraft-carrier. Novorossiisk, would enter the Pacific. Within a few weeks the New Zealand Defence Minister confirmed this, his remarks serving to raise a chorus of protest — at United States’ warships. A study of the Novorossiisk is revealing. She carries a dozen Yak-36 “Forger” fighters, which are no match for British Sea Harriers or U.S. Tomcats.

The warship itself more than reverses the balance. Whereas Western carriers are armed with a few Phalanx 20mm guns and a single twin missile-launcher for air-defence, the Kiev-class ships bristle with guns and missiles. With the forgers are more than 20 helicopters. They can be used for anti-submarine operations or for directing fire at targets over the ship’s radar horizon. Other weapons include four twin launchers for an anti-ship missile with a range of 500kms. Air defence is provided by four twin launchers for a mix of missiles, with more than 100 reloads available. In reserve are two twin 76mm guns, eight Gatling guns, another twin launcher for anti-submarine missiles and 10 tubes for 21-inch torpedoes. More interesting are the basic design differences between the anti-ship missiles of East and West.

Western missiles in this class, with the French “Exocet” the most publicised, have certain characteristics in common. They are slow, that is less than Mach 1 (the speed of sound), they do not have nuclear warheads, and they are seaskimmers.

Soviet missiles in this category are fast, as much as Mach 2.5, with a choice of conventional or nuclear warheads. They approach their targets anywhere on an arc from a

shallow dive to the nearly vertical. This combination makes detection and destruction of them both more difficult and more urgent. Whereas a missile with a high-explosive warhead can be safely intercepted at close range without danger to the intended victim, a missile with a nuclear warhead needs to be destroyed at a much greater range. The British "Seawolf" missile has demonstrated an impressive ability to intercept a subsonic seaskimming missile and has also demonstrated an ability to hit a 4.5-inch shell. To hit ’ a missile approaching at more than Mach 2 is quite another matter. Can it therefore be said that Soviet design in missiles and ships is “right," and Western ideas are "wrong?” A definite answer may not be possible, although the recent trend towards warships with exceptionally heavy armament may actually be creating vulnerability. World War II battleships were the scourage of lesser vessels, yet were open to destruction by a single shell or bomb hitting a weak spot. In this respect, the fearsome Soviet warships of today are no less at risk, and their loss would be the greater for the fire-power lost to the Soviet fleet.

Submarines, not battleships, are now the capital ships of major navies, and the Soviet Typhoon class are beyond any doubt the biggest of their kind ever built. Almost twice as large as the United States Ohio class of Trident submarines, the Typhoon is 10 times the size of a Royal New Zealand Navy frigate. Armed with 20 long-range nuclear missiles, this new vessel suffers, by her very bulk, from the vulnerability mentioned earlier. Compared to her lesser brethren she should be easier to detect, to track and therefore to sink.

On February 18, 1873, the “Southern Cross” newspaper published an article describing the shelling of Auckland by a Russian battleship. The story was spurious, although a reflection of popular anxiety about such a threat. Today a Typhoon class submarine could be several thousand miles north-east of Australia, and simultaneously fire missiles at Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. What would the “Southern Cross” have made of that?