Chemical warfare treaty recedes

Press, 13 April 1984, Page 20

Chemical warfare treaty recedes

The poison gas used in the IranIraq war has already killed some Iranian soldiers; it may kill other people in other countries in future because it has disposed of any early prospect of a new treaty outlawing chemical weapons. A few weeks ago, the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament at Geneva seemed at last to be getting close to a treaty that would ban not only the use of these weapons, as the 1925 Geneva protocol does, but also their manufacture and ownership. The Soviet delegation even looked like accepting its provisions for on-site inspection — the issue that has bedevilled almost every arms control negotiation since 1945. Now this break-through looks like breaking apart. The ease with which Iraq (or Iran, or both) obtained mustard gas, and probably a nerve agent, tabun, as well, will strengthen the

From ‘The Economist,’ London

hand of those who argue for intrusive forms of inspection, far in excess of anything the Russians are at present willing to permit. The Iran-Iraq war is also likely to raise demands for other forms of enforcement. Until now the conventional wisdom has been that international public opinion and possible retaliation would suffice.

But moral suasion has not worked in the south-west Asia war. Both Iraq and Iran signed the 1925 protocol forbidding the use of poison gas; its use in their war now stands condemned by the United Nations. Will this condemnation deter Iraq’s President Saddam Hussein from using gas again if he thinks a whiff of mustard can save his Army? Not likely.

The Russians are believed to be shipping the makings of toxic gases to Iraq through Jordan. Prohibiting sales of weapons,

and even of their poisonous innards, will not stop the poisonmakers. Many countries have the capacity to make mustard gas and get it into some sort of missile, shell or spray. Nerve gas is a bit harder, but any country with the technological advancement of, say, Egypt, or with an extensive petrochemical manufacturing plant, could make this gas. Iraq has almost certainly made its own.

The spread of nuclear weapons may be curbed by controlling supplies of their key ingredients — plutonium and highly enriched uranium. Chemical weapons have no such controllable elements. There are just too many chemical warfare agents, and too many ways to produce their ingredients. For example, potassium fluoride, which was one of the chemicals that the Americans impounded last month to prevent

them being sold to Iraq, can be used to make nerve gas; but it was not on any of the Geneva lists. Like other feedstock chemicals, it also has legitimate industrial uses and would be impossible to control.

Neither the most demanding of the inspection provisions considered at Geneva, nor any exportcontrol system for chemicals, would have prevented the use of poison gas in the Iran-Iraq war. So

is there any point in going on with the Geneva exercise? Yes, but with newly opened eyes. Vice-President Bush will be putting a new American draft on the table later this month. A chemical warfare treaty cannot be expected to be air-tight; the poisons are too easy to make and hide. The most that can be expected of a treaty is the prevention of massive surprise attacks with chemical weapons.

Even to achieve this, the treaty would have to require frequent and unannounced inspections of all plants producing things, such as insecticides, which are chemically close to poison gas and can be quickly converted to weapons manufacture.

The Russians — and many other governments too — will not be quick to accept this. But anything less would be a palpable fraud, which could create a false sense of security and thus be worse than no agreement at all. Copyright — The Economist.