Chinese Army hampered largely by its feet

Press, 6 March 1984, Page 10

Chinese Army hampered largely by its feet

By ERIC HALL, of Reuter (through NZPA) Peking

China’s Army is like an old tank — slow and outdated and not always able to see where it is going. The People’s Liberation Army is manned by quality troops backed by an arsenal of obsolescent weapons and racked by doubts and fears over what its new role should be in a modernised China.

In a nation where the State and Communist Party control most aspects of society, the soldiers are all volunteers. Although each area has quotas for recruitment, coercion to join has not previously been necessary for a respected organisation with fiercely proud martial and revolutionary traditions. But as China’s economic reforms take hold and the peasants are given a chance to make money, to have a son in the Army has become less of an honour when it means a missing pair of hands in the fields.

For the officers, careerists or reactionary Leftwing radicals from the days of Mao Tse-tung, the realisation that the Army has been given lowest priority in national development is discouraging. Consequently, there have been morale problems. The problem has been helped but not solved by giving soldiers’ families back home on the farm extra labour help or subsidies. Last month a new set of discipline regulations was introduced which foreign military sources believe is stricter than a 1975 set formulated under China’s period of extreme Leftism. Dress uniforms to replace the old, drab green fatigues are being issued, but the planned re-establishment of formal ranks is now expected to be delayed until next year because of Army opposition. Yet, despite reports of discontent, the sources be‘lieve that discipline is still generally good and morale high over all. n The main Army (ground forces), Navy and Air Force

of the People’s Liberation Army number roughly 3% million men.

The Army’s 35 “armies,” each of usually three divisions, and 12 armoured divisions, are stationed in 11 military regions. Probably the best-supplied and certainly the greatest numbers are around the metropolitan Peking region, in the northeast where Chinese Manchuria is surrounded on three sides by the Soviet Union, and in the south along the Vietnamese border.

The Navy is split into North, East, and South sea fleets and the Air Force is spread around eight main military air regions and includes three airborne divisions.

The militia, previously assigned a guerrilla and support role in line with Mao’s people’s war theory, seems to be undergoing an important reorganisation as a first-line reserve. Recently, in an apparent admission that the country’s mobilisation plans were inadequate, the Deputy Chief of General Staff, General He Zhengwen, said that in future war the militia would replenish existing Army units and form new ones capable of immediate action. “It would be too late in such a (modem) war for the militia to be organised in the old way, first by mobilising the people, then forming militia or guerrilla units and later upgrading them to the level of regular armed forces,” he said.

Western military and industry sources said that China’s capacity for producing advanced weapons systems was growing. But the dwindling percentage of total State revenue budgeted for the forces precludes any rapid development Announced military spending last year was unchanged from 1982 at 17.9 billion yuan (JNZI3.S billion), while State revenue rose 11.3 per cent to 123.2 billion yuan (1NZ92.4 billion) over the period. This is undoubtedly too low because it does not include such items as pay or allowances. But it is basically what the Army spends on

equipment One problem for commanders is that the Government has told the military industrial sector, which commands the best plant and technology in crucial areas such as oil, textiles, chemicals, steel, and drugs, that it must gear up to help the civilian economy. The resources that an average Chinese commander could call on in combat are thus considerably limited by what is available.

Based on published data, official statements, and conversations with foreign military experts, the following is an educated estimate of the People’s Liberation Army’s capabilities. The hardy infantryman armed with a dependable Chinese-designed carbine or assault rifle is at the centre of the basic 700-man battalion. Platoons are equipped with light machine-guns and hand-held anti-tank gre-nade-launchers, and the battalion is supported by heavy machine-guns, mortars, and recoilless-rifles. Heavier artillery support and anti-air-craft gun protection starts only at divisional level

Infantry is basically footmobile. Even armoured divisions can lift only a proportion of their “mounted” infantry in armoured personnel carriers at any one time. The prevalent main battle tanks are the various Chinese versions of the old Soviet T 548. China has so far only looked to up-gun and re-engine its existing tanks with foreign help. The main Air Force warplane is the old F6-series fighter, a version of the MiG-19, which makes up about 65 per cent of the Army’s 4500 fighters and ground-attack planes.

The glaring weaknesses are the People’s Liberation Army’s poor air cover and its lack of anti-aircraft missiles, its limited anti-tank guided weapons systems, its relative immobility, and its inefficient supply system, which was a serious problem during its punitive strike against Vietnam in early 1979. Chinese commanders

have said that anti-tank and anti-aircraft guided weapons systems are needed quickly and it is no coincidence that the United States has offered to sell such weapons to Peking. Other critical problems are bad communications and electronic warfare capabilities. Operating blind against an electronically sophisticated enemy could be extremely costly. Against the military resources of China’s only comparable potential land-based opponent, the Soviet Union, it is generally agreed that the People’s Liberation Army would be in deep trouble. Despite propaganda films, P.L.A. experience of unstaged combined arms operations allowing leadership initiative and backed by effective staff work and supply is limited. The Chief of the General Staff, General Yuang Dezhi, said that more map and sand-table exercises and field manoeuvres, including headquarters training, confrontation manoeuvres at divisional level and below, and rear-echelon practice were needed.

Offensive tactics seem to centre still on the infantry wave and infiltration that were a feature of the Korean war. The heavy casualties suffered then by Chinese troops would be multiplied many times now against modern weapons. Casualties in Vietnam were reported to have been high. Emphasis is on defence. Chinese formations seem to plan for a defence in great depth against mobile assault, relying on attrition to wear down an enemy. The P.L.A.’s political director, Yu Qiuli, recently summed up military doctrine for the foreseeable future: “Our weapons and equipment are still very backward. Even if our Army is modernised within 10 to 20 years, it will still be inferior to aggressors with better hardware. However, we have a vast territory and large population... and we have the tradition of using «poor equipment and relying on protracted war to wear our enemies down.” ‘