Ship sunk to keep war going, says book

Press, 5 March 1984, Page 10

Ship sunk to keep war going, says book

NZPA-PA London Fresh assertions that Britain made full war with Argentina inevitable by sinking the cruiser General Belgrano just as peace talks were on the brink of success are made in a book to be published in Britain this week.

“The Sinking of the Belgrano,” by Desmond Rice and Arthur Gavshon, also asserts that the nuclearpowered submarine H.M.S. Conqueror detected the General Belgrano 46 hours before being told to strike. After making contact she then trailed her for 25 hours at periscope-depth before the order came through to sink her on May 2, 1982.

The book uses what the authors say are previously unpublished details of telephone conversations between Argentina’s then President, Lieutenant-Gen-eral Leopoldo Galtieri, and tae go-between Peruvian President, Mr Fernando Belaunde Terry, who was working on a peace plan with the Americans.

The authors say: “Mrs Thatcher’s War Cabinet decided in principle on the use of force the day Argentina occupied the Falklands, that only unconditional surrender by the junta couldLhave prevented a killing wsf»

“The phase of phantom negotiations through April served only to fill the ‘diplomatic vacuum’ until the task force could be brought to bear.”

The book says that Mr Belaunde was so confident that peace had been achieved just before the sinking that he had even arranged a formal signing ceremony in Lima that evening. One Navy source that the authors say they spoke to, close to the Argentinian junta, asserted that the Argentinians had told the Peruvians at midday on May 2 that they would sign a pieace plan based on (the then American Secretary of State) Alexander Haig’s proposals at 8 pm. that day. But at 5.30 p.m. the Belgrano was sunk by two torpedoes fired by the Conqueror 20 nautical miles outside the British-imposed total exclusion zone, and 368 lives were lost

The book says that then then Argentinian Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Mendez, was amazed at the sinking, so close to a peace accord.

“I cannot believe that Haig, who had shuttled most of the previous month in search of just such an agreement or Pym, (the then Foreign Secretary, Francis Pym) in his office

with him that May 2, did not trasmit the news of Belaunde’s success to Mrs Thatcher and her War Cabinet in London at once. “In that case there could have been a good 3% to four hours clear between London’s receipt of the news and the torpedoing of the Belgrano,” Dr Costa Mendez said.

The authors say that the British Ambassador to Peru, Charles Wallace, gave the Peruvians the clear impression that he was passing information back to London all the time, as well. Rice and Gavshon say: “What strains belief is that the Foreign Office should have failed to keep itself fully informed about the progress of the Haig-Be-launde initiative before London gave the order to sink the Belgrano.” The authors says that they had acquired the text of telephone conversations between General Galtieri and Mr Belaunde, recordings of which were made at the time.

General Galtieri spoke to Mr Belaunde after the sinking, saying: “The Argentine Government will not, in the face of this military pressure, accept any negotiations relating to peace in the South Atlantic in these circumstances. We would ratheOfie on our feet than

on our knees.” Mr Belaunde replied: “I understand you very well, Mr President. I understand that it was practically a tacit understanding that while there was any possibility of negotiations those people would refrain from any warlike act.” Rice and Gavshon also spoke to crew members of the Conqueror, her commander, Commander Christopher Wreford-Brown, has already made public his version of the events of May 2. They say that crew members told them the General Belgrano had been sailing away from the task force for 10 hours before she was hit. This contradicts assertions by the task force’s commander, Rear-Admiral Sir John Woodward, that the cruiser had been part of a “pincer movement” closing in on the British ships. Crew members also had said that the General Belgrano had been sailing a dead straight course at the time of the sinking for more than nine hours — a contradiction of Mrs Thatcher’s statements that the cruiser had made “many changes of course.”

The then Chief of the Defence Staff, Admiral of the. Fleet Sir Terence (now Lord) Lewin, has already given his own version of events. “It didn’t natter

what direction the Belgrano was going. She might have been wasting time so as to be able to attack the task force at night ... I said we could not wait, here was an opportunity to knock off a major unit of the Argentine Fleet,” he has said. Mr Pym and Mr Haig have also commented on the

likelihood of a peace success around the time of the sinking. Mr Pym said last year, “What Mr Haig outlined to me was, at best, a promising basis for future works. If the Peruvians had prepared a treaty ready for signature on the evening of

May 2 they certainly gave us no indication of this in Lima or in London.” Mr Haig said: “There was no way of assessing the prospects of achieving an immediate Argentine consensus on the pin grasp by all the parties concerned excepting British Ministers and