Staying in Lebanon

Press, 9 December 1983, Page 18

Staying in Lebanon

Neither the British nor the Italian Governments, both of which faced alarm at home because of the United States bombing of Syrian positions in Lebanon, have decided to pull out of the multi-national peace-keeping force in Lebanon. To do so would have ended the multi-national aspect of the force. This would certainly have caused pressure to mount for the withdrawal of the French and United States components of the force as well. The point was seen clearly by the British Prime Minister, Mrs Thatcher, who said: “Britain will not consider unilateral withdrawal, or lead a strategic retreat from Lebanon.” For all this, the other three Governments will want to be consulted if the United States plans another major air raid on Syrian petitions in Lebanon, however justified. Even the Americans, who seem curiously slow to perceive the sensitivities of other countries, might hesitate to risk stirring up calls for the withdrawal of the peace-keeping force. The suspicion is held in Europe, that the United States tends to be motivated by antiSoviet feeling. Syria is allied to the Soviet Union and it is this, and the United States view that Syria is preventing a settlement of the Lebanon issue, that leads to fears that the United States and Syria will go to war. Certainly, Syria wants the United States out of Lebanon, and Syria does not want the solution that the United States wants for Lebanon. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to insist that what Syria wants is a Lebanon completely under its domination, or that it wants to use Lebanon as a springboard to attack Israel. One of the most important and long-standing Syrian demands is for the return of the Golan Heights from Israel. Other Arab countries fear Syria’s ability to make trouble for them if they ignore Syrian demands. Henry Kissinger once said that the Arabs could not wage war without Egypt, but could not make peace without Syria. Lebanon, Israel, and the United States will have to take some account of Syrian demands. Syria’s ability to change the course of Palestinian and Arab history is being demonstrated by its support for the anti-Arafat forces in the Palestine Liberation Organisation.

Yasser Arafat, and 5000 of his followers, will leave Tripoli soon, probably in ships supplied by the Greek Government and under the United Nations flag. This may be the end of the Palestine Liberation Organisation as an independent force, at least for a long time. If the 5000 are distributed between Tunisia and North Yemen, their military and political impact will be negligible. The anti-Arafat forces left in Lebanon will be under Syria’s direction. It is ironic that the Syrians will have completed what the Israelis, in their invasion of Lebanon, failed to do: that is, to destroy the P.L.O. as an effective force. The events of the last few days will still not make Israel feel more secure; and they will not mean a restoration of peace and orderly government in Lebanon. Much more is needed to secure these reasonable objects.

If the P.L.O.’s power is destroyed, two important changes may occur: the P.L.O. will lose its place in the Arab world as the sole representative of the Palestinians, and Mr Arafat may no longer be the recognised leader of the Palestinians. King Hussein of Jordan has already set out to be the representative of the Palestinians. He is unlikely to get full cooperation from the West Bank Palestinians. They prefer Mr Arafat, and they fear that interference from Syria would prevent King Hussein from assuming a dominant role in Palestinian affairs. The Israelis hate Mr Arafat so much that they would be unlikely to accept Mr Arafat in a formal role among West Bank Arabs.

The United States does not have enough troops in Lebanon to wage war on Syria, even if it wanted to. The troops who are there have been subjected to fierce and damaging attacks. As the 1984 Presidential election gets closer, the position will worsen. The election-year tilt towards Israel is already occurring, and this may mean a closer linking of the aims of Israel and the United States in Lebanon. This would bring the United States on to a course of greater conflict with Syria. Against this, President Reagan would like, as an electionyear move, to bring the troops home from Lebanon.