Making sense of Hegel’s mysteries

Press, 16 July 1983, Page 18

Making sense of Hegel’s mysteries

Hegel. By Peter Singer. Oxford U.P., Past Masters Series, 1983. 97 pp. $5.95 (paperback). (Reviewed by David Novltz)

The German philosopher Hegel (1770-1831) is not everyone’s cup of tea. Those who have read him will know that he is mercilessly obscure. Those who have not, tend to think of him either as the forefather of Marxism or else of Fascism. Either way he is not much liked.

Peter Singer does much in this extraordinarily fine book to dispel the mystery and misconceptions which surround Hegel’s philosophy. He makes every concession to the general reader, and explains the main tenets of Hegel’s thought with great care and lucidity. Perhaps most extraordinary is Singer’s method of exposition. Instead of proceeding chronologically, and introducing the reader straightaway to the concept of Spirit as it appears in Hegel’s notoriously difficult “The Phenomenology of Spirit,” he “uses Hegel’s understanding of world history as our way into his system of ideas.” The aim initially is to explain Hegel’s view that “the history of the world is none other than the progress of the consciousness of freedom” (“Lectures on the Philosophy of History”). Singer does this by introducing us to Hegel’s account of various periods of world history — where each is delineated in terms of the freedom enjoyed by the individual in that period. And it is only with the rise of Christianity, as eventually purified and reinforced by the Reformation, that people become truly free.

On Hegel’s view, such freedom involves being free to reason so as to judge truth and goodness. Since people in the post-Reformation (so-called “Germanic”) era are now free to make rational choices, they will only consent to, and abide by, the institutions of their society when these conform to reason: that is, to truth and moral goodness. The real world will have to be rationally organised, for only then will individuals freely choose to act in accordance with it.

At this point Singer proceeds to discuss Hegel’s conception of freedom (“The Philosophy of Right”), showing that it must not be confused with the liberal conception of “freedom as the absence of restrictions,” for on the liberal view it matters not how we arrive at our desires so long as we are not prevented from satisfying them. But if one does not really choose one’s desires — if, say, they are the product of fashion, or advertising, or propaganda — then we are not genuinely free when we act from desire. Free action, according to Hegel,

is action based on reason alone; and since, following Kant, only reason can enable one to apprehend one’s moral duty, it follows for Hegel that in order to be genuinely free, one has simply to do one’s (rationally apprehended) duty. But the only society that will allow one to do so will be a rationally ordered society, a society which is “organic,” in the sense that it does not disregard the interests of its members “any more than I would disregard an injury” to my body. Despite this, Singer is emphatic that Karl Popper’s interpretation of Hegel as the forebear of the “closed society” is mistaken, and that it is based on a selective reading of the notes taken by certain of Hegel’s students. It is only at the start of the fourth chapter that Singer addresses himself to Hegel’s notion of “Geist.” We should . not, he warns us, assume that Geist is properly translated as Spirit, for the German word is ambiguous as between Spirit and Mind. To translate Geist as Spirit is to assume that Hegel’s' is a mystical philosophy which has no proper connections with the European tradition. However, since Hegel was writing at a time when European philosophy was very concerned with human mind, it “is entirely to be expected that a philosopher like Hegel should write about mind.” And his aim in “The Phenomenology” is to establish the necessity of mind developing as it does. Phenomenology is the study of the way in which things appear to us, and since appearances are only ever apprehended by the mind, a phenomenology of mind is a study of mind as it appears to itself. So Hegel’s - phenomenology is explained by Singer as tracing “differing forms of consciousness, viewing each one from the inside, as it were, and showing how more limited forms of consciousness developed into more adequate ones.” In doing this, Hegel tries to show which forms of consciousness afford knowledge, and he aruges to the view that the (Kantian) distinction between knowledge and reality is false and must inevitably lead to a self-refuting

scepticism. Consequently, the only form of consciousness which affords knowledge is that which recognises that our knowledge creates reality — and this is part of what Hegel calls “self-consciousness.” This aspect ,of Hegel’s thought is obscure and difficult, but is very adequately explained by Singer.

Since knowledge helps create reality, any rational person will help create a rational world: a world, we have been told, which maximises human freedom. According to Singer, though, Hegel regards reason not only as universal, but as “the essential medium of mind.” It follows then, that for Hegel mind itself is universal, and that all particular minds are linked in this universal mind, for they all share a common reason.

At this point Hegel’s thought does become mystical, but Singer manages to show that the assertion of a universal Geist (now best translated as Spirit) is not an arbitrary invention, but grows out of very real problems which Hegel perceived in European thought. What is more, it now transpires that Hegel believes that the development of more adequate forms of consciousness (and eventually selfconsciousness) in the individual, is reflected in the universal mind (Spirit). Hence, the aim of Spirit is to achieve self-consciousness, and thereby make the world congruent to its rational self. In this way, the development of Spirit is seen to parallel that of world history, for both will ultimately lead to the maximal achievement of human freedom.

Singer’s exposition in this little volume is crisp, unpretentious and persuasive. He does not assume that his exposition is unproblematic; nor does he refrain from criticising Hegel’s ideas. The dustjacket of this publication boasts that “Singer’s book eliminates any excuse for remaining ignorant of the outlines of Hegel’s philosophy.” It is difficult not to agree with this assessment; and since Hegel’s writings are both arduous and interminable, Peter Singer is to be congratulated on a job excellently done.