Mr Arafat and Syria

Press, 28 June 1983, Page 20

Mr Arafat and Syria

The position of Mr Yasser Arafat, leader of the Fatah group within the Palestine Liberation Organisation, and chairman of the P.L.0., has become very difficult indeed. He is no longer wanted in Syria, which has been the home of the Fatah since the P.L.O. fighters were expelled from Lebanon. Whether he was expelled or, as one Syrian report has it, he has exiled himself, is immaterial. He is cut adrift from his military and political base. The threats to his leadership, apparent over the last few months, have a fresh opportunity to flourish. He may, for a while, be able to take part in international conferences; but unless he demonstrates that, in spite of his separation from his guerrillas, he is the main influence and is exercising control, his standing seems bound to diminish. The accusations made by Syria through its newspapers against Mr Arafat are revealing. They may or may not be true, but they demonstrate Syria’s fears about what might happen if Mr Arafat continues to lead the Palestinians either in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon or in Syria itself. The first accusation is that Mr Arafat wants to drag Syria into a war with Israel. A second accusation is that Mr Arafat is secretly negotiating with foreign powers to turn the Bekaa Valley into a battleground between different Palestinian groups, thereby giving Israel an excuse to “complete its invasion.” Syria also says that Mr Arafat has been guilty of misconduct towards the Palestinian cause and of provoking Syria. The last two accusations may be taken as part of Syria’s rhetoric or beliefs. The first two contain the nub of Syria’s fears: that Mr Arafat and his supporters will upset Syria’s relationship with Israel. In spite of Syria’s hard-line stand against Israel, Syria has a realistic appreciation of Israel’s might and almost a working relationship in which Syria and Israel have some respect for one another’s strategic interests, including their interests in Lebanon. Syria is still refusing to withdraw its troops from the Bekaa Valley. Although a Syrian withdrawal from, there would be the key to Israel’s withdrawing from Lebanon, the last thing that Syria wants is an Israeli attack on the Syrian positions in the Bekaa Valley. Syria fears that, if Palestinian groups fight there, Israel will feel it necessary to, or would at least have an excuse to, move into the Bekaa Valley. The valley has approaches to the heartland of Syria itself. Syria knows that, if Israel tries

to take the Bekaa Valley, Syria will need to throw a great deal into resisting the Israelis. If Israel succeeded in wresting control from Syria, Israel’s position in Lebanon would be even more consolidated. Israel is aware that Syria thinks in this way and will be unwilling to take on Syria, with unpredictable consequences, especially because of the closeness between the Soviet Union and Syria. Syria is not a supporter of Mr Arafat within the Palestinian movements. The main criticism has been that Mr Arafat has not been sufficiently radical. Yet it is probably too simple to regard the exclusion of Mr Arafat from Syria as evidence that Syria is using any means to weaken Mr Arafat. Syria sees its own vital interests at stake. The argument that it has with Mr Arafat is more that he is pursuing an independent course in the Middle East. Syria wants a P.L.O. that can be dominated by Syria. There is something of a parallel in the circumstances of June, 1976, when Syrian troops entered Lebanon because it seemed that the Palestinians were coming to a close arrangement with the Muslim Left. Syria saw the balance of power in Lebanon turning against it. Some evidence exists to support the proposition that, when Syria moved into Lebanon, Syria made clear to the Israelis that the action was not a move against Israel. Although Syrian pressure to make the Palestinians more radical and possibly more aggressive against Israel would seem to point towards greater violence, it may be argued that the real quarrel at present is more about a form of peace than about a form of war. If there is any form of settlement, the Syrians want to feel secure from the Lebanese side and to get the Golan Heights back from Israel. Syria may be leaving its troops in Lebanon precisely for those reasons. It will shift them when its western border is secure and it will use their presence in the meantime as a bargaining lever to try to get the Israelis out of the Golan Heights. Syria does not want a settlement that suits Jordan, Israel, the Palestinians, and the Americans and which leaves Syria’s demands unfulfilled. The Golan Heights and the Bekaa Valley are particularly important to Syria. Mr Arafat has been exploring ways of making a settlement. His ways are inimical to Syria’s interests. The separation of Mr Arafat from the base of his power in Syria will make it all the harder for a settlement involving some arrangement between Mr Arafat and Jordan to be achieved.