Soviet missile offer

Press, 6 May 1983, Page 12

Soviet missile offer

When President Reagan describes a proposal on nuclear arms by the Soviet President, Mr Yuri Andropov, “positive,” as he has just done, the world has some reason if not to give a sign of relief, at least to take another breath of hope. President Andropov is not about to lead a march bearing a banner carrying the Russian equivalent of “ban the bomb”; but he has made an offer, which at first sight appears substantial, on intermediate-range weapons in Europe. The offer includes a reduction in the delivery systems and in the warheads. Although the offer does not appear to have been laid on the table in Geneva, where the negotiations are being conducted, the fact that it was published at all from the Soviet Union means that it was more than a throwaway line during the vodka toasts at the Kremlin banquet for the visiting East German leader, Mr Erich Honecker. Bbth sides, the Americans and the Soviets, have made various offers before and the offers have usually been rejected within hours of being made. This time both President Reagan and the Secretary of Defence, Mr Caspar Weinberger, have welcomed the Soviet suggestion. Both the offer and the American reaction are therefore to be welcomed by the rest of the world. President Reagan’s proposal of having no American missiles in Europe and of having no Soviet missiles aimed at Western Europe would be the best in an ideal world; the Soviet Union saw this zero option as forcing it to withdraw all its nuclear weapons in return for a promise by the United States not to deploy weapons in Europe. The zero option left the British and French nuclear forces intact. The Americans stuck with the proposition long enough to lead to some suspicion that the Americans did not want an agreement. However, some movement became apparent in the American position and the willingness to take the Soviet offer seriously appears to establish clearly that the Americans are after an agreement.

The Soviet Union has given signs of alarm about the deployment of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe. Almost certainly the Soviet Union hoped that the peace movements in Europe would make deployment impossible for the countries of Western Europe. It is not at all clear that they will do so, and the Soviet Union may have given up such a hope. The official

policy in Western Europe was that deployment would go ahead unless a suitable agreement could be reached with the Soviet Union. The peace movements in Europe have so far not managed to upst this official policy.

When the time comes for actual deployment — later this year in some countries — protests may hinder deployment. In the meantime, the fear and worry about the possibility of nuclear warfare continues and the ethical aspects of continuing the build-up of nuclear arms have been pressed into public discussion. The most significant move recently came from the national conference of American Catholic Bishops, who have called for a halt to the nuclear arms race. No comparable movement exists in the Soviet Union, a fact which is disturbing both to some supporters and to opponents of the Western peace movements.

The choice of the occasion to make the offer is interesting. In Western Europe, the Federal Republic of Germany has generally shown itself prepared to continue to keep talking to the Soviet Union. This is undoubtedly because West Germany knows that it would be in the middle of any clash between the Soviet Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. The announcement of the Soviet offer at a banquet given for the leader of East Germany is something of an acknowledgement of the position of East Germany as well. The Soviet offer is not without important difficulties, but these may be surmountable. The chief difficulty is that it is not clear whether the Soviet Union would destroy the weapons it removed, or simply reserve them elsewhere, or even deploy them against Asia. The other difficulty is that the Soviet Union insists on counting the nuclear weapons held by Britain and France as part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s arsenal. The British and French insist that these are independent deterrents. However, it should not be beyond the skill of negotiators to arrive at some formula over these weapons. At present the prospects are slightly brighter. Should the Geneva talks fail, both sides want the other side to receive the blame for failure. This is bound to lead to posturing from time to time. The latest offer should go some distance towards ensuring that the talks continue.