Wave of defections from Iran

Press, 30 December 1982, Page 10

Wave of defections from Iran

From

RALPH JOSEPH,

in Athens

A wave of defections and daring escapes from Iran over the past few months mark a growing sense of desperation in the country and fading hopes that life under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini x can improve in the near future or that the now commonplace street killings and executions will end.

A good number of defectors, including Iranian diplomats, airline crew members, sportsmen, and media personnel, have announced their affiliation to the National Resistance Council headed by former President, Abol Hassan BaniSadr, and Mujahideen-e-Khalq guerrilla chief, Massoud Rajavi.

the publicly-announced defections are just the tip of the iceberg. Hundreds have been fleeing Iran over difficult mountain tracks via Turkey and Pakistan, and have quietly sought political asylum in other countries, particularly the West. Others, fearing that to seek political asylum would endanger the security of their families still in Iran, have preferred to simply seek residence in other .countries, as unofficial refugees. One defector who recently made it out told this correspondent that, on average, about 50 people were crossing into Turkey from Iran every day. Opposition sources . in . Paris said that two former Ministers from the Cabinet of Mehdi Bazargan (Khomeini’s “provisional” Prime Minister in 1979) had also recently used that route to escape the. Khomeini regime. They named them as former Labour Ministers, Dariush Foruhar, and former Interior Minister, Hashem Sabbaghian. A more prominent member of the Bazargan Cabinet, former Foreign Minister, Ibrahim Yazdi, is said to have used the eastern route across

rebel Baluchi territory into Pakistan. From there he flew to Paris, stayed three or four days, and then went on to the United States, where he had earlier lived for several years. I spoke to several defectors. Those who were willing to talk about their escape have asked that their names not be disclosed. Some of them then described to me how it was done. After initial contacts in Tehran or another town in the interior, the person wishing to leave the country makes his way to a small town or village near the border between Iran and Turkey (or between Iran and Pakistan). He stays at a small hotel or private house there and waits for his guide to make contact.

When this happens, the terms are again discussed and the would-be defector is told of the dangers involved and also that he would have to walk perhaps six to eight .miles over difficult terrain.

“When we left,” one of the defectors said, “it was so dark, I . could not see where we were going, but the guides known the way.”

The guide, who may be a small-time Turkish, Kurdish, or Baluchi smuggler living in the area, will charge different fees from different people, depending on their means. “The price ranges from 30,000 tomans to 80,000 tomans ($lOOO to $2500 at the unofficial rate of exchange),” one informant said, “but the price keeps going up.”

However, another said the guides have been known to charge up to 300,000 tomans ($10,000) for a single family, “but sometimes they take people across free if they see that they can’t afford to pay, and know that their lives may be in danger if they turn back.” An Iran Air pilot, Mahmoud Namdar. who fled across the

border with his wife and two children, told reporters in Vienna later that he had paid $4500 to the guide, and had spent five days on the way, going partly on horseback and partly on foot.

One woman, a former official in' the Government, however, balked at making the dangerous trip .across rebel Baluchi territory into Pakistan. "I heard they (the guards) do very nasty things to women if they catch them.” Instead she took help from a member of the Tudeh (Communist) Party who happened to hold an influential position in the Government. He pulled strings and got her out on a legal passport. Ordinarily it is difficult for an Iranian to get a passport to leave. Another defector told me that the small-time smugglers can also arrange to buy an Iranian passport (probably forged) after the border is crossed, in case the defector does not already have one. “They also arrange to get you the Turkish (or Pakistani) ‘entry’ stamp on your passport, and often enough the passports are stamped before the crossing is made.” The informant suspected that the smugglers themselves were equipped with these stamps or were acquainted with others who had them.

“They will ask you for your passport before you leave, and then return with it in a day or two saying they have obtained the ‘entry’ stamp from the official checkpoint on the Turkish side of the border. Actually they probably stamp it themselves, but of course border officials may do it for a small sum.”

Those who get across to Turkey without getting the proper stamps on their passports, or who have no passports at all. may have to spend a few days in a Turkish jail, or are directed to a special refugee camp in Instan-

bul, where they must stay until their papers are set in order. “The Turkish Government does not allow them to stay in the country. They are made to leave as quickly as possible for another country.” Some of the defectors may receive travel documents and assistance from United Nations and International Red Cross offices in Instanbul, which may also arrange for political asylum in a third country. Officially, Turkey has friendly relations with Iran, and though the Government in Ankara turns a blind eye to most of these escapes through its territory, it will occasionally arrest some of those who have come across and hand them back to Iran. “Four Mujahideen-e-Khalq members were recently arrested and sent back,” one source said. “They were immediately executed.” On December 5, the Turkish Radio reported the arrest of seven members of the Fedayan Khalq guerrilla organisation “on charges of forging passports and taking people out of Iran illegally.” They were to be tried in a military court in Instanbul.

The possibility of arrest by the Turkish police is only one of the dangers involved. On the Iranian side there is always the danger of being spotted and arrested by revolutionary guards or gendarmes (rural police) in officially controlled territory. Beyond that, the would-be defector is in a lawless zone and at the mercy of the men taking them across, who are usually themselves on the criminal fringe. Some people are known to have been robbed at gunpoint along the way, “and it’s always possible the bandits are in cahoots with the smugglers who are taking you across.” Defectors carrying large sums of money or valuables become the most likely targets of attack by bandits.