Problems remain in spite of new rolls

Press, 14 December 1982, Page 24

Problems remain in spite of new rolls

Alan McRobie,

senior lecturer in social sciences at the

Christchurch Teachers’ College, reviews the effect of the new electoral rolls at last year’s General Election and identifies shortcomings that still remain.

The 1978 Genera] Election was, perhaps, best remembered for the chaotic state of the electoral rolls.

The legitimacy of the National Government, elected on November 25. 1978. was not seriously in doubt, but the large number of errors contained in the rolls (there were 465.000 names more than there were people of voting age), and the apparent inability of those responsible for preparing the rolls to get on top of the problem, resulted in undermining of confidence in the electoral process.'

Shortly after the election the Wicks Committee was established to examine the administration of the Electoral Act, a Parliamentary select committee (under the chairmanship of the member for Kaipara, Mr Peter Wilkinson) was set up to consider wider issues, and the Department of Justice set about the mammoth task of purging the rolls. As a result, a new electoral enrolment procedure was instituted, the central element of which was a total re-registra-tion of electors. During October, 1980, every elector whose name appeared on an electoral roll was mailed a registration card. By June, 1981, an estimated 95 per cent of those eligible to enrol had done so. When the rolls closed at the end of October just over two million people had enrolled.

During the enrolment exercise an advertising campaign was mounted to make electors aware of their obligation to enrol.

Pamphlets (some printed in several Pacific and Asian languages) detailing procedures for enrolling and casting a valid vote were published. In the six weeks before election day, a nation-wide voter information telephone service was established to answer electors’ questions. No effort was spared by the departments responsible for running the election to ensure that every qualified person was enrolled as an elector, and that all electors knew what steps to

follow to cast a valid vote. Just how successful was this campaign’ The Attorney-Gen-eral, Mr McLay. described the new rolls as “the most accurate and up-to-date ever," and in its post-election review of election procedures an Interdepartmental Committee of senior public servants stated that “the revised procedures affecting both enrolment and voting arrangements have fully demonstrated the effectiveness of these improvements. . . There has been little criticism to date of any facet of the process . .. .” Few complaints have been voiced about the accuracy of the electoral rolls used for the 1981 election. The intensive 15month campaign to establish new and clean rolls did much to restore public confidence, not only in the rolls themselves, but also in the electoral system as a whole. It is also noteworthy that turnout was significantly higher in 1981 than in 1978 — 89.3 per cent as against about 87 per cent after allowance has been made for the duplications present in the 1978 rolls. On this basis the exercise may well be regarded as having been very successful. In terms of cost-effective-ness, however, it must be seriously questioned. While there are some difficulties in identifying accurately the expenditure incurred in getting electors on to the roll, the amount expended on electoral enrolment during the three years between April 1, 1979, and March 31, 1982, was a staggering $16,074 million, or $7.90 for every registered elector. By way of contrast the cost of running the election itself was $4.14 million or $2.29 for every valid vote cast. An expenditure of this magnitude can, perhaps, be justified if it produces significantly better results than hitherto. But, as the official election returns show, this was not the case in 1981. Depite the intensive and lengthy enrolment campaign there were still 43,606 people who went to the trouble of going to a polling

place and casting a vote, only to have their votes disallowed because they were not enrolled. In 1978, 45,003 people were in this position; in 1975 the figure was 44,937 and in 1972 it was 36.302. Thus, despite the publicity exhorting every qualified elector to enrol, the overall response was no better in 1981 than it had been before the three previous elections. A comparison of the statistics for the 1972 and 1981 elections reinforces this conclusion (see table). 1972 has been chosen because this was the last time that fresh electoral rolls were prepared immediately prior to an election. Then, the normal practice was for a full-scale re-enrolment to be undertaken in a three-month period between the beginning of April and the end of June in an election year immediately following a redistribution of electoral boundaries. As the table shows, there is no significant difference in the percentages for each category of disallowed and special votes in each of these two elections. Although the number of special votes has risen slightly over the decade this appears, to have made no difference to any of the remaining categories. The rise of 3 per cent in the number of special votes allowed is attributable entirely to a marked improvement among voters registered on the Maori rolls where the proportion of special votes allowed has risen from 41.8 per cent to 70.2 per cent. In the general electorates the figure has remained constant at 76.6 per cent. Of particular note are the special votes which were disallowed. In both 1972 and 1981 the proportion of votes disallowed because the voter was not enrolled was just over 86 per cent. Of the remainder, those which were “not signed/ witnessed/no reason • stated/ miscellaneous” declined slightly in 1981 when compared with 1972, but this was due largely to the creation of another discrete sub-category, “arrived too late for inclusion.” It is worth noting, also, that the percentage of disallowed votes in the “not signed” category was well up on the 1978 figure — which suggested that the amended rules governing the validity of special votes

may have actually made it more difficult for an elector to cast a valid special vote. For example, some special votes cast in the Taupo electorate were disallowed because the persons taking them were not authorised to do so. They were disallowed even though the electors concerned may well have otherwise fulfilled every condition for the casting of a valid vote. In other words, they were discarded through no fault of the elector concerned! The new category, “arrived too late for inclusion." was introduced largely in response to concerns raised by John and Jane Ritchie following the 1978 election. The Ritchies had cast special votes in Fiji only to discover later that they had been disallowed because they had not reached the returning officer for the electorate within the time-frame set out in the Electoral Act. During its deliberations the Electoral Act Committee expressed concern at this kind of delay and it endorsed the steps taken by the Department of Justice and the Post Office to institute new, more efficient procedures. Nevertheless, despite the changes, 803 votes were disallowed in 1981 because they reached returning officers too late. In a number of instances the fault may have rested with the elector because he or she has the responsibility to ensure that the vote is delivered to a returning officer before the poll closes at 7 p.m. on election day. It is, however, very difficult to accept that the 115 votes disallowed in the Manawatu electorate because they arrived “too late" resulted from the failure of electors to deliver their votes to a returning officer on time. A more likely explanation is that a parcel of special votes destined for the Manawatu electorate’s returning officer was mislaid. If this was indeed the case, it is a clear instance of administrative incompetence resulting in votes being disallowed through no fault of the electors concerned. The inclusion of these 115 votes would have made no difference to the result in Manawatu, but this is not the point. Every elector who casts a valid vote is entitled to expect it to be counted. A deficiency of this magnitude in Taupo

(where the final majority was a mere 36) could well have been critical, not onlv for Taupo itself but also for the country as a whole. If public confidence in the electoral system is to be sustained. incidents such as this one must be avoided. An examination of the costs of preparing electoral rolls between 1970 and 1973 also supports the contention that the cost of roll preparation in 1980-81 was out of all proportion to the benefit gained. During the 1970-73 financial years $339,126 was expended on electoral registration — only one-twentieth of the amount spent between 1979 and 1981 even after increased costs of just under 240 per cent (based on the movements of the Consumer Price Index) between late 1972 and the end of 1981 are allowed for. Taken over all. the administration of the. 1981 election was very satisfactory and a big improvement on 1978. Nevertheless. there are a sufficient number of worrying features to suggest' that it was not an unqualified success. No electoral system is likely to be perfect, but if a society

holds the view that every qualified citizen has an equal right to have his or her vote counted as valid, the responsibility is placed fairly and squarely on the shoulders of the lawmakers and administrators to ensure that every vote cast which should be counted, is counted. Since enrolling as an elector is a duty (registration as an elector has been compulsory’ since 1924) it is incumbent upon the State to leave no stone unturned in the quest for a 100 per cent enrolment. Despite concerted efforts during 1980 and 1981. New Zealand did not achieve a 100 per cent registration of electors. Perhaps the time has arrived when New Zealand should take the next logical step and "freeze" the population shortly before the date of an election and carry out a re-registration of electors in much the same way as a census is taken. By adopting this procedure and applying it at a point in time when public interest in an approaching election is perceptibly quickening, many of the problems experienced in 1981 and earlier would be largely eliminated.

ANALYSIS OF AGGREGATE VOTE, 1972 - 1981 1972 1975 1978 1981 Category Valid Votes As %of Regd Electors 89.1 82.5 *87.4 89.0 As %of Turnout 97.1 95.5 97.2 97.3 Informal Votes As %of Valid Votes 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.5 Special Votes As %of Turnout 10.7 12.0 11.8 11.2 Special Votes Allowed: (As % of all Special Votes) 72.9 62.3 76.1 75.9 Special Votes Disallowed: (As % of Disallowed Votes) Not on Roll 86.2 58.9 . 91.9 86.8 Not signed/witnessed/no reason stated/miscellaneous 13.8 41.1 8.1 11.6 Arrived too late for inclusion — — — 1.6 “ The lower turnout in 1975 has ah element of roll error built into it (approximately 3 per cent). The base rolls for this election were prepared shortly before the 1972 election. (NB the breakdown of Special Votes disallowed in this election appears to have been determined in a somewhat different manner to the other elections.) * Based on an ‘implied enrolment’ of 1,967,527 at the time of the 1978 election. The calculations took population growth between 1976 and 1981 and the known enrolments of 1975 and 1981 into account. NOTE: Registered Electors are all persons enrolled on election day. Turnout comprises all persons who cast votes, even those whose votes were subsequently disallowed. Valid Votes are all votes made by persons entitled to vole by virtue of being registered, including those votes classified as ‘lnformal’.